Guinea`s Future Remains Uncertain After an Attempt to Kill Camara Failed
A week after the assassination attempt against Guinea’s military leader Captain Moussa Dadis Camara has failed uncertainty reigns in the country. Camara came to power in a bloodless coup on December 23 last year, after the death of dictator Lansana Conte, who had led the country since 1984. The junta leader was shot and wounded on 3 December by his aide de camp, Aboubacar Sidiki Diakite, in an alleged bid to seize power. Camara was later evacuated to Morocco, where he has been treated for head wounds.
Alemayehu Behabtu, Researcher, PSC Report Programme (PRP), ISS Addis Ababa Office
A week after the assassination attempt against Guinea’s military
leader Captain Moussa Dadis Camara has failed uncertainty reigns in the
country. Camara came to power in a bloodless coup on December 23 last
year, after the death of dictator Lansana Conte, who had led the
country since 1984. The junta leader was shot and wounded on 3 December
by his aide de camp, Aboubacar Sidiki Diakite, in an alleged bid to
seize power. Camara was later evacuated to Morocco, where he has been
treated for head wounds.
Five days after the incident took place, on 8 December, a Guinean
minister told state television that his country’s military rulers have
decided to suspend their participation in talks on Guinea’s crisis
until injured junta chief returns to work. But Camara is said to be in a
‘difficult’ condition and his return to home is not imminent. Moroccan
officials have said Camara was stable after an operation to treat
"trauma of the cranium" but they have not given details on when he
could be discharged from hospital. His absence in Conakry has left
behind a power vacuum and a divided military in the troubled West
African country. Defence Minister Sekouba Konate has now taken over as
junta chief but uncertainty grows with the risk of instability in
Guinea spreading across a historically volatile region.
When the CNDD junta came to power in a bloodless coup on 23 December
2008, it initially assured the domestic population and the
international community that it would reform the institutions of
government and eliminate corruption. True to form and in keeping with
dictatorial double-speak, Captain Camara declared himself ‘president of
the republic’ the day after the coup. Camara stated that he had no
intention of clinging to power and assured his bemused audience that he
would convene elections in 2010 after, what is now, the customary
two-year transitional period. The junta has utilised the last one year
in power to consolidate its position and has systematically replaced
numerous administrators in government with its own supporters.
Consequently, the majority of the key posts in the government
established on 14 January 2009 are held by fellow military cadres.
What tipped in the deterioration of the situation in Guinea is
caused by the actions of the Guinean armed forces that led to the death
of innocent 150 civilians at a peaceful rally in the capital Conakry. A
demonstration organised in on 28 September 2009 to protest the
prospect of Captain Camara to contest the presidential elections
scheduled for 31 January 2010, became a killing field when Guinean
security forces opened fire on the gathering of people. According to
the UN and human rights groups more than 150 people were killed, 1,200
people were injured and numerous women were reportedly raped. The
military junta contests this number and claims that 56 people were
killed. Analysts suggest that following the stadium killings, Camara’s
grip on power appears increasingly tenuous and there are reports of
increasing divisions within the leadership of the junta, particularly
following the 3 December incident. Camara is reluctant to step down,
apparently stating that his position will simply be usurped by someone
else in the military.
At present, gunshots are heard in the capital Conakry as soldiers
loyal to Camara pursue those linked to his would-be assassin. Earlier
after the 28 September 2009 incident, Guinea’s military leader had
banned all ‘subversive’ gatherings. Guinea’s national civil society
coalition, Les Forces Vives, is currently divided on their way forward.
Since the botched assassination trucks full of heavily armed soldiers
have swept through Conakry and into the countryside looking for
suspects. There have been reports of multiple arrests, torture and
killings. Many Guineans fear that if Camara dies this will leave a power
vacuum in the military leadership which could provoke infighting,
spilling over into more atrocities on civilians. On the other hand they
also fear that his return could bring tough military rule with the
possibility that he may behaves angrily.
