Mozambique deploys lawfare against the political opposition
Terrorism charges against the main opposition leader could eliminate FRELIMO’s key challenger in the next elections.
Published on 19 September 2025 in
ISS Today
By
The Mozambican Attorney-General’s Office has indicted leading opposition figure Venâncio Mondlane for instigating and inciting terrorism. The charges relate to his role in post-election protests against the country’s highly fraudulent 2024 general election results.
The 22 July indictment carries a sentence of more than 20 years’ imprisonment, and could bar Mondlane from running in the next presidential race.
Mondlane came second in the 2024 presidential election, securing 24% of the official vote. The candidate of the ruling Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), Daniel Chapo, was declared the winner with 65%.
Recently, Mondlane registered a new political party, the National Alliance for a Free and Autonomous Mozambique (ANAMOLA). Combined with his strong popular support especially among urban youth, this makes him the country’s undisputed opposition leader and a natural challenger to FRELIMO in the 2029 presidential and legislative elections.
But the terrorism charges could bar his way. Across Africa, there has been a sharp increase in lawfare – the manipulation of laws by ruling parties to prolong and entrench their hold on power. This might be explicit, like amending the constitution to extend presidential terms, or more subtle, like disqualifying strong challengers through legal manoeuvres.
FRELIMO has repeatedly used lawfare to neutralise candidates perceived as a threat to its hegemony
A judicial decision excluding Mondlane from contesting would be a subtle form of lawfare to remove the ruling party’s main rival from the political field.
FRELIMO, in power since Mozambique’s independence in 1975, has repeatedly used lawfare to neutralise candidates perceived as a threat to its hegemony, both in national and local elections in strategically important cities like Maputo.
In the 2009 general elections, the National Electoral Commission (CNE) – dominated by FRELIMO appointees – barred the up-and-coming Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM) from contesting in seven of the country’s 11 constituencies, on spurious grounds.
This prevented the party, which was popular among young urban voters, from gaining parliamentary seats. MDM secured eight seats in the four constituencies where it was allowed to run. Had it competed nationwide, analysts believe it could have won about 10% of seats in Parliament.
In the 2024 general elections, the same CNE rejected the Democratic Alliance Coalition (CAD) led by Mondlane from standing in all constituencies. This forced him to align with another party at the last minute.
In both cases, the excluded parties appealed to the Constitutional Council – Mozambique’s top electoral court. But the body, whose majority of judges are nominated by FRELIMO, upheld the CNE’s decisions on legally questionable grounds.
Post-election unrest was largely caused by police repression against initially peaceful marches
In 2013 and 2018, the CNE used similar tactics to disqualify the candidacies of Mondlane and Samora Machel Junior (son of Mozambique’s first president) for mayor of Maputo. Both were seen as potential winners in the country’s most important city.
The criminal case against Mondlane is seen as an expansion of FRELIMO’s lawfare strategy. Mondlane had led demonstrations contesting election results widely denounced as flawed by domestic and international observers, including those from the European Union and Commonwealth.
It is true that the post-election protests escalated into unrest, with damage to public and private property. But this was largely the result of violent police repression against initially peaceful marches. Of more than 380 people killed during the demonstrations, the majority were young people shot dead by the police. Accusing Mondlane of terrorism – a charge that could exclude him from standing – appears more like lawfare than genuine justice.
Support for the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), the country’s historic main opposition party since the advent of multiparty elections in 1994, has declined since the death of long-time leader Afonso Dhlakama in 2008. In the most recent polls, it won fewer than 10% of parliamentary seats, making it unlikely to regain the status of main opposition before 2029.
The Optimist Party for the Development of Mozambique (PODEMOS), which formed a last-minute alliance with Mondlane after CAD was barred in 2024, came second in the legislative vote, benefitting from Mondlane’s support base. ANAMOLA, Mondlane’s new party, has the potential for a strong showing in the 2029 parliamentary elections – provided its leader is not disqualified.
FRELIMO’s regional allies, such as the ruling parties Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) in Tanzania and the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), have also used lawfare to sideline political rivals.
Accusing Mondlane of terrorism, which could exclude him from elections, is more like lawfare than justice
In Tanzania, the CCM government used criminal proceedings to bar Tundu Lissu, the main opposition presidential challenger, on charges of treason after he publicly called for electoral reforms. The main opposition, the Party for Democracy and Progress (CHADEMA), was also barred from contesting the October 2025 elections. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) claimed it had refused to sign the electoral code of conduct – a justification widely seen as baseless.
The INEC also disqualified the Alliance for Change and Transparency’s (ACT-Wazalendo) presidential candidate Luhaga Mpina, even after the High Court reinstated him following a petition by the Registrar of Political Parties. ACT-Wazalendo is Tanzania’s second biggest opposition party after CHADEMA.
Given the two regimes’ close ties, the risk of Tanzania’s lawfare model spilling over into Mozambique is high. Also, regional organisations like the Southern African Development Community and African Union lack clear enforcement mechanisms and the political will to deter authoritarian governments from using lawfare.
If democracy is to prevail on the continent, regional and continental bodies must strengthen their tools and resolve to prevent lawfare. This should include suspending member states using the tactic from regional and continental organisations, as is the practice for regimes that seize power through coups.
After all, lawfare is not very different from a coup in its outcomes. One is more subtle, but no less unjust.
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