01 Sep 2008: The ethics of climate change: Right and wrong in a warming world, James Garvey

BOOK REVIEW

 

Published in African Security Review Vol 17 No 3

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The ethics of climate change:
Right and wrong in a warming world
James Garvey*
*   London: Continuum, 2008.

James Garvey’s short book The ethics of climate change is designed as an introductory text on a dauntingly complex and serious question. The issue is complex because it involves questions of scientific fact, competing understandings of moral value, different conceptions and levels of moral responsibility, and conflicts between the moral principles that one can call upon to guide or assess policy-making. It is serious because even conservative estimates of climate change indicate its alarming potential to disrupt and threaten the lives of humans and other animals and forms of life over the next century.

Garvey addresses the question of scientific evidence for global warming in his first chapter. He has three concerns here: to convince the undecided or uninformed that climate change is not a distant prospect but is already at work; to dispel the idea that there is a serious scientific debate about the existence of anthropogenic climate change; and to consider some scientific predictions concerning the impact of climate change. With regard to Garvey’s first two concerns, suffice it to say that at this stage there is no real doubt that climate change is occurring. In 2007 the International Panel on Climate Change, in a statement supported by numerous national and regional scientific bodies, concluded that ‘warming of the climate system is now unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice, and a rising global average sea level’ (p 15). However, there remains disagreement concerning the third issue – estimates of the impact of climate change. Some of this concerns factual predictions: estimates of increases in global average surface temperature vary from 1,1 oC to 6,4 oC this century, though even the lowest increase is likely to produce dramatic effects (p 24). This means that although we can make educated guesses about how different regions will be affected, there is real uncertainty here. It is unfortunate that Garvey does not give more serious attention to the ways in which this affects moral judgements about how to distribute resources and energy in reducing climate change.

The moral argument begins in chapter 2. Rather oddly, this is a review of the dominant theories of morality, which – unless I am missing something – is not properly integrated into a discussion of the moral issues posed by climate change. Garvey claims that he wants to show that it is possible to justify moral claims; he would do better in a book of this length to assume that it is, and proceed to the substantive questions. In fact, he gets to these issues in the following chapter, where he articulates three moral principles aimed at guiding reflection on who should bear the burden of responsibility for taking action against climate change. The principles may be simply stated: historical responsibilities (the ‘You broke it, you bought it’ intuition), present capacities (if you have the resources to address the problem, you should do so), and sustainability (concerned with our responsibility not to damage or use up the resources needed for survival by future generations). Later, in chapter 5, Garvey adds a fourth principle – procedural fairness (decisions concerning policy should be made in a manner that is fair to all participants, and should take relevant scientific information into account).

These first three principles lead Garvey to conclude that it is the developed world – especially the USA – that needs to shoulder the burden of responsibility in dealing with climate change. Because the countries of the developed world are responsible for the bulk of both current and historic carbon dioxide emissions (although developing countries such as China and India are beginning to catch up), they need to do most to resolve the problem. Similarly, because far more of the carbon dioxide emissions of developed countries are luxury emissions (not subsistence emissions), these countries can and should do more to reduce them. The principle of sustainability, on the other hand, applies to everyone, including developing countries, and raises the possibility that poor countries might have to engage in ‘belt-tightening’ too. Here Garvey falls back on his first two principles to insist that the principle of sustainability should not be used to prevent countries with starving populations from developing economically. He concludes by expressing the hope that ‘the developed world will see to it that the developing world will leapfrog the worst of industrialization and join the rest of us living sustainable lives’ (p 87).

While I sympathise with this move, it is not clearly consistent with the rest of Garvey’s argument, which is heavily reliant on the consequentialist concern to avert disaster. In chapter 4 he turns this concern against a range of proposals that suggests there is no need to alter emissions-rich lifestyles, showing that new technologies alone cannot solve the problem, and that proposals that we should wait until we are sure that others will act are guaranteed only to make matters much worse. In this chapter Garvey seems to rely more on considerations of fairness; he uses his fourth principle – procedural fairness – to criticise the artificial targets, unequal sacrifices, and non-binding nature of the Kyoto Accord. But in the end he concedes that while Kyoto seriously misses the moral mark, some concessions will probably have to be made to developed countries to gain their support, and that the focus will have to be on agreeing upon ‘equal per capita’ shares of emissions that do not exceed the planet’s capacity to absorb them. Garvey praises the ‘contraction and convergence’ version of this approach for going some way towards recognising the present capacities principle, for placing a somewhat heavier burden on developed countries, and for allowing emissions trading, which, Garvey claims (without discussing the evidence), tend to ‘narrow the gap between rich and poor’ (p 129). But it is hard to avoid the conclusion that while concerns of justice and fairness continue to matter to Garvey, his argument is increasingly driven by the concern to minimise harm overall, irrespective of the fairness of the policies chosen. Indeed, he comes close to admitting this directly: ‘If there is a conflict between sustainability and the other criteria, in this case historical responsibility, I get the feeling sustainability wins’ (p 133).

My main complaint about Garvey’s argument, then, is that he is not sufficiently frank about the potential conflict between consequentialism and considerations of justice involved in deciding on strategies for reducing climate change. Through much of the text, Garvey presents himself as a defender of developing countries. But when it comes to the crunch he subordinates these concerns to the goal of sustainability. Considering the magnitude of the crisis we are now facing, that is unpalatable but not unreasonable. However, it is unfortunate that Garvey does not confront this conflict consistently and openly, or devotes more reflection to the extent to which sustainability cannot be achieved unless it occurs through agreements that are perceived to be fair by the developing world.

There are other problems with the book. In his final chapter, Garvey moves much too quickly from discussing the responsibilities of national governments to a call for action at the individual level. There is a need for a much clearer recognition of multiple levels of responsibility; exceptional individuals may choose to sacrifice for the sake of sustainability – but unless the practices of businesses and local and regional governments concerning the design and placement of homes can be changed, the costs of sustainability will remain prohibitive for most individuals.

Finally, there is a real question about how international agreements to reduce emissions levels are to be enforced. Garvey alludes to economic sanctions as a means of achieving this but says nothing about what agencies could implement such strategies legitimately. Would he support unilateral action by a developed country or set of countries who complies with the agreement, to force a defaulting developing country such as China into compliance? I am sure that he would not want to, though if there were a genuine violation of an agreement and of the principle of sustainability, it would be inconsistent of him not to support coercive action. Here again the issue of legitimacy intrudes, and demands a more sustained treatment.

It is clear that climate change is going to pose some very unpleasant moral questions. I must say that I do not think that this book faces up to their full weight. 

Book review by Jonathan Allen, Department of Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign