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South Africa’s G20 presidency faces mounting pressure

The challenge isn’t just defending Africa’s interests but managing a G20 in which one of its most powerful members is actively disengaged.

When South Africa hosts the G20 summit this year, it will be the first time the gathering takes place on African soil. This milestone comes at a time of geopolitical flux, amplifying questions about Pretoria’s ability to navigate global fault lines, particularly with the return of US President Donald Trump.

Can South Africa seize this moment to shape the agenda or will its G20 presidency be overwhelmed by domestic fragilities, regional tensions and global power shifts?

To be sure, hosting the G20 in the first year of a Trump 2.0 presidency would be a challenge for any country. However, South Africa faces a tougher test that will push its diplomatic machinery to the limit.

Whether the country can truly represent Africa’s interests at the G20 is an open question. While Pretoria played a pivotal role in continental coordination during the COVID-19 pandemic and led the 2023 Ukraine-Russia peace mission, today’s landscape is more complex.

Although the African Union’s (AU) G20 admission in 2023 means South Africa no longer solely represents the continent, its influence remains distinct as a founding G20 member. Yet, South Africa’s aspiration to be Africa’s voice is complicated by strained ties with key regional players, including Nigeria, Morocco and Rwanda.

Tensions with Rwanda have again flared over the deteriorating security situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), with Pretoria and Kigali essentially backing opposing sides. Rwandan President Paul Kagame’s brazen public criticism of South African President Cyril Ramaphosa damages Pretoria’s credibility in continental diplomacy.

SA’s aspiration to be Africa’s voice is complicated by tensions with Nigeria, Morocco and Rwanda

Morocco is another important challenge. South Africa’s longstanding support for the Sahrawi cause has put it at odds with Rabat, but this is no longer a bilateral dispute. As Morocco strengthens its alignment with the United States (US) and key European countries, South Africa’s influence in continental affairs appears to be weakening.

The role of Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law, in brokering the Abraham Accords has further cemented Rabat’s geopolitical standing. The agreement saw Morocco normalise ties with Israel in exchange for US recognition of its sovereignty over Western Sahara. This rivalry is increasingly playing out in regional and multilateral institutions too.

Nigeria presents a different but equally pressing dilemma, despite recent improvements in bilateral relations. While both nations have historically jostled for influence as Africa’s largest economies, shifting global alignments could exacerbate tensions. Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy and his family’s business connections to Nigeria, suggest that US-Nigeria ties may deepen in ways that further challenge South Africa’s role.

Nigeria’s strategic position in counter-terrorism efforts in the Sahel also makes it an indispensable security partner for the US. If Washington prioritises bilateral ties with Abuja over broader African engagement, South Africa could be increasingly isolated in continental decision making.

While these tensions aren’t new, they are now magnified – particularly under a second Trump administration. These divisions will also frustrate continental integration, particularly under the African Continental Free Trade Area.

South Africa must navigate these strained bilateral relations alongside other foreign policy challenges, such as its stance on the Russia-Ukraine conflict and its legal actions against Israel in relation to Gaza.

Trump’s adversarial stance towards South Africa adds to Pretoria’s challenge as G20 president. South Africa’s International Court of Justice case against Israel had already put it on a collision course with Washington in 2024, with potential repercussions for trade agreements like the African Growth and Opportunity Act.

Then last week US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said he would be skipping the G20 foreign ministers’ meetings from 20-21 February due to Pretoria’s ‘anti-American’ stance. This raises the question of whether Trump will attend November’s G20 Heads of State summit, where South Africa is meant to hand over the presidency to the US for 2026.

The G20 foreign ministers’ meetings will serve as a bellwether for SA’s ability to navigate competing interests

South Africa may face an unprecedented scenario: a G20 presidency where the US presence is diminished, combative or entirely absent. While previous G20 presidencies under India, Indonesia and Brazil also had to balance domestic and global priorities, none had to navigate a fractured multilateral order under a Trump presidency.

The challenge is not just defending Africa’s interests but managing a G20 in which one of its most powerful members is actively disengaged.

A crucial aspect of South Africa’s G20 presidency is whether it has the personnel to manage these complexities. Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Ronald Lamola, who will represent Pretoria at key diplomatic engagements, faces a baptism of fire.

His limited foreign policy experience combined with the gravity of the situation make this a litmus test of his negotiating skills. Indeed, his ability to forge consensus amid deepening global divisions will be a defining test of South Africa’s G20 presidency.

The timing could not be more awkward. South Africa has been at pains to bolster its reputation as a trusted middle power and maximise the G20’s role as a bridge between the G7 and BRICS+ nations for global consensus building.

The country aims to build on its successful hosting of the 2023 BRICS Summit, which delivered an expansion of the bloc – a major foreign policy win for South Africa. For Ramaphosa, this G20 summit is a signature event. As the organisation’s first African president, he will be eager to leave a lasting legacy.

Under Trump’s second term, the rules-based order may not just be broken – it may cease to exist entirely

As South African Institute of International Affairs Chief Executive Elizabeth Sidiropoulos recently noted, the question isn’t whether South Africa will push an ambitious global south agenda, but whether it has the diplomatic skill to deliver meaningful outcomes. The upcoming foreign ministers’ meetings will serve as a bellwether for South Africa’s ability to navigate competing interests within the G20.

Pretoria’s ability to focus on the G20 is also hampered by domestic challenges of maintaining adequate electricity and water supply, unemployment and fiscal constraints. Under the new Government of National Unity, foreign policy will likely be more contested, limiting Pretoria’s ability to take decisive positions internationally.

While the challenge of balancing domestic and foreign policy is universal, South Africa’s predicament is unique. Previously, it operated within a multilateral order that, while weakened, still functioned. Under Trump’s second term, the rules-based order may not just be broken – it may cease to exist entirely. This places South Africa in uncharted waters, where old diplomatic playbooks may no longer apply.

Besides steering a divided G20, can South Africa move beyond reactive diplomacy to carve out a strategic role? The G20 presidency presents an opportunity, but also a profound risk: if South Africa fails to demonstrate diplomatic dexterity, its presidency could reinforce perceptions of the country’s declining influence rather than enhance its global standing.

Ultimately, success will not be measured by lofty declarations but by tangible outcomes. Can South Africa forge consensus on key issues? Can it navigate Trump-era unpredictability?

And most importantly, can it reconcile its aspirations with its practical limitations? The answers will shape whether the country’s G20 presidency is remembered as a turning point or a missed opportunity.


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