Such developments could lead to a situation where developments
become increasingly detrimental not only for Guinea but also to the
wider sub-region. First, the ‘uncontrollable’ elements within the
country’s armed forces could push for a more hard-line position with
dire consequences for the citizenry including human rights violations.
That will further push the CNDD to resist external pressure and refuse
to respect the timetable for a transition to the restoration of
constitutional order. Secondly, Captain Camara could cancel or renege
on his assurance and contest the presidency, casting doubt on any
short-term resolution of the domestic crisis. The recent attempt on the
life of the junta leader may exacerbate dissent and disagreement within
the military and security apparatus which may end in a bloody
counter-coup. In the most unlikely prospect also, Guinea could try to
convene national elections, not as required and stipulated by the AU
and the international community not before the end of 2009 but sometime
in 2010.
In the short-term, therefore, the ongoing confrontation and
repression in Guinea casts serious doubt on the prospects for restoring
peace and stability in the country in the short-term. The current
situation remains volatile notably following the comments by the
President of the military junta suggesting that it was not ready to
relinquish power. There are concerns that the power struggle will be
further magnified by ethnic polarization. The assassination bid aimed
at the first Guinean leader from the minority Guerze tribe has indeed
raised concerns that ethnic and regional divisions in the country could
deepen. Historically, most of the violent ethnic conflicts in Guinea`s
recent past have involved the Peul, who make up about 40 percent of the
country and who have never been in power. In 1993, open violence broke
out between the Peul and the Sousou amid accusations the Peul were
trying to overthrow President Sekou Toure, who had both Sousou and
Malinke parents. The Guerze are related to the Kpelle, the largest
ethnic group in Liberia, itself recovering from years of war.
Regionally also, the future stability of Guinea is vital in order to
provide a modicum of tranquility in the West Africa region which was
ravaged by the scourge of conflict in the last two decades. By 2000,
half a million refugees who were fleeing from the conflicts in Sierra
Leone and Liberia established their camps in Guinea. This increased the
strain on the country’s meager social and economic resources. The
refugee presence has also heightened suspicion within Guniea’s junta
about the potential for border incursions and external attempts to
destabilize the country. Uniquely, there are ‘foreign’ soldiers within
the Guinean military, drawn from neighbouring Liberia and Sierra Leone,
which does not augur well for internal cohesion and military
discipline. Organised crime has taken advantage of this cacophony of
chaos to further extend its clandestine drug production activities
further exacerbating instability in Guinea. The potential for deepening
divisions remains and could spread beyond Guinea`s borders to
neighbouring Liberia, Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast, experts say.
So far the dynamics in Guinea has generated varied responses from
important actors and is progressively increasing. Immediately after the
coup last year, both the AU and ECOWAS have also suspended Guinea’s
membership of their respective organisations. Also the AU Peace and
Security Council which met at the level of Heads of State and
Government, in Abuja, Nigeria, on 29 October requested the AU
Commission to take the necessary measures to implement targeted
sanctions against the CNDD-led government. On 13 December ECOWAS chief
Mohammed Ibn Chambas called for a special force to be sent to Guinea
to protect civilians. His comments came at the start of the ninth
meeting of the International Contact Group on Guinea, ICG-G, which
includes the United Nations, the European Union and the African Union
as well as ECOWAS.
But now is time caution is needed in responding to Guinea’s crisis.
Any escalation in the country’s internal power struggle would
transform a volatile situation into an even more acerbic and dangerous
one given the ethnic divisions that exist in the country. This suggests
that the situation in Guinea is precarious and that there are no
guarantees that either the period leading to the proposed presidential
election or its aftermath will be peaceful. Careful pressure is
needed on the CNDD’s leadership to formalize the commitment it made, on
its own volition, not to extend the election date beyond January 2010,
or try to contest the presidency. The international mediation effort
being led by President Compaoré of neighboring Burkina Faso could also
work with vigour before the further entrenchment of military power.
Given the current trajectories, however, encouraging the military to
find a proper role to play in the restoration of civilian democratic
rule appears a job easier said than done.
