Borno Model’s valuable lessons on handling Boko Haram deserters
The approach of Nigeria’s Borno State shows how to manage more humane, locally grounded reintegration efforts that work.
The death in 2021 of Abubakar Shekau set off a wave of exits from the Boko Haram faction he led, Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS). In Borno State, northeastern Nigeria, tens of thousands of men, women and children affiliated with JAS started handing themselves in to the military in the Lake Chad Basin area.
Most early surrenders were non-combatants. But fighters and members of Boko Haram’s other faction, Islamic State West Africa Province, were also spurred to desert by mass media campaigns, aerial leaflet drops, targeted negotiations and inter-factional clashes. Borno government records say around 160 000 people in total had left the two groups by 2024.
Initially, Borno State’s formal involvement in managing those leaving the insurgency was limited to accepting and reintegrating ex-fighters rehabilitated under the federal government’s Operation Safe Corridor, a military-run deradicalisation programme.
However, with the scale and spontaneity of exits after Shekau’s death, Borno State became more involved. The Borno Model was presented as the state’s non-military contribution to the security operations of the federal government and regional Multinational Joint Task Force.
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Borno State, Lake Chad Basin
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The state government negotiated two levels of agreement with those who had left Boko Haram. First, it assured deserters they would not be taken to the notorious Joint Investigation Centre at Giwa Barracks in Maiduguri, an Operation Safe Corridor transit facility known for its harsh interrogation techniques. Also, families could stay together in camps for deserters. (The Giwa Barracks camp hosts only male ex-fighters.)
Second, Borno State reached an understanding with the military that those surrendering voluntarily would be transferred to the state’s programme, while Operation Safe Corridor would process those captured in combat.
The United Nations has for decades recognised the challenge of ex-combatants’ economic and social integration. Experience across Africa and beyond confirms how fraught disarmament and reintegration can be. The process is plagued by poor coordination, minimal local ownership, lack of transparency and short-term thinking – challenges shared by the Borno Model.
New research by the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) on the model offers valuable insights into overcoming these challenges.
Central to the model’s success is its humane and voluntary character. Militarisation has long been the dominant response to Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin, but the insurgency is resilient and expanding. The Borno Model’s shift away from the militarised approaches of Operation Safe Corridor is a crucial positive step.
Borno’s assurances of inclusivity and a more dignified process have lowered the barriers to desertion
Notably, the Borno Model avoids using controversial facilities like the Giwa Barracks Joint Investigation Centre, whose arbitrary detentions and abusive interrogation techniques are documented and condemned by Amnesty International and others. The assurances of inclusivity and a more dignified process have lowered the barriers to desertion.
One drawback of keeping families together is that it may result in forced reunification with former captors or abusers, as many women and girls were kidnapped and forcibly married to fighters. The Borno Model’s practice could perpetuate harm under the guise of inclusivity, making proper risk assessments and survivor-centred policies crucial.
Another key success factor is the Borno Model’s grounding in local ownership and dynamics, allowing for quicker feedback loops that create opportunities for adaptation and improvement. This is demonstrated in the switch from programme officials only engaging with communities shortly before deserters’ reintegration, to twice-weekly meetings with community members and former Boko Haram affiliates.
Programme administrators say the change reduces suspicion of deserters, enables dialogue, and gives communities time to ask questions and prepare for the return of former insurgents. In several places once hostile to deserters, sentiment has shifted from fear to cautious acceptance. One resident told GPPi and ISS researchers: ‘They are our children … if they have realised they are in the wrong and can come back, we accept them.’
Previous ISS research argues that programmes fail as ‘communities aren’t centrally involved in reintegration processes, even though they facilitate disengagement and are the first point of contact for ex-Boko Haram associates.’
Despite its achievements, the Borno Model faces persistent challenges, especially in providing sufficient economic support to deserters once they leave the camps. Many former Boko Haram members interviewed in March and June 2025 said they left the group with few employable skills, little start-up capital and no tools to begin livelihoods.
The Borno Model struggles to provide sufficient economic support to deserters once they leave the camps
The state has introduced vocational training in the camps, teaching skills such as carpentry, tailoring, welding, and mechanics. It also provides a one-off payment of ₦100 000 (about US$67), but this isn’t enough to restart a life after years in the bush.
The limited funds available for livelihood programmes risk undermining the model’s gains. Programme administrators told researchers that they were worried exits had slowed partly because potential deserters had heard that promises of economic support were not being fulfilled.
Another weakness is insufficient follow-up after people leave the camps. Currently, only a few individuals are followed on a case study-based approach, rather than systematically tracking all enrollers and patterns. A robust, data-driven post-release monitoring system could improve screening and camp programming, with better long-term outcomes – not just in Borno, but regionwide.
Transparency is equally critical. Deserters are inconsistently categorised as ‘fighters’ or ‘farmers’, and some have reportedly bypassed deradicalisation by posing as low-risk, highlighting the need for better screening.
By taking stock of both its limitations and gains, the Borno Model becomes not just a case study in innovation under pressure, but a blueprint for progress. As conflict-affected states look to balance security and reconciliation, Borno’s experience offers valuable guidance on how to chart a more humane, locally grounded path forward.
The Nigerian federal government should create a national legal framework that harmonises state-level efforts with clear standards for screening, accountability and post-release monitoring. Regional and international partners should deepen their support – not by imposing new models – but by filling the funding and capacity gaps to help improve on existing ones.
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