UN Resolution 2036 Another Attempt at Peace in Somalia

Whether the latest UN Security Council Resolution on Somalia, which provides for, amongst others, a stronger Amisom, will help change the Somalia situation , lies in the ongoing complementary political process, the state of war-weariness on the streets , and the overall realisation that there is the need to involve Somalis in the quest for peace in the country.

Published on 01 March 2012 in ISS Today

Tsegaye D. Baffa, Senior Researcher, Conflict Management and Peacebuilding Division, ISS Nairobi

On 22 February 2012, the United Nations (UN) Security Council adopted a resolution (SCR 2036) that expands the capacity and mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia (Amisom) in an effort to intensify pressure on Al-Qaida linked Al-Shabaab militants. The Resolution authorises an increase in the Amisom force from 12000 to 17000, allows for an expansion of the UN support package for the mission, expands AMISOM’s presence and operations beyond Mogadishu, and empowers the mission to take all necessary measures, as appropriate, to reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab. It also incorporates the Kenyan troops involved in a military operation in Somalia into Amisom.

The adoption of the Resolution was welcomed by delegates to the London Conference on Somalia, held last week and has generally been praised by the international community. However, whether this move can guarantee any significant improvement in the complex situation and the realization of peace in Somalia remains debatable. The resolution appears to have been informed by a thinking that increasing the military pressure on Al-Shabaab will lead to an improvement in peace and security in the country and further decrease the space available to them. However, whereas this might hold true in theory, the more than two decades of conflict in Somalia does not support that assumption. Instead, the Somali case shows that military intervention in Somalia is hugely unpopular and can act as a catalyst to whip up Somali nationalism to unite Somali groups that had, hitherto, been sworn enemies.

The first of such foreign military interventions in Somalia was by the United States, a year after the ousting of Siad Barre’s government in 1991. After two years in Somalia, the US troops withdrew without any significant impact in the realization of peace amidst increasing hostility and opposition from the Somali public and armed groups. The Americans, shocked by the spectacle of the killing and dragging of US soldiers through the streets amidst cheers from a section of the Somali public, withdrew and abandoned the country to its fate.

A second case was that of Ethiopia’s incursion into Somalia in 2006 in support of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) against the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). Predictably, many locals took the intervention as an invasion. Even though the move by Ethiopia contributed to averting the UIC’s possible take-over of power from the TFG, the initiative is, to date, blamed for contributing immensely towards the emergence of the now al-Qaida linked group Al-Shabaab.

At the moment, Somalia is still hosting AMISOM - an AU force which was formed to replace the Ethiopian troops and has been in the country since 2007. In stepped  Kenya. Upon the launch of operation Linda Nchi by the Kenyan military in October 2011, the Eastern African country has also been drawn into the quagmire of the quest for peace in Somalia through the military solution and will be joining AMISOM to continue the struggle.

The above narrative of military involvement and experiences in Somalia shows that external military intervention has not significantly contributed towards state building and realization of peace in the country. On the contrary, it has always either complicated issues or exacerbated the situation, as was the case with the circumstances surrounding the emergence of Al-Shabaab. In such circumstance, the implementation of the Resolution is set to confront numerous challenges.

First, Al-Shabaab has significant support in Somalia in certain areas and still controls a large part of the south-central region of the country. The group has also been able to embrace members of different clans.  Therefore, an offensive against it has the potential of fomenting dislike among some section of Somalis and may be capable of whipping up nationalists sentiments in favour of the Al-Shabaab.

Secondly, the SCR 2036 authorizes Amisom to take all necessary measures as appropriate to reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab in its areas of operations, in conjunction with Somali security forces.  This may imply that during implementation, leaders and members of Al-Shabaab are to be identified and incapacitated. The members of Al-Shabaab are, however, not easy to be differentiated, isolated and destroyed given their largely clandestine and complex nature, as well as the fluid context within which they exhibit their guerrilla tactics. This applies particularly their ability to dissolve into the civilian population as a way of camouflaging their operations.

Thirdly, some form of force may be needed to fully implement the resolution. This is in the areas of intercepting, and investigating existing complex relationships and affiliations of suspected Somalis. An individual Somali who may not necessarily be a core member of Al-Shabaab could be indirectly affiliated to the group owing to the relationship he or she has with family members or blood relations directly involved with the group. This compounded by the fact that many Somalis attach great importance to such social ties. These do not only make the isolation of the Al-Shabaab difficult, but also expose the Amisom to public hostility.

Overall, it can be argued that the SCR 2036 is a new resolution based on old assumptions. Despite the noticeable changes in regional and local dynamics and the accruing experiences and lessons, the Resolution is based on the same concept of militarism in the affairs of Somalia, which has had mixed results in the more than two decades of the conflict in the country.