Monograph 66: Peacekeeping in the DRC. MONUC and the Road to Peace, Jakkie Cilliers and Mark Malan
The peacemaking process
in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) began virtually at the outset
of the war, long before many of the interlocutors understood the
dynamics of the conflict. It took merely a year from the firing of the
first shots of the DRC war in August 1998 to reach an extremely complex
ceasefire agreement, and for the UN to authorise a peace operation in
its support.
The Lusaka Peace Agreement included
provisions on the normalisation of the situation along the DRC border;
the control of illicit trafficking of arms and the infiltration of armed
groups; the holding of a national dialogue on the future government of
the DRC; the need to address security concerns; and the establishment of
a mechanism for disarming militias and armed groups.
The Mission de l’organisation des Nations Unies au Congo (MONUC)
was mandated, among others, to develop an action plan for the overall
implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement by all concerned with
particular emphasis on the following key objectives:
- the collection and verification of military information on the parties forces;
- the maintenance of the cessation of hostilities and the disengagement and redeployment of the parties’ forces;
- the comprehensive disarmament, demobilisation, resettlement and reintegration of all members of all armed groups; and
- the orderly withdrawal of all foreign forces.
The aim of this monograph is to enhance
understanding of the complex array of actors and actions that underpin
the current Congolese ‘peace process’ — from the key protagonists and
their interests in the DRC, to the deployment of MONUC, and attempts to
initiate the Inter-Congolese Dialogue.
To a large degree, the key to the
conflict in the DRC, as well as that in the Great Lakes region, can be
found in the eastern Kivu provinces. Since 1959, the various crises in
Rwanda and Burundi have generated four major refugee flows that have
affected security in the Great Lakes region, and the Kivu provinces in
particular. The involvement of foreign forces in the present DRC
conflict, on the side of both government and opposition armed forces,
has been in pursuit of a variety of powerful interests — ranging from
‘legitimate’ security concerns to ethnic solidarity and financial gain.
Thus the engineering of the very complicated Lusaka ceasefire agreement
proved to be much easier than actually getting the foreigners out of the
DRC.
The ceasefire was due to come into
effect within 24 hours of the signing of the agreement (commonly
interpreted as 31 August 1999, when the RCD signed). The Joint Military
Commission (JMC), representing all the signatories, was established
under the ceasefire agreement to regulate and monitor the cessation of
hostilities until the UN deployed a peacekeeping mission.
In his report of 15 July 1999, the UN
Secretary-General recommended to the Security Council that the UN’s
responsibility for the implementation of the ceasefire agreement should
be approached in three phases:
- firstly, the deployment of unarmed
military liaison officers to the capitals of the signatories and, if the
security situation permits, to the rear headquarters of the rebel
groups;
- secondly, the deployment of up to 500 military observers inside the DRC; and
- thirdly, the deployment of a peacekeeping force.
These have remained the basis of
discussion and planning for the incremental deployment of UN military
and civilian personnel and assets during what has come to be known as
phases one, two and three of MONUC.
MONUC is now well into its second
phase of operations, with a maximum authorised strength of 5 537
military observers and peacekeepers. The satisfactory disengagement of
the parties’ armed forces has been verified by MONUC, and the emphasis
is now on monitoring their adherence to agreed points of deployment and
the eventual withdrawal of all foreign forces. However, the security
situation in the Kivu provinces remains volatile, and presents a
significant obstacle to the transition to phase III operations, which
sees the main effort shifting to the Kivu provinces and the primary task
to disarm, demobilise, repatriate, resettle and reintegrate all armed
groups in the DRC.
Underlying the seemingly
insurmountable challenges of effective disarmament and reintegration of
combatants, there are far broader and deeper social, political and
economic challenges to be met. If peace is to involve more than those
armed élite presently masquerading as liberators and purporting to act
in the interests of a hapless population, it will require a massive
process of social engagement and mobilisation of peoples and communities
whose only experience of governance has been a brutal, corrupt and
exploitive one.
It has been two years since the
signing of the Lusaka agreement, and the much delayed Inter-Congolese
Dialogue on the political future of the country is due to start in Addis
Ababa on 15 October 2001. However, untangling the web of conflict and
creating relative stability and order in the DRC will require a very
substantial commitment from the international community over an extended
period. Sustainable peace will require an extensive peacebuilding
programme and ongoing development assistance lasting decades rather than
years. What is at stake in the DRC is not really ‘peace’, but the
(re)creation of a state often described by foreigners as ‘Europe without
roads’. In this sense, MONUC is merely the start of a process — the
first piece in a very large puzzle.
It is hoped that this relatively brief reflection on the
progress, problems and prospects for the peace process will help make
some sense of what is arguably the most complicated and ambitious
post-Cold War experiment in the creation of peace from chaos with fairly
modest resources. Indeed, it needs to make sense in a security climate
that threatens to push Africa even lower on the global agenda.