Beyond solidarity: Sahel security needs regional strategy and support
Action rather than affirmations of support is key to tackling the terror threat in West Africa.
Recent attacks in central Sahel are evidence of the growing terror threat in West Africa. This demands more from the region’s states and partners than declarations of solidarity with those affected. Security cooperation is urgently needed with Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger – the three countries of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES).
Extremist and rebel alliances
On 25 April, the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the separatist Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) launched coordinated attacks on several cities in northern, central and southern Mali. This was the most ambitious operation by the armed groups since the outbreak of the Malian security crisis in 2012. Defence Minister Sadio Camara was killed and insurgents seized the northern towns of Kidal and Tessalit.
On 4 July, the FLA-JNIM coalition replicated its synchronised offensive in six regions of the country. Although the Malian Armed Forces contained most of the attacks, the insurgents seized part of Anéfis in the north, prompting the force and its Russian partner, Africa Corps, to entrench themselves in their military base. After six days of intense fighting, the two suppressed the offensive and retook Anéfis. The events suggest that the FLA-JNIM alliance is part of a more structured operational complementarity. The two groups pool their in-depth knowledge of the field and their local networks.
Armed groups are challenging Sahelian states’ authority and possibly creating conditions for their overthrow
FLA is more active in the north, while JNIM brings its experience in asymmetric warfare to the central, western and southern regions. The two also conduct complex, coordinated operations, such as on 1 July last year, when seven simultaneous attacks took place in the west of the country. At the same time, they targeted the economic corridors leading to Bamako to block or disrupt commercial traffic.
A gradual erosion of state authority
While the FLA-JNIM coalition is disrupting security in Mali, bold, collective attacks are also unfolding in the other two AES countries. On 30 June, Burkina Faso’s armed forces announced that they had thwarted ‘complex and coordinated’ attacks by terrorist groups in the east and north of the country.
In Niger, the army repelled two attacks against Niamey’s Diori Hamani International Airport. The first, on 28 January this year, was claimed by Islamic State Sahel Province and the second, on 18 June, by JNIM. Rising numbers of collaborative operations on several fronts, targeting of strategic infrastructure, use of more sophisticated technologies (particularly commercial drones) and assassinations of leaders have reconfigured the terror threat.
By showing governments' inability to protect their people, the armed groups are challenging the foundations of Sahelian states’ authority and possibly creating conditions for their overthrow. While a jihadist group is unlikely to take over a government in the short term, the risk cannot be ruled out. Such a scenario would have major consequences not only for the Sahel but for West Africa and beyond.
Beyond solidarity
The gradual expansion of armed groups into coastal countries, particularly northern Benin and Togo, with JNIM’s disruptions of trade corridors, indicates a risk of regionalised terrorism. Repercussions could extend from security to trade flows and international interests.
The AU has strengthened its engagement with AES states and has a diplomatic window to broker dialogue
The April attacks in Mali sparked a wave of official statements of support. Neighbouring states including Senegal, Mauritania, Algeria, Morocco and Benin condemned the incidents and reaffirmed their support for Mali. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU) also denounced the violence and called for action. Beyond Africa, the European Union, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia voiced their concern and stressed their support for Mali’s authorities.
The AU has, however, emerged as the main institutional source of support. It was the only organisation that decried the 4 July attacks in Mali and those in January and June in Niger. Algeria, which enjoys good relations with Niger, was the only neighbouring country to express its ‘deep indignation’ and full solidarity with the Nigerien government and people.
While these sentiments are encouraging, they should be accompanied by more meaningful engagement. Diplomatic developments could assist . These include the recent rapprochement between Mali and Algeria and between Niger and Benin. Senegal has positive relations with the AES countries and could use its presidency of ECOWAS and its role as chair of the ECOWAS Commission to enhance security cooperation. Constructive engagements by Togo and Ghana with the central Sahel states are also significant, as is strengthening dialogue between the AU Commission and AES members.
Towards a regionalised response
At least two actions should be prioritised. First, military coordination and intelligence-sharing mechanisms between security officers would address the management of border incidents and cross-border threats, while reducing the risk of diplomatic crises. Secondly, the AU, which recently strengthened its engagement with AES countries, has a diplomatic window to broker dialogue. In an environment characterised by fragmented traditional cooperation frameworks, the AU remains a credible platform to maintain dialogue with all states, preserving a continental perspective on peace and security challenges and supporting African-led cooperation.
Preventing the Sahel from reaching a security tipping point is vital to preserving West Africa’s stability
The AU could rely on its strategic instrument, the African Union Mission for Mali and the Sahel, established in 2013, to play this political role more effectively. This would require bolstering the mission's mandate and enhancing its human, financial and operational capacities to ensure they are commensurate with its evolving political responsibilities.
The AU could seek support for regional peace initiatives from the United Nations under Resolution 2719, which authorises financing of peace support operations in Africa. Better relations between Bamako and Algiers may also revitalise the Nouakchott Process, a cooperation mechanism founded in 2013 to combat terrorism. The process brings together Algeria, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Chad and Senegal, but could be expanded to include Togo, Ghana and Benin. Preventing the Sahel from reaching a security tipping point is imperative for preserving stability across West Africa.
