Monograph 130: From Soldiers to Citizens: The Social, Economic and Political Reintegration of Unita Ex-Combatants, Joao Gomes Porto, Imogen Parsons and Chris Alden

Demilitarisation in the Angolan Context

Demilitarisation of conflict and society is crucial to building sustainable peace in countries emerging from the scourge of civil war. As longstanding conflicts come to an end, a variety of approaches are adopted by national governments and international agencies aimed at supporting processes that facilitate this potentially volatile transition from formal peace to social peace. At the heart of the exercise is the necessity of transforming the culture and the instruments of war – in particular, demobilising, disarming and reintegrating former combatants into society as well as ridding the wider society of arms.

The experiences of controlled processes of demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DD&R) in the past two decades have demonstrated that DD&R must per force be regarded as a tool of development aid. This is particularly true as regards programmes for the reintegration of former combatants into society, “no longer merely seen as a humanitarian issue but…recognised as a vital element of conflict prevention and a critical precondition of any security sector reform”.2

While the process of societal demilitarisation must stem from a commitment by all to an end to using violent means in the resolution of disputes (most importantly by the leadership of armed movements), if it is to lead to sustainable peace, a deeper commitment at a socio-political level amongst those individuals (perpetrators of conflict) and communities (supporters or victims of conflict) to move beyond the identities and emblems which serve to perpetuate violence is critical. Moreover, the emergence of a new social contract in post-war societies is a vital step towards re-legitimising (in many instances, creating) the institutions and culture of good governance, of which democratic elections are a critical threshold. These can serve as a litmus test of the degree of reconciliation in a post-conflict situation.

In addition, genuine demilitarisation is only possible when all constituent elements of society are able to function fully as citizens. Former combatants, while numerically small relative to other vulnerable groups such as internally displaced peoples (IDPs), are not only potentially disruptive elements in the aftermath of war, but their reintegration back into society is widely thought to present very specific challenges. In this sense, while social acceptance and economic activity form part of the basis for this reconciliation, these factors must be accompanied by some form of political participation for reintegration to be considered complete. The sublimation of the instinctive resort to arms when conflict rears its head, and its substitution with the ‘cut and thrust’ of non-violent dispute resolution (including, of course, parliamentary debate and judicial appeals), is the key indicator that a democratic peace has been achieved.

Yet, this time, the situation is fundamentally different because peace came largely through military victory. The death in combat of Jonas Savimbi, leader of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in February 2002, and the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the belligerents two months later, established formal peace in Angola, at last.4 As we have pointed out elsewhere, “the Angolan Armed Forces’ (FAA) undeniable victory over a severely weakened UNITA must be considered central to this conflict’s ripeness for resolution – and this, more than any other factor, helps explain the pace at which the belligerents agreed on a comprehensive cease-fire agreement as well as their unhindered political will demonstrated in the resurrection and completion of [the military aspects] of the Lusaka peace process”.5 This was also the view of UN-system organisations present in Angola at the time:

In addition to a shattered infrastructure and devastated economic fabric, the situation prevailing in Angola at the end of the civil war presented severe humanitarian challenges. In fact, by mid-2002, the number of people displaced by the war had exceeded four million. When compared to the 800,000 estimated to have been displaced at the time of the Bicesse Accords (1991) and the additional 1.3 to 2 million displaced when the war spread to major urban centres in the period 1992-1994, the tasks facing the government and humanitarian agencies in the immediate post-war period become clearer. With more than a third of its population internally displaced and several thousand refugees in neighbouring countries, limited or no access to large parts of the country, overcrowding in urban areas and thousands of people in temporary resettlement sites, the challenges of implementing a DD&R programme in addition to the challenges of returning and reintegration its displaced population are momentous.

At the end of the war, thousands of people emerged from previously inaccessible areas, in spontaneous movements of a magnitude impossible to predict and therefore prepare for – Medicins Sans Frontières referred to these as the ‘grey areas’ of Angola (the areas in white in the map above). The scale of the accessibility problem may also be attested by the difference, registered in November 2002, between reported IDPs (4,440,056) and confirmed IDPs (1,296,303). Of the 18 provinces, five (Luanda, Benguela, Lunda Norte, Huambo and Kwanza Sul) were the worst affected, with a combined total of 2.5 million displaced. As we pointed out in an earlier work on DD&R in Angola, this humanitarian catastrophe determined the context in which post-war DD&R was undertaken,

At the municipal and communal level for example, shattered infrastructure and weak or non-existent state structures were often all that was left after the war. For the most part, the population movements described above took place without the substantive support foreseen by the ‘Norms on Resettlement and Return’ approved by the government during 2001. These norms defined a number of pre-conditions necessary for resettlement and return, including the establishment of security at local level, access (e.g. mine clearance), a functioning state administration, availability of land, water and basic sanitation and health facilities.

