01 Dec 2005: The DRC, From Fiction to Fact?, Richard Cornwell AFRICA WATCH The Democratic Republic of the Congo From fiction to fact? Richard Cornwell Senior Researcher Fellow in the Africa Security Analysis Programme at the Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria. Published in African Security Review Vol 14 No 4, 2005 The Global and All-Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), signed by the Congolese parties on 17 December 2002, outlined a transitional process to culminate in national elections to be held two years after the inauguration of the Transitional Government in June 2003. The agreement also stipulated that the transition could be extended for two six-month periods if technical preparations for elections were delayed. The Transitional Governmental has encountered significant difficulties in the past two years. Nonetheless, the basic objectives of the peace agreement – such as the drafting of a constitution, the elaboration of key laws and the embryonic reintegration of the Congolese armed forces – have been realised, and the Congolese people are now increasingly focused on the constitutional referendum, now due on 18 December, and on the elections expected by June 2006. The holding of the referendum and elections are the key steps in the creation of a legitimate state apparatus in the DRC. It is essential, therefore, that the upcoming elections are sufficiently credible in the eyes of the Congolese electorate and the political parties to produce broad acceptance of the process and its results. In order to ensure this credibility, insecurity will have to be kept to a minimum to make sure that a maximum number of people will be able to participate in the process and all parties participating in the process must be guaranteed equal access to election resources. Thus far, the immensely costly voter registration process has achieved remarkable success, given the logistical difficulties involved. Some 15 million of an estimated 20 million voters have been identified and issued with documents. The registration exercise progressed with surprisingly few problems in the troubled east of the country and has now been extended to the sparsely populated Equateur and Bandundu provinces. In the next two months 40,000 voting locations must be established and 200,000 election workers recruited, trained and moved into the field. Securing the elections against disruption will depend largely on the efforts of The United Nations Mission in The Congo (MONUC) and the understaffed and nascent national police force. The integration of units in the new Armed Forces of the Congo (FARDC) has been slow, and there is ample evidence that the various parties represented in the Transitional Government have withheld their best troops as a possible insurance against electoral disappointment. The handful of FARDC brigades that has been established lack both adequate training and equipment. Apart from the potential spoilers within the Transitional Government principal among whom is Vice-President Jean-Pierre Bemba, whose electoral hopes have been dealt a severe blow by his ineptitude in managing his patronage network – there are a number of other troublemakers at large. These include the plethora of armed factions and predators under no defined command, mainly in the Kivus, northern Katanga and Ituri. The continued presence on Congolese soil of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) also provides Kigali with an excuse to intervene across the border if it senses its interests being threatened by developments there. The unpopularity of the Congolese Rally for Democracy-Goma (RCD-G) does not augur well for its electoral chances on the national stage, yet its base in North Kivu, in particular, is viewed by Kigali as a legitimate and essential sphere of economic and political influence. The international diplomatic and business community is obviously placing a great deal of hope on the holding of successful elections finally to provide the DRC with a government that has some element of popular legitimacy. Of course, moving from this to the establishment of a functioning state will be a protracted and troubled process, and one that will require high levels of international commitment to succeed. The kleptocratic political culture of Congo ’s elite will also somehow have to be held in check, for international funding for reconstruction and development constitutes potential loot on a scale not experienced since the days when Mobutu was regarded as an essential client of the West. If the Congolese state project is to be successful and value received for all the blood and treasure so far expended by the Congolese and the international community in the quest to achieve a favourable outcome, there can be no talk yet of an exit strategy or a reduction in engagement. The referendum and the elections to follow are essential, though not sufficient, to establish a Congolese state that exists in more than fiction.
