South Africa's Decision to go Nuclear Tests Democratic Policy Making
Given the unfolding Japanese nuclear plant disaster, the South African government's decision to go nuclear is poorly timed. This article grapples with some of the major shortcomings in the energy policy making process.
Trusha Reddy, Senior Researcher, Corruption & Governance, ISS Cape Town Office
In the midst of the Japanese nuclear plant disaster last month, the South African cabinet made an endorsement of a 20-year electricity plan for the country with a significant amount of nuclear energy in it. At the same time Germany issued a three-month moratorium on the use of nuclear energy. The German Green Party has conducted a long-standing campaign against nuclear energy in that country. In fact, their victory in state elections has much to do with the timing of the disaster, swinging voters on a key issue of national debate. The glib attitude of the SA government is startling by contrast. But the reaction is also revealing of the nature of policy making in the country.
To be clear, the fallout from the Fukushima nuclear meltdown in Japan is still far from over. The Japanese were forced to shut down four of the six reactors and food, water, milk and surrounding seawater have tested positive for radiation. As a result, thousands of people within a 30km radius of the plants were evacuated and other countries as far flung as Scotland have already registered small amounts of radiation. The Japanese have now raised the severity rating of the crisis to the highest of seven, matching that of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster.
Given this context, there are a few vexing issues regarding the nuclear policy decision taken in the country, the most obvious of which is the timing of the announcement. With the Japanese crisis unfolding, local public fears were mounting about Koeberg - the only nuclear plant on the African continent, situated in the heart of Cape Town - which only last year raised the alarm about 91 workers exposed to excess radiation. It was expected that statements from the SA government and the SA National Nuclear Regulator (NNR) would go to allaying these fears. Instead the opposite happened: a shock government announcement that it would be building a fleet of nuclear power stations amounting to 9600GW or 23% of electricity supply. The only official comment was from the SA state’s electricity utility, Eskom’s spokesperson Tony Stott, stating that:
‘Nuclear power is certainly complex... It requires management depending on the level of risk, but the level of risk in nuclear is low. Clearly we would be looking at what actually happened in Japan... but South Africa has a nuclear safety culture because of Koeberg station.’ You will also find some vague information on the internet relating to daily reports by the SA Director-General of Foreign Affairs on his recent visit to Japan. While these efforts do show some attempt at understanding the situation, it is highly unlikely that a full assessment of the damage caused and possible risks that we may be faced with locally could have been made at the time. It therefore appears that the SA government is unresponsive to both international realities and local sentiments. With the local government elections coming up in May, this kind of absence of context in policy making raises questions as to the value that is placed on public perception about key health and safety issues. It is also a wonder why the SA government would make such outright contentious statements so close to an election.
On the other hand, the government does not seem immune to the influence of particular group interests. SA President Jacob Zuma and Energy Minister Dipuo Peters visited France during the Japanese crisis to talk about securing a nuclear deal with them. The announcement to go nuclear came shortly after that visit and it is speculated that an agreement was signed. The relationship with France has a longer history, with the CEO of French nuclear company Areva sitting on the SA presidential advisory panel for international investment. David Fig, a local environmental researcher, states that the failure to curb the special pleading of the local and international nuclear industries has meant that the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) project was allowed to proceed without proper controls and accountability. In his ISS publication on the governance of the PBMR Fig writes that the project failed and the government was eventually forced to shut it down last year, but only after nine years and consuming R10 billion (US$1,46 million) of taxpayers’ money.
The electricity policy planning or Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) process has also been tainted by the influence of industrial lobbyists who were appointed by the Department of Energy to a special advisory committee. This so-called ‘technical task team’, who were mandated to develop the policy, operated in secret and to the exclusion of civil society and broader community representation. A civil society analysis published on the IRP process towards the end of last year showed that out of a sample of 265 issues that were raised from civil society, 61% received no response from the Department, 8% were ‘noted’, and 10% were responded to substantively but the issues were excluded from the draft document. Only 16% of issues were included and substantively commented on. The comments on nuclear accident risks were ‘noted’ with an allusion to different technology options being considered. However, the final document does not show any scenarios without nuclear energy in it. The policy option of a full nuclear fleet that was ultimately chosen was justified by the arguments of ‘security of supply in the event of a peak oil-type increase in fuel prices and (to) ensure that sufficient dispatchable base-load capacity is constructed to meet demand in peak hours each year’. Issues of risk were omitted from this explanation, as were those related to cost even though the staggering nuclear energy costs will crowd out investment in cleaner, safer energy sources such as renewable energy. Another worrying issue in the process concerns the violation of the National Economic Development and Labour Council’s (Nedlac) request on nuclear. ‘Constituencies agreed to have a proper and focused national stakeholder debate on nuclear in 2011, prior to a decision being taken to include nuclear in the energy mix.’
In order for policy processes to be regarded as administratively fair they need to be accountable, responsive, open and transparent. The decision taken on nuclear energy in the IRP has shown up considerable deficits in the process. The SA government has elected to run a public education campaign on nuclear energy. This is not only premature, but also undemocratic and inadequate. The main job ahead is to restore integrity to the process by committing to public hearings and the Nedlac decision and trust amongst a nuclear-edgy public.
