Monograph 38: Monografias 38 Arms Management Programme-Operations Rachel 1996-1999, Martinho Chachiua
With the
end of the Cold War proxy conflicts, Southern Africa has been left with
large numbers of weapons. These weapons have kept social stability and
human development hostage as they are used to fuel crime and violence.
Given the regional nature of weapons proliferation, efforts undertaken
with one or more partners have the best chance of success.
Various
countries in Southern Africa have entered into bilateral or trilateral
co-operation agreements around arms control issues. The agreement
between Mozambique and South Africa perhaps has had the most success in
destroying surplus weapons.
In
recognition of the extent of illicit arms smuggling, motor vehicle theft
and the damaging effects that both were having on safety and security,
Mozambique and South Africa signed a crime combating agreement in 1995.
The agreement allows police forces of the two countries to undertake
joint operations in response to common safety and security problems.
It
was recognised that arms caches in Mozambique were a main source of arms
being smuggled into South Africa. The joint operations (known as
Operation Rachel) were established to find and destroy weapons within
Mozambique left over from the war.
One
of the main characteristics of the operations undertaken as part of
Operation Rachel is that they have been intelligence-driven. It was
agreed that both the Mozambican and South African police forces would
gather information about cache locations. A team consisting of
Mozambican and South African police would destroy the weapons on site.
South Africa would pay the bulk of the costs of the operations and
provide expertise on weapons and explosives disposal and destruction. As
a result of increasing awareness about the programmes, private
companies have become involved, giving incentives to informers who
declare the location of arms caches. These informers are often women and
children.
The
Rachel operations also have an unorthodox policing approach. There is
co-operation with individuals with information on arms caches who are
often remunerated for disclosing their location. The rationale behind
this approach is the belief that most of the cache caretakers have
information about the whereabouts of other caches. "If you prosecute at the outset you lose the person’s co-operation to disclose other caches."
Since
the initiative was launched, Operation Rachel has gone from strength to
strength. By September 1998, three such operations had already taken
place. Police statistics indicate that these operations have destroyed
more than 300 tons of firearms and about four million rounds of
ammunition.
As a
result of these successes, Operation Rachel IV was undertaken in October
1998. While previous operations focused on southern Mozambique, Rachel
IV went into the central Sofala province. Over thirty bomb, explosive
and firearm disposal experts of the South Africa Police Service and
twelve Mozambican experts were involved in the operation. The operation
destroyed more than 100 tons of illegal weapons, including two cannons,
assault rifles, four types of handguns, three types of detonators, eight
types of mortar bombs and five types of rocket launchers.
The
expectation is that, if these operations continue to be as successful as
they are now, eventually most caches in Mozambique will be destroyed
and hence one of the sources of illegal weapons will have been
eliminated. The lessons of Operation Rachel will prove valuable for
other regions considering similar programmes.
The
Arms Management Programme of the Institute for Security Studies —
understanding the importance of this indigenous operation in the context
of regional initiatives for the control, management and reduction of
small arms in Southern Africa — offers the first full account of the
evolution and nature of the series of recovery operations entitled
‘Rachel’ in this monograph.
The
Arms Management Programme believes that examples such as these need to
be understood by the national, regional and international communities,
since they represent a special type of feasible and desirable
subregional initiative, one that — in time — might be perfected in order
to generate a working model for other similar situations in the African
context.