09 Jul 2007: ISS Today: Laurent Nkunda - A New "Governor" For North Kivu?

9 July 2007: Laurent Nkunda - A New “Governor” For North Kivu?

 

The recent behaviour of renegade General Laurent Nkunda suugests that he may be preparing to present himself as the new shadow governor of North Kivu. He has been around in the Kivus for a long time, but became especially prominent when he took over the town of Bukavu in eastern DRC in May 2004. The general says he went to Bukavu to protect civilians, in particular the Banyamulenge ethnic group, whom he claims were being attacked. After that incident, and because of an international warrant for his arrest for earlier misdeeds in Kisangani, he kept a low profile and did nothing to endanger the 2006 elections. It was only after these elections that he re-emerged and became a real threat to stability in North Kivu.

 

The first real indication of Nkunda’s return to the political game came when he attacked the FARDC and seized Rutshuru and Sake for a while, until MONUC intervened to evict him from the two towns. This made it obvious that the new DRC government would have to address the chronic threat his activities continued to pose. With the help of General Kabarere, the Rwanda Military Chief of Staff, Nkunda and General Numbi, the Congolese Chief of the Air Force met on 31 December 2006 and agreed to mix Nkunda’s forces with the non-integrated FARDC forces in North Kivu. After serious deliberations, both sides decided to reintegrate the brigades (rebel brigades of Nkunda and the FARDC non-integrated brigades) by mixing and renaming them under new a new structure, in a process called mixage. In essence, the mixing process aimed at combining Laurent Nkunda’s 81st and 83rd Brigades, and the rest of the combatants, with the FARDC’s 110th and116th Brigades, as well as the 1st Reserve Brigade. An estimated 4,500 to 5,000 of Nkunda’s troops, according to his figures, were due to be combined with a similar number of FARDC troops.  

 

This exercise was doomed from the beginning because it lacked the involvement or support of the international community, MONUC and the local population. It was the population that bore the brunt of the Mixed Brigades operations against the Rwandan rebel FDLR, resulting in human rights violations and mass displacement of the population. It is still uncertain what the objectives of either Numbi and Nkunda were. Nkunda claims that wanted primarily to ensure the safe return of 45,000 Tutsi refugees from Rwanda, the freeing of political prisioners, operations against FDLR and his own appointment as an officer in the FARDC. The position of the Congolese government was that this mixage process was purely for the purpose of completing military integration and had no connection with the possible appointment of Nkunda in the FARDC.      

 

Nkunda has used the mixage process as an opportunity to consolidate his strong position in North Kivu and is even sending people to South Kivu and Ituri to raise support there. Nkunda has also established a political party, the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP). Except for strengthening his military power Nkunda is going around North Kivu telling large crowds that his party is there to protect everybody and urging them to join. At these meetings he promises the communities he is going to develop their facilities including the provision of free education to children, medical facilities and of electricity. CNDP loyalists are acquiring machines to repair roads in these areas. He is also replacing Congolese police at police stations with CNDP-recruited police and hoisting the flag of the CNDP at these installations. There are also reports that he intends to appoint his own ministers in North Kivu. In short, what we are seeing is the creation of an alternative or a shadow state in North Kivu. Nkunda has already demonstrated his contempt for the FARDC; only MONUC has the capability and capacity to act against him.

 

The question is now how to deal with Nkunda? In an ISS Situation Report dated 4 July on the DDR Process, a military response was given as one option, What does that mean? It means the DRC government must make a decision to take on Nkunda militarily. The mixage process must be stopped immediately and operations against FDLR must be made the responsibility of the FARDC brassage brigades. These units will not be able to execute their task unaided, but will require the support of MONUC. Another option would be to isolate Nkunda, cut all his internal and external support lines and basically force him into a negotiation process. It is unlikely that either option, however, will be able to avoid a new round of violence in the east of the DRC.

 

Henri Boshoff, Military Analyst, African Security and Analysis Programme, ISS Tshwane (Pretoria)