Special Presidential Pardons Undermine Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa
President Jacob Zuma is currently considering the applications of 149 perpetrators who have applied for `special pardon`, without sufficient disclosure. This would undermine the social contract that informed South Africa’s transition to democracy and entrench impunity.
Chandre Gould, Senior Researcher, ISS Pretoria office and Howard Varney, Senior Programme Advisor, International Center for Transitional Justice
South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma is currently considering the
applications of 149 perpetrators who have been recommended for ‘special pardon’
under a deeply flawed process that began in 2007. This process was meant to ‘complete
the unfinished business of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)’ and
comply with its principles and values. However, the special pardons process
undermines rather than complements the TRC and in particular it significantly
dilutes the TRC’s amnesty process. While the TRC placed specific emphasis on
full disclosure, the special pardons process places no premium on the truth.
As a result of many serious procedural flaws the special pardons process has
been irrevocably tainted. Initially the state blanketed the process in a veil
of secrecy, which forced civil society groups to turn to the courts to impose
openness. If the TRC’s criteria for amnesty had been consistently applied few
of the pardon applicants would have qualified on the basis of full disclosure
or the showing of a political objective.
South Africa’s TRC is considered internationally as an example of a
successful transitional justice process. Yet the integrity of the difficult
bargain that gave rise to the TRC has been repeatedly undermined and betrayed
by strenuous efforts of the state to let perpetrators of human rights
violations off the hook.
In the bargain that gave birth to the TRC, the apartheid government, the
liberation movements (the ANC and PAC) and other parties agreed that those who
had been responsible for ‘gross’ human rights violations would receive amnesty
in exchange for truthfully revealing the details of their involvement. Only
those who made a full disclosure of the specific and contextual details of the
incidents, and who were politically motivated in committing the violations,
were to qualify for amnesty.
For many anti-apartheid activists the bargain was bitter, not least because
the actions of liberation movements were to be evaluated on the same basis as
the actions of the apartheid state. But this social contract offered a way to move
forward and, more importantly, it was believed that exchanging information for
freedom from prosecution was the only way in which crucial details about the
past would be revealed. A cut-off date of 6 December 1993 was agreed upon and
extended to 10 May 1994. Any acts of violence committed after this date would
not entitle the perpetrators to apply for amnesty.
There was logic behind the decision to set the cut-off date to shortly after
South Africa’s first democratic election. The ANC, PAC and all other
anti-apartheid organisations were unbanned in the early 1990s and the process
to negotiate a democratic future began in earnest soon after. Moreover, there
could be no justification for politically motivated acts of violence in a
constitutional democracy that upholds the freedoms of assembly, association, expression
and the right to campaign for a political cause.
Since the winding up of the TRC, the state has failed to live up its
obligations in respect of victims. Reparations were never comprehensively made and
few serious attempts have been made to prosecute perpetrators who either failed
to apply for amnesty or who were refused amnesty.
Honouring the social contract that underpinned the TRC has not been at the
top of the current government’s agenda or indeed that of any previous
government. Since the closure of the TRC considerable efforts have been made to
virtually guarantee impunity for apartheid-era offenders. The National
Prosecuting Authority even amended its prosecution policy in 2005 to include
the TRC’s amnesty criteria for purposes of declining to prosecute. This
bizarre policy was struck down by the Pretoria High Court.
In the latest effort, presidential pardons for so-called political offenders
may be secured without any need for full disclosure. Essentially all that is
required is for an offender to secure the endorsement of a political party.
This special pardons process even goes so far as to forgive apparent political
crimes committed as late as July 1999. Most of the 149 cases recommended
for pardon took place well after 1994.
The current situation is the culmination of a long process that started ten
years ago.
In 2002 President Thabo Mbeki pardoned 33 prisoners who had allegedly
committed acts of political violence on behalf of the ANC and PAC. According to
the Department of Justice, a number of those pardoned were previously refused amnesty
by the TRC. The victims (or their families) in these cases were not informed or
given an opportunity to respond.
A year later, the IFP assisted 384 prisoners to apply for presidential
pardon. These applications were ignored for several years and the IFP took
their complaint to the courts. In an apparent attempt to deal with these
developments the then Minister of Justice, Brigitte Mabandla, said that a
solution was needed for those political offenders who may not have known about
the TRC’s amnesty process, or whose political parties opposed the TRC (such as
the IFP).
In 2007 Mbeki established a special reference group made up of representatives
of all political parties to consider the applications for presidential pardon.
The process was secret. The applicants included former Minister of Police Adriaan
Vlok and former police Commissioner General Johan van der Merwe, as well as a
large number of offenders whose crimes ranged from serial murder and armed
robbery to race crimes.
Victim groups had to approach the High Court to stop the President from
granting pardons without consulting victims and interested
parties. Surprisingly, Zuma joined members of the far-right AWB, who were
convicted of brutal race crimes, in an ultimately futile appeal to the
Constitutional Court.
Following the ruling of the Constitutional Court in 2010 that victims had a
right to be consulted, the Department of Justice at first refused to disclose
the application forms of the pardon applicants. When the forms were
disclosed in January this year it became clear why the government was so
reluctant to release them: in key cases little or no truth was disclosed.
In several other cases, such as those in the ‘fundraising category’, which
includes robberies and cash heists, the claimed political objectives were
clearly fabricated.
Victim groups have warned Zuma that any pardon issued on the back of such a
flawed process would be irrational and in violation of the rule of law.
This special pardons process undermines the TRC
process, entrenches impunity, and is enormously disrespectful of victims and
the people of South Africa. It also raises very serious questions as to why
South Africa’s political leaders seem so intent on serving the interests of the
perpetrators of political violence well into our constitutional democracy.