Securing Africa's Nuclear Resources

The need to better secure nuclear and other radioactive material and associated technologies has taken on heightened significance in recent times. African States have a key role to play in implementing US President Barack Obama's effort 'to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years'.

Published on 15 February 2011 in ISS Today

By

Amelia Broodryk

Noël Stott

Amelia Broodryk, Researcher and Noel Stott, Senior Research Fellow, Arms Management Programme, Pretoria Office

Although the need to better secure nuclear and other radioactive material and associated technologies has been on the international agenda for many years, it has taken on heightened significance in recent times. This is because of the uncovering of an international nuclear smuggling ring - the A.Q. Kahn network - in 2004, implicating a number of citizens of various countries in spreading sensitive nuclear technologies without authorisation; and, post-9/11 evidence suggesting that Al Qaeda-linked groups have an interest in acquiring or developing a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) and in particular a nuclear or radiological explosive device. Sources of radiological and nuclear material include, amongst others, nuclear research reactors, nuclear power plants, radiological sources in hospitals and uranium and other mines that produce uranium as a by-product.

In response to the growing demand for a nuclear weapon-free world, in April 2009, US President Barack Obama presented an ambitious three-part strategy to generally address international nuclear threats and in particular the increase in the risk of nuclear material diversion and illicit trafficking by: 1) proposing measures to reduce and eventually eliminate existing nuclear weapon arsenals; 2) strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); and, 3) preventing 'terrorists' from acquiring nuclear weapons or materials.

With respect to the latter, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has categorised four potential nuclear security risks:

• Theft of a nuclear weapon;
• The acquisition of nuclear materials for the construction of nuclear explosive devices;
• The malicious use of radioactive sources, including in so-called "dirty bombs"; and,
• The radiological hazards caused by an attack on, or sabotage of, a facility or a transport vehicle. 

The responsibility for securing nuclear and radioactive materials ultimately rests with individual states. However, countries tend to rely on a number of international instruments and acknowledged principles to guide their control of nuclear and other radioactive materials. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 'this broad range instruments (many developed under IAEA auspices) provides a framework for using such material safely and securely in ways that protect all States - both those with active nuclear programmes and those conducting only limited nuclear activities'. However, not all states adhere to the existing body of regulations governing nuclear security, and many have not implemented them effectively through their national legal and regulatory frameworks. This has led to gaps in the system that could potentially be exploited by armed non-state actors or other criminal networks.

The African continent is blessed with abundant uranium deposits and countries such as Niger, Namibia and South Africa are some of the main suppliers of this resource to the international community. As such, African states have a key role to play in assisting the international community in securing nuclear and radioactive materials and in implementing Obama's pledge to lead an international effort 'to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years' which he concretised during the Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington DC in April 2010 and to which Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa were invited.

Notwithstanding the African perception that there is little or no risk of an imminent radiological device or weapon of mass destruction (WMD) attack on the continent nor a significant threat of nuclear trafficking through the region by domestic or transnational armed non-state actors, according to the IAEA's Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB) from January 1993 to December 2009, a total of 1773 incidents globally were reported by participating States and some non-participating States.

To date, there has only been one incident of lower enriched uranium (LEU) trafficking and one known theft of nuclear fuel from a research reactor in Africa. In 1997, eight fuel rods of uranium were stolen from a Kinshasa research reactor. Only one of the rods was recovered, the whereabouts of the remaining rods is still unknown.

Confirmed incidents of natural uranium smuggling have been comparatively low in Africa, with only 12 such incidents occurring between 1994 and 2005. These took place in Tanzania (four incidents), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Kenya, Namibia and South Africa (with two incidents each). Most of the incidents involve stolen uranium ore, usually stored in containers, from unidentified sources. The deterioration of security around mining sites in the DRC due to political instability probably represents the most pressing nuclear security challenge in Africa today. Of particular concern is the illegal uranium and cobalt mining at the Shinkolobwe mine in Katanga Province, where the source material for the atomic bombs that were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 originated.

In order to explore the current status of nuclear security in Africa, the Institute for Security Studies hosted an experts' workshop on 'Securing Africa's Nuclear Resources' from 1 - 2 February 2011. Participants included officials from various South African government departments, African national nuclear regulators, power plants, atomic energy commissions and radiation protection authorities, the Africa Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology (AFRA); the African Union (AU), and the Forum of Nuclear Regulatory Bodies in Africa (FNRBA).

The result was a final document (or Action Plan) setting out implementable actions on nuclear security issues that African states could take, or lobby for, at the international, regional/sub-regional, and national levels. These actions included:

• Greater participation of African States, including the African Union in the follow-up meeting of the international nuclear security summit to be held in Seoul, South Korea in 2012.
• Accession to, and compliance with, relevant international legal instruments on terrorism and international organised crime, such as the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism as well as to implement relevant UN Security Council resolutions, such as UNSC 1540.
• The ratification and compliance with existing international nuclear security conventions, such as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment.
• Support for the full implementation of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba) and its soon to be established African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE).
• To encourage the African Commission on Nuclear Energy to liaise closely with both the African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology (AFRA) and the Forum for Nuclear Regulatory Bodies in Africa (FNRBA) so as to both avoid duplication of effort and to prevent gaps.
• To put in place, where they do not exist, national nuclear regulators and the appropriate institutional infrastructure responsible for policy guidance, research and monitoring on all aspects of the peaceful application of nuclear and other radioactive materials.
• To draft effective policies, legislation and regulatory frameworks for nuclear security, and to take steps to ensure the safety of nuclear and other radioactive materials and facilities as well as to improve import and export controls.
• To enhance the capacity of national law enforcement officials to deal with the trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material, including appropriate training on investigative procedures, border control and the upgrading of equipment and resources.

Participants importantly also agreed that given the developmental benefits of nuclear and other radioactive materials for Africa, there is a need to commit to the safety and security of such materials and sources while ensuring the continued delivery of the benefits that nuclear materials and related applications provide, for example, radionuclides intended for use in life-saving medical applications. Finding the balance between security and development is the most challenging aspect of the international nuclear security regime, and it is imperative that African states play a key role in determining the nuclear security agenda in future.