Kony 2012 Has Missed its True Target
The documentary, though a noble effort, over-simplifies the LRA problem and undermines Africa’s role in resolving the crisis.
Luyolo Ngcuka, Research Consultant, International Crime in Africa Programme, ISS Pretoria
On 5 March Invisible Children Inc. launched Kony 2012, a 30-minute YouTube video
aimed at raising awareness about the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) leader Joseph
Kony and the atrocities the LRA continues to commit against the children of
Uganda. The creators of the video believe that one of the reasons nothing has
been done about Kony and the LRA is because nobody knows who he is. Thus the
video signals the launch of a worldwide campaign to make Kony infamous. In one
month, the video has already gone viral with over 80 million views on YouTube,
reposting on Facebook, and multitudes of tweets about Kony on Twitter. The aim
of the campaign is to get as many people as possible, primarily Americans, to
put pressure on policy makers to take action against Kony. The campaign recognises
that the United States (US) legislature is unlikely to take action in a foreign
country when that is not in the US’ national interests.
The video is a noble effort and has helped to bring
attention to one of the most horrendous criminals still at large. However, it
is over-simplistic in its portrayal of Kony and the LRA. The video fails to
explain exactly who Kony and the LRA really are, and does not deal with the
full magnitude of the problem he poses. The video deals with neither the
regional nature of the problem, nor with the Ugandan and African efforts that
have been employed in trying to counter the threat he poses to the central
African region.
The LRA, originally named the Ugandan Christian
Democratic Army, was founded in 1988 with the intention of seizing power in
Uganda and reforming the Ugandan constitution in line with the Biblical Ten
Commandments. It set up bases in then-southern Sudan and began a terrorist
campaign in northern Uganda targeting government officials and installations.
Initially, the LRA enjoyed immense support in the north, primarily among the
Acholi – Kony’s ethnic group – and dissatisfied former Ugandan Army soldiers.
Kony’s supporters believed that he had magical powers, which allowed him to talk
to spirits and God. But having just endured a civil war, people did not want
any more conflict, thus Kony quickly lost support and any legitimate claims to
power the LRA might have had. The LRA began attacking villages and towns in the
area, torturing and killing civilians, as well as kidnapping women and
children. The LRA kidnapped young boys for use as child soldiers. Men were
kidnapped for use as porters for stolen goods and then executed. Young girls
and women were kidnapped and used as sex slaves or traded to arms dealers. The
LRA also continued its attacks against government officials and installations,
over time expanding the scope of these attacks to include humanitarian convoys
and non-governmental organisation (NGO) workers. While based in then-southern Sudan,
LRA soldiers also operated as mercenaries for the government of Sudan in return
for support and arms, which allowed the LRA to continue to terrorise northern
Uganda for two decades.
The Ugandan government has been actively
trying to deal with the LRA. In 2000 a general amnesty was offered to all LRA
soldiers who defected and handed themselves over, with the exception of the LRA
leadership. The amnesty offer was made in recognition of the fact that a vast
majority of the LRA’s combatants were victims themselves. Because the LRA was
stationed outside Uganda, the government of Uganda was unable to pursue it and
decided to refer the matter to the International Criminal Court (ICC) on 16
December 2003. The ICC decided in 2005 to indict Kony, his second-in-command
Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo (LRA commander) and Dominic Ongwen (LRA Brigade commander).
Earlier in 2005, the government of Sudan and the Sudan
People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) had signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA), which led to the handing over of power in then-southern Sudan to the
SPLM. Consequently, the LRA was forced to leave Sudan. Unable to return to
Uganda because of increased military action by the Ugandan army, the LRA fled
into the border regions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). There
the LRA continued to terrorise villages, kidnap young children, and maim and
kill civilians.
With the ICC arrest warrants hanging over his head,
coupled with the loss of the backing of the Sudanese government, Kony decided
to negotiate a peace deal with the government of Uganda in July 2006. In
September 2006, the two sides agreed on a ceasefire and negotiations began, but
by 2008 an agreement was yet to be signed despite a peace agreement having been
reached, and negotiations collapsed.
The Ugandan government decided to go on the offensive
in 2008. It secured agreements with neighbouring countries and the Ugandan army
began an all-out pursuit of the LRA in the region. First, the Ugandan army went
into the then southern Sudan, targeting remaining factions there, then into the
DRC. In December 2008, the Ugandan military, together with the forces of the
DRC and then-southern Sudan, launched Operation Lightning Thunder, which was aimed at swiftly eliminating the LRA. Due
to a combination of factors the operation was a failure. Bad weather and rough
bush nullified the use of gunships and slowed the movement of advancing
soldiers. Kony already knew about the operation and his forces scattered into the
neighbouring Central African Republic. Since 2009, operations against the LRA
have continued, with varying degrees of success. There have been some
defections, captures and deaths of numerous LRA combatants and senior
commanders.
Kony 2012 does not include any of this information.
However, the documentary does point out that 100 US soldiers were deployed to
Uganda in an advisory capacity and calls
for more US action beyond the assistance the Obama administration has already
pledged. While showing images of a Ugandan boy who managed to avoid getting
kidnapped by the LRA, the documentary does not mention the number of former
child soldiers who have been rescued and reintegrated into society. Most
importantly, the video does not mention that the LRA has not been active in
Uganda since 2005. In addition, it calls for increased American action, failing
to take into account the effect that increased Western intervention could have
on future African initiatives.
Kony 2012 has been effective in its goals to publicise Kony and
get the attention of policy makers. Notably, two of the targeted policy makers
(Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Senator John Kerry) have already made
public statements damning the LRA and calling for more US action. That being
said, Kony 2012 was aimed at the wrong
audience. The reality is that Kony is already known in Africa. His victims may
have been invisible to the Western world, but they have been visible to
millions of people whose lives have been affected by the LRA over the last two
decades. To make a real impact, Kony 2012
should have focused on getting Africans
to put pressure on their own policy makers.
