07 Jan 2009: ISS Today: Possible Scenarios for Eastern DRC in 2009

7 January 2009: Possible Scenarios for Eastern DRC in 2009

 

The Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region, the former President of Nigeria Olusegun Obasanjo on 8 December described the conflict in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as a “scar on Africa”. This was at a follow-up meeting of African leaders and role players involved with the Great Lakes Region held in Nairobi.

 

This is a serious statement from a former Head of State and highlights the negative impact of the conflict in the DRC on the entire African continent. The DRC has in the last ten years been the symbolic “trigger” of the continent. In fact, if you look at the map of Africafrom another angle it indeed looks like a revolver with the DRC being the trigger. In the past decade it has become clear that whenever you touch that trigger it impacts on at least 9 countries in Africa. This is more reason for the conflict to be taken for what it is, and dealt with accordingly. It not just another “African tragedy” beyond redemption, but a human catastrophe that calls for a sustained and concerted diplomatic and military intervention by the international community.

 

The following can be described as the key driving forces behind the present conflict in the North Kivu in Eastern DRC:

  • The incapacity of the Congolese government to govern the Eastern DRC;
  • The non-completion of the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) process;
  • The lack of capacity of the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo(FARDC) to use force in stabilising Northern Kivu;
  • The lack of will or lack of capacity of the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo(MONUC) to implement its mandate as to the protection of civilians;
  • The non-completion of the repatriation process of the ForcesDémocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR);
  • The control of North Kivu by theForcesDémocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (CNDP) and its ability to project military force;
  • Support from Rwanda for the CNDP; and
  • The ongoing conflict over resources.

Given these factors above, three possible scenarios for the future emerge: maintaining the status quo, returning to war and establishing peace through negotiations.

 

1) The Status Quo


This scenario implies that the current status quo be maintained. General Laurent Nkunda, leader of the CNDP, adheres to his own unilateral cease-fire and the FARDC do not launch new attacks on the CNDP. The opposing parties stay in their current positions and negotiations under the guidance of former President Obasanjo continues. This scenario is likely to continue to play out in the short term.

 

2) The War Scenario


This scenario will very much depend on the outcome of the current mediation process coordinated by Obasanjo. If the CNDP led by Nkunda feels that it will not benefit from the talks and there is any indication of new attacks by the FARDC, CNDP will return to war and can easily expand its area of influence to Ituri and possibly South Kivu. If MONUC does not receive reinforcements soon and if a European Union Battle group is not deployed in time, the CNDP could overrun Goma and set its sights on Bukavu and Bunia. This offensive will be in line with the vision of Nkunda to spread his control over the whole of DRC. In a statement on 2 October 2008,Nkunda called for the “liberation” of the DRC, which further heightened anxieties, and was condemned by the international community, national actors and the population. In subsequent statements and letters addressed to the UNand others from the international community, the CNDP continued to challenge the legitimacy of the elected Congolese institutions, which it accused of mismanagement, collusion with “genocidal foreign forces” and failing to protect the Congolese population.

 

The FARDC will not be able to stop this offensive campaign because it is too weak. MONUC could possibly stop such a campaign if the will within the mission exist to implement its mandate. It could however be obstructed by the way different troop contributing countries interpret the mandate and more specifically the use of force and rules of engagement. The only force that could stop such an offensive campaign is a robust external force such as a EU Battle group. Such a force is currently unlikely. This scenario is the most dangerous and it is not impossible that this can happen.

 

3)  Peace


This scenario is based on the assumption that the current peace talks will succeed and a robust military force is deployed to ensure stability. This means all the parties come to an agreement on the implementation of the Goma and Nairobi agreements and the implementation of the Amani process. If Obasanjo can convince the role players to accept such an agreement thedisengagement plan proposed by MONUC will be implemented. It comprises three phases:

  • An immediate ceasefire and separation of forces;
  • Disarmament and demobilization of combatants; and
  • Integration into FARDC or their return to civilian life.

The disengagement plan covers all armed groups, including the FDLR and provides for the garrisoning of FARDC concomitantly with the regrouping of the armed groups and the progressive deployment of the Congolese National Police to maintain law and order in the area.This will be followed by a stability plan developed between MONUC and the Government of DRC. The  stability programme will help stabilise the Eastern DRC and protect civilians by improving the security environment and extending state authority. To achieve this, MONUC and its partners will support the government of the DRC with the containment of armed groups, to put in place basic elements of state authority and ensure the return of refugees and IDPs, and so improve regional relations, too. This is the preferred scenario.

 

Can the preferred scenario become a reality?


The preferred scenario is not seen as the likely scenario in the short term and the status quois likely to prevail in the very immediate term. Certain conditions however exist that indicate we could see a movement from the status quo scenario to the negotiated peace process and stability scenario. These are: 

  • An improvement in relations between Kinshasa and Kigali on handling the FDLR;
  • Nkunda’s support for Obasanjo’s mediation; and
  • The likelihood of talks between FARDC and CNDP.

For thenegotiated peace process and stability scenario to become a reality, the mediation should ensure that the following takes place:

  • The deployment of a robust force to ensure stability;
  • Implementation of the UN mandate and deploy an additional2,785 soldiers and 2 formed police units to North Kivu;
  • Respect of the ceasefire agreements and the re-establishment of the tripartite +1 (DRC, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi) ceasefire monitoring mechanism;
  • Direct talks between Presidents Kagame and Kabila on one hand, and between the Government of DRC and Laurent Nkunda on the other;
  • Kigali to close its border and end its support to Nkunda’s CNDP;
  • Kinshasa to stop supporting FDLR and to ensure better discipline on the part of FARDC in this respect;
  • Kinshasa to revisit the outdated national DDR law, draft a realistic and tailor-made programme for the eastern provinces and begin disarmament of illegal militias; and
  • Kinshasa to pursue the reform of defence and security forces.

This scenario can become a reality if the international community continues to keep up the pressure on all the role players to come to a negotiated peace settlement and the EU in the short term deploys a EU Battle Group as a bridging force until MONUC has been re-enforced.

 

Henri Boshoff, African Security Analysis Programme, ISS Tshwane (Pretoria) office