Is MONUC Withdrawal from the DRC by 2011 Realistic?
The Congolese minister of Communications and Media, Mr Lambert Mende Omalanga, on 14 September announced that the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), MONUC, would withdraw from that country by 2011.
Henri Boshoff, Head, Peace Missions Programme, ISS Tshwane (Pretoria)
The Congolese minister of Communications and Media, Mr Lambert Mende
Omalanga, on 14 September announced that the UN Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), MONUC, would withdraw from that
country by 2011. Though the issue of withdrawal had been raised many
times in the past, so definite a statement came as something of a
surprise. Not only was it left unclear as to whether this would be a
total or merely the beginning of a phased reduction in strength, but the
choice of 2011 was strange. Not only will 2011 mark the 50th
anniversary of Congolese independence, it should also see the holding of
the second set of national multiparty elections.
The minister mentioned the issue of instability in the eastern DRC
and the status of the Forces Armées de la Republic Democratic du Congo
(FARDC) and the National Congolese Police (PNC). This might imply that
the Congolese government believes that by 2011 its own forces would be
up to the task of providing nationwide security, a conclusion most
informed observers would question, though a redeployment of MONUC forces
to the east of the country suggests that the west is now relatively
stable.
In 2008 the Security Council, in terms of Resolution 1856, had asked
MONUC for its recommendations on the progressive handover of its tasks
to a United Nations country team and bilateral and multilateral partners
as far as the western part of the country was concerned to allow MONUC
to concentrate on the eastern DRC. The subsequent assessment advised
that it would take between 6 to 24 months to hand over MONUC’s
responsibility to a country team. MONUC also suggested having MONUC
police and military response units available if needed.
The technical assessment mission determined that, although both the
eastern and the western parts of the DRC faced problems created by the
absence of effective state institutions and authority, the challenges in
the east were more acute given the prevailing armed conflict. In the
west, however, provincial authorities generally lack effective capacity,
and institutions are unstable and under resourced. The Security Council
therefore advised that an overarching United Nations strategy should be
developed for the DRC, bringing together the focus on peacekeeping
tasks in the east and peace consolidation and peace-building in the
west. The strategy would identify coordination mechanisms with
authorities and partners and cooperation modalities for the United
Nations country team and MONUC to support stabilisation and
peace-building in the DRC and elaborate the details and modalities of a
handover from MONUC to the country team and other partners to ensure a
smooth transition.
It is clear that the principal difficulty lies in assuring stability
and governance in the east. The implementation or non-implementation of
Security Sector Reform (SSR), Demobilisation, Disarmarment and
Reintegration (DDR) of the FARDC and PNC as well as the Demobilisation,
Disarmarment, Reintegration, Resettlement and Repatriation of foreign
armed groups are the biggest challenges here. The Congolese government
has predicated the withdrawal of MONUC in the east upon the successful
implementation of the military master plan’s short-term vision, which
included:
-
the training and deployment of 12 battalions of a rapid reaction
force drawn from elements yet to undergo brassage, as well as from the
18 existing integrated brigades
-
the establishment of the legal framework necessary for army reform; and
-
the completion of the transitional disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and army integration programmes.
Unfortunately this short–term vision remains just that, and has been
delayed because of the ongoing fighting in eastern DRC since late 2007, a
lack of coordination between all role players to address the conflict,
SSR, DDR, and DDRRR. For example the first rapid reaction battalion
trained in 2008 by South Africa at an enormous cost has disappeared from
view. The international community is very reluctant to undertake
further such training until there is an overarching white paper on
defence, a strategy and structure as well as political oversight. MONUC
is again seeking to expand its working group on Security Sector Reform
to include bilateral partners in addition to the European Union Mission
of Assistance for Security Sector Reform and the European Union Police
Mission in an effort to enhance information-sharing and move towards
more strategic coordination on this critical issue.
The Congolese government’s claims to possess a reliable military
force are given the lie by the FARDC’s treatment of civilians during its
eastern operations. Unless this and other issues are addressed very
quickly there seems little possibility of a MONUC withdrawal by 2011.
Given the slow rate of progress so far, a further 5 to 10 years
deployment would not seem unrealistic.