Global uncertainty calls for an overhaul of AU peace support operations
US and likely European funding cuts call for peacekeeping that is focused, fast and modest in its ambition.
Published on 07 May 2025 in
ISS Today
By
Paul-Simon Handy
Regional Director East Africa and Representative to the African Union, ISS Addis Ababa
The United States (US) intends to significantly reduce its contributions to the United Nations (UN), including a complete withdrawal of funding for peacekeeping operations, according to a recent Washington Post report.
The decision must still be formalised by the State Department and approved by Congress, but it’s an ominous sign of what may lie ahead for both UN and African Union-led peace support operations (PSOs). This includes the new AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), which already faces major funding uncertainties.
While the European Union (EU) is still committed to multilateralism, its growing focus on the war in Ukraine may lead to a decline in assistance for PSOs in Africa and elsewhere.
The changing multilateral context and resource constraints require innovative thinking from the AU and its member states. Not only are PSOs beyond the financial capabilities of African countries and regional organisations, but traditional partners are growing reluctant to fund an instrument that struggles to demonstrate its efficiency.
Peace support operations are beyond the financial capabilities of African countries and regional organisations
In recent years, laudable efforts have been made to meet the AU Peace Fund’s endowment target of US$400 million, but using the income for PSOs such as AUSSOM would deplete it. Despite some Western partners committing to support the Peace Fund once it starts financing AU-led operations, the sheer number of conflict hotspots across Africa casts doubt about the sustainability of that option.
Reimagining PSOs – particularly their conflict management role – starts with acknowledging that they are just a means to an end, namely the peaceful resolution of violent conflicts, as articulated in the AU’s normative frameworks. Peace missions are not meant to last for decades.
As often reiterated since the 2015 UN High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations report, peacekeeping should be informed by a political strategy grounded in a measured understanding of what these operations can realistically achieve. To improve future funding prospects, peacekeeping should focus on visible impact and realistic results.
AU-led missions can, for example, help stabilise conflict environments and create the conditions for political dialogue. They can also support the implementation of political agreements.
One of the most important lessons of multidimensional peace operations is that the instrument is not fit for long-term endeavours such as state building or fostering societal cohesion. These are inherently endogenous processes. Clarity of purpose and modest ambition must become the guiding principles of a redefined peace support model.
This new model should blend various existing approaches, guided by the spirit of the Powell Doctrine. In a 1984 speech on the use of military power, then US Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger set out criteria that would inform what is today known as the Powell Doctrine, named after late Chief of Joint Staff General Colin Powell.
These criteria included a clearly defined vital interest, a firm intention to win, proportionality between objectives and military means, support from the public and Congress, and the use of force as a last resort.
Peace operations are not fit for long-term endeavours such as state building or fostering societal cohesion
In the context of African PSOs, the new model could rest on four key principles: clear and limited mandates, time-bound deployment, selective criteria for troop-contributing countries, and multidisciplinary deployments.
First, it is vital to have political and military clarity on the mission’s objectives. The scope of the mandate should be limited to a maximum of three core objectives, primarily within the political and security domains.
Second, each mission should be subject to a clearly defined and non-renewable timeframe. This is essential to avoid the risks of institutional inertia that often arise in protracted deployments.
Third, the AU should consider adopting a middle-ground position between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s framework nations concept and the current AU lead-nation approach. It is important that capable African countries be given more responsibilities in leading missions, supported by no more than two additional contributing countries.
This streamlined approach would help address some of the persistent command and control challenges that often undermine the effectiveness of AU-led missions, including AUSSOM. Also, states sharing a border with crisis-affected countries should be excluded from participating in the operation to avoid conflicts of interest and safeguard the mission’s credibility and neutrality.
The fourth principle is to avoid an overly militarised approach to peace operations. Many security challenges – such as protecting civilians – require police-led rather than military responses. Future missions should be genuinely multidisciplinary, demand-driven and tailored to the needs of each situation.
Prolonged peace missions often result from the failure of stakeholders to develop political solutions
A reimagined PSO model should be based on the rationale of acting swiftly, forcefully if necessary, and withdrawing as soon as conditions permit – leaving the space for a sustainable political process.
Strengthening the political dimension of these operations is vital. Prolonged peacekeeping missions often result from the failure of internal and external stakeholders to develop political solutions that would render peacekeeping unnecessary.
The AU’s main value lies in its political and diplomatic legitimacy. That means it should enhance the capacity of its political units and diplomatic instruments both within and beyond PSOs.
While the AU Peace and Security Council’s primary function should be to prevent conflicts from breaking out, it could help manage conflicts by developing accountability instruments such as a sanctions regime. Along with robust procedures for adopting and enforcing sanctions, this could pressure conflict parties towards dialogue and compliance with agreed frameworks.
However, member states’ resistance to sanctions remains strong despite the looming risk of another postponement of the ‘Silencing the Guns by 2030’ goal, which would significantly damage the AU’s credibility.
Substantial normative shifts are needed across the crisis management cycle of the AU and UN. Rather than just a facelift, this requires a complete rethink that reflects the ongoing transformation of the international order.
A thorough overhaul of the African PSO concept is vital to reinvigorating the AU’s Peace and Security Architecture and resolving the continent’s enduring instability.
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