What does Trump’s likely Africa team say about policy direction?
While the incoming US President is expected to be tough on SA, his wider Africa policy is less clear.
United States (US) President Donald Trump’s likely Africa team is not looking favourable to South Africa. How it might impact the rest of the continent though, is more ambiguous.
There is broad consensus among Washington insiders that Trump will tap Peter Pham as his assistant secretary of state for Africa – the top diplomat tasked with running policy for sub-Saharan Africa. Pham, a seasoned scholar on Africa, served twice during the first Trump administration – as Special Envoy for the Great Lakes and then for the Sahel.
In a November 2024 opinion piece about Trump’s likely Africa policy, Pham said Trump expected reciprocity beyond trade. He said one of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) eligibility criteria was that would-be beneficiaries did ‘not engage in activities that undermine United States national security or foreign policy interests.’
Pham said outgoing president Joe Biden’s administration overlooked that with South Africa, ‘the biggest beneficiary of AGOA and several other American programmes, notwithstanding the country’s closeness to Russia, China and Iran, and its role in leading the “genocide” case against Israel at the International Court of Justice.’
Pham noted that all three national security team members nominated by Trump had raised concerns about ‘Pretoria’s positioning itself in the orbit of Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran as well as its antisemitic antics.’ (The three were Senator Marco Rubio – secretary of state, Michael Waltz – national security adviser, and Elise Stefanik – UN ambassador.)
All three national security team members nominated by Trump have raised concerns about SA’s positioning
Washington sources also forecast that Trump will nominate Joe Foltz, Staff Director for the Republican side of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, to lead the National Security Council’s Africa desk.
Foltz worked in the outgoing Congress with Representative John James. James introduced legislation demanding the Biden administration conduct a comprehensive review of US relations with South Africa, including its AGOA privileges, because of its Russia, China and Iran connections and hostility towards Israel.
So South Africa’s new US Ambassador Ebrahim Rasool faces a tough task, keeping South Africa in AGOA and in America’s reasonably good books. He has already taken some preemptive action, telling Daily Maverick that South Africa should ‘put away the megaphone’ on Gaza.
Rasool also believes Pretoria and Trump are basically ‘in alignment’ on Russia’s war against Ukraine because both share a ‘healthy disrespect for [the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)]’ and oppose the Biden administration’s imperative that NATO should ‘surround Russia.’
A Washington trade expert told ISS Today that the trade tariffs Trump had threatened could have a bigger impact on South Africa even than potentially losing AGOA.
But what about US relations with the rest of Africa? Arguably, the threat Russia poses to US interests is more concrete in several countries besides South Africa. Russia is spreading its influence in the Sahel and displacing the US and France there and elsewhere, partly by deploying troops under Wagner/Africa Corps.
Arguably, the threat posed by Russia to US interests is more concrete in several countries besides SA
China, too continues to gain influence and tighten its grip on critical minerals vital for the green economy. Pham is rather enigmatic on how a Trump administration (widely expected to be isolationist) might handle this ‘increasing competition with revisionist powers like China, Russia, Iran – all three of which have ramped up African entanglements over the last four years.’
In the opinion piece, Pham suggested only that, ‘African regimes nowadays have multiple options to choose from’ and that ‘where it makes strategic sense to engage, [the US] must be prepared to offer a better value proposition than America’s rivals.’
He insisted, though, that tackling security challenges was ‘not at cross purposes with … Trump’s determination to avoid new wars and open-ended commitments to counter-insurgency operations or nation-building exercises.’
Pham notes that in his first term, Trump assessed that Somalia’s government was not a capable local partner and no vital US interests were at stake, so withdrew US forces from the country. Biden returned them, but Pham suggests this will be revisited.
And would Trump also handle Sudan, Africa’s greatest current humanitarian crisis, differently to Biden?
Senator Jim Risch, recently elected Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair, blasted the Biden administration on 7 January for only now imposing sanctions on the Rapid Support Forces and its leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo, for alleged genocide in Darfur. New House Foreign Relations Committee Chairperson Brian Mast echoed these sentiments, and Pham reposted them with obvious approval.
Yet in his first term, Trump lifted sanctions on Sudan in exchange for Khartoum recognising Israel as part of Trump’s wider Abraham Accords, which persuaded several Arab countries to accept the state of Israel.
This sort of deal prompted observers to label Trump’s foreign actions as transactional and unpredictable – a feature that could complicate his efforts to pursue a consistent and effective security policy in Africa.
Trump’s unpredictable foreign actions could complicate efforts to pursue an effective security policy
Trump will be on surer ground economically, with Pham making clear that the incoming president will focus on commerce rather than aid. This will include continuing Biden’s major US investment in the Lobito Corridor, the rail link that intends to ensure critical minerals from Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo flow west and not east to China.
Pham also indicated that the Trump administration would resuscitate negotiations for a free trade agreement with Kenya, which he chastised the Biden administration for dropping. He suggested Kenya would become an even more important US ally, citing Trump’s belief that ‘America’s partners should be capable … and bring something to the table.’ Kenya would bring its importance as a regional economic hub and partner in fighting terrorism.
Other important relations, like those with Nigeria, remain unclear. Still, Anthony Carroll, a Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Non-resident Scholar, remains upbeat. ‘If the past is prologue, the first Trump administration’s policies on Africa were mostly favourable,’ he told ISS Today.
‘Global health initiatives such as [the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief - PEPFAR] were not defunded, economic and commercial engagement was favoured over social programming and there was mature and coherent leadership in the Africa Bureau.’
But a former US official who requested anonymity, is not so sure, believing, ‘Trump 2.0 will be very different from Trump 1.0,’ with even more focus on strategic competition with global powers – and even less focus on human rights, humanitarian aid and the environment.
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