 At the same time, the first steps towards demilitarisation (cantonment, disarmament and demobilisation) of UNITA’s Military Forces (FMU) began during April 2002 with the setting-up of 27 quartering areas scattered throughout the country. As mentioned  earlier, the government of Angola (through the Angolan Armed Forces) retained total control of the disarmament and demobilisation process as well as the responsibility for its financing. A product of the specific circumstances of the war’s ending, the government’s exclusive control and financing of the process further distinguishes this process from previous attempts at DD&R in the country, as well as contemporary DD&R programmes in other African countries (for example Liberia, Burundi, DRC). No provision for formal third-party monitoring was included in the MoU, although the Troika (Portugal, Russia and the United States) and the United Nations were invited as observers.10

Two structures were created to oversee the DD&R process. A Joint Military Commission (JMC), presided over by a military representative of the government and composed of the chiefs of staff of the Angolan Armed Forces and the FMU (as well as 11 UN Military Observers), was responsible for overseeing and promoting the application of the MoU. A Technical Group (TG) was tasked with the responsibility of assisting the JMC in the performance of its duties, including the drawing-up of detailed timetables and the definition of specific activities to be carried out.

The commitments made in the Luena MoU, and the subsequent plans and timetables for a case-load of 50,000 former combatants, were subject to continuous revision and negotiation between the government and UNITA’s Management Commission (the movement’s temporary leadership structure). Internal and international pressure for the swift implementation of the DD&R programme (which would represent unquestionable evidence of an end to war and a successful demilitarisation of Angola) led to the announcement of the extinction of the FMU during August 2002 – a mere four months into the DD&R process. In a public statement, the Joint Military Commission announced that the demobilisation and disarmament components had been completed, as well as the integration of approximately 5,000 former UNITA combatants into FAA structures.

The political symbolism of the extinction of the FMU notwithstanding, the process was in fact far from complete because several thousand combatants and their family members continued to arrive at quartering and family reception areas many months later. In fact, by 18 February 2003, only five quartering areas had effectively been closed and the official figures released by the Ministry of Assistance and Social Reintegration (MINARS) at that time pointed to a total number of resettled and returned former combatants of only 22,643 and 70,694 family members.

At the time the FMU was declared extinct, demobilisation (which includes ‘registration and distribution of identification documents, data collection, pre-discharge information, medical screening and transport home’) was just about to begin.12 This was confirmed by a World Bank-led mission to Angola during August 2002, which highlighted that the registration of ex-combatants and the production of demobilised ID cards were still underway while the collection of socio-economic data in 24 of 35 quartering areas had just begun.13

Former combatants and their families in quartering and gathering areas continued to require emergency support well into 2003. This effort, as noted elsewhere, was largely undertaken by the FAA as regards former combatants, and by the World Food Programme (WFP) and international and local NGOs as regards assistance to family members (through the distribution of food, non-food items, seeds and tools, family tracing and reunification, etc).14 Throughout the process, the coming of the rainy season limited access to quartering and gathering areas, severely hampering resettlement efforts as well as the distribution of resettlement support kits. By April 2003, there were still 11 gathering areas and UN agencies and NGOs that reported difficulties, particularly in the highland provinces of the country, as regards the provision of basic supplies and services in the transit areas that had been created to assist the resettlement process.

Implementation of socio-economic reintegration programmes has, since then, proceeded at a limited pace. It has been hampered by a lack of funds and institutional capacity, the sheer scale of the problem as well as the inability of government institutions and international partners to agree on a timely reintegration programme that would closely follow resettlement and return.

While negotiations with international financial institutions for technical and monetary support, in particular the World Bank, had begun in mid-2002, it was only on 27 March 2003 that the Bank’s Board of Directors approved the Angola Demobilisation and Reintegration Program (ADRP). This emergency programme (initially worth an estimated US$180 million but by September 2004 estimated at US$230 million) was designed to assist more than 100,000 ex-UNITA combatants and approximately 33,000 FAA personnel. Of the $180 million, the Bank pledged and began to disburse US$33 million (through the IDA) and US$53 million (through the MDRP’s Multi-Donor Trust Fund); the government pledged US$127 million and the European Commission an additional US$17 million.

Objectives and Methodology

The dynamics that drive and sustain transitions from war to peace are not well elucidated or, more crucially, studied in a systematic manner. Resources of the international community given over to the study of reintegration (in its social, economic and political dimensions) have largely focused on the instrumental concerns of policy makers – more often than not bound by tight timeframes and primarily focused on stabilisation of populations rather than a longer-term developmental and peace-building approach. The increasing realisation that demobilisation and reintegration programmes are at the core of post-conflict peace-building has resulted in the involvement of new actors in the field of demobilisation and reintegration – actors that have traditionally shied away from working closely with the military and security sectors.17 In addition to the traditional bilateral support provided by third-party countries for DD&R and Security Sector Reform (SSR) processes, international development agencies have become increasingly important actors in these processes, in particular the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank (WB) as well as a myriad of NGOs and community-based organisations (CBOs) in countries undergoing DD&R processes.

Demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of former combatants have been given their correct place as critical components of peace-building – a function of the risk that former combatants are perceived to pose if not adequately demobilised or reintegrated (in itself an assumption that requires further research, both context-specific and of a comparative nature), or as a result of a perceived ‘peace’ dividend that may ensue from the downsizing of armed forces. Yet, paradoxically, the content of substantive reintegration, from the point of the target group remains fundamentally unexamined. Key conceptual issues such as the nature of ‘reintegration’ and its relationship to citizenship in post-conflict societies are not properly understood or accounted for in the design and development of reintegration programmes.

This is not to say that a blueprint for DD&R processes, to be applied indiscriminately to different situations and different types of beneficiaries (e.g. regular forces, paramilitary forces, child combatants) should be aimed at. In this regard, one should note the GTZ’s point that while ‘good preparation and coordination can prevent mistakes and provide timely clarity about the assistance required’, ‘experience shows that blueprints do not exist, and that demobilisation and reintegration support is at best dealt with within the broader rehabilitation and development support’.18 Yet, understanding the last step of a DD&R process, that of the socio-economic and political reintegration of former combatants into society – by nature a long-term process which should be linked to broader recovery efforts and development strategies – is critical. A cursory review of the available academic and policy-oriented literature reveals that, above all, the development of adequate methodologies is required so that a comprehensive and participatory assessment of reintegration processes (from the perspective of individuals and communities in post-conflict societies) can be achieved.

At a time when the reintegration of former combatants in Angola was in its infancy and several DD&R programmes were being developed in the region (Burundi and DRC in particular) the authors felt that is was critical that a project be pursued that addressed the complexities of this process with a view to critically understanding its various dimensions– not least through the development and employment of both quantitative and qualitative research methods. The project “From Soldiers to Citizens” therefore focused on former UNITA combatants in post-war Angola as a case-study, with the primary aim of obtaining a statistically informed analysis of the factors that enhance or impede the transformation of soldiers into civilians in a post-conflict environment.

Conducted over an 18-month period, commencing in November 2003, the project included the development of an appropriate and situation-specific survey methodology; fieldwork in three select provinces in the Central Highlands of Angola; an interim workshop with Angolan policy-makers and project partners in Johannesburg to present initial research findings and, finally, the publishing of the project’s findings.

Specifically, the project aimed to address the following questions through primary quantitative and qualitative research and analysis:

What does or should reintegration mean in the context of weak or non-existent state structures? An essential feature of many (if not most) post-conflict situations in Africa – but one which seems to have been consistently neglected – is that reintegration takes place within the conditions of weak, enervated or even collapsed states. This raises the question of how one can speak of ‘reintegration’ back into a fragmented society, a shattered economy and often a contested political authority. Are these factors taken into account in the development of reintegration programmes?

To answer these questions, a time-series quantitative and qualitative study of reintegration in post-war Angola was conducted. Samples were used both as regards the target group (focusing solely on former UNITA combatants demobilised following the Luena Memorandum of Understanding of April 2002) as well as geographical area (focusing solely on the provinces of Huambo, Huíla and Bié in the central plateau of Angola). The choice of these three Provinces was a function of several factors, discussed at more length later on. At this point, it suffices to say that all three (but particularly Bié and Huambo) were key areas of recruitment during the war and that a significant proportion of former combatants were demobilised and resettled in the central highlands– 46,940 out of a total of 103,928 (representing roughly 45% of the total).

In-depth surveys, focus group discussions and key informant interviews were conducted to assess the levels of (i) social reintegration; (ii) economic activity; (iii) and political engagement (See Annex 1, Survey Questionnaire). These methods were used over a six-month period and involved one field visit to each province (two target districts, one urban and one rural in each) to collect data and information.

As was mentioned at the outset of this monograph, the project established a number of partnerships with Angolan NGOs, including Development Workshop (DW), CARE Angola and the Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development (ACORD). The participation of the Angolan partners was essential for the field research component of the project, in particular the collection of surveys, the undertaking of focus group discussions, as well as logistical support.

During November 2003, a five-day methodology test and training course was undertaken in Huambo. A core team of local researchers from DW as well as a representative from Care Bié were trained in basic research methods and the subject matter of the research. The course included activities such as small-group and one-to-one discussions, group brainstorming, role-playing and mapping. In addition, the project’s methodology was tested in the field, and the feedback used in the refinement and finalisation of the questionnaire and focus group questions.

Though every effort was made to allow for the development and implementation of a survey that was both unbiased and could produce statistically sound results, the project team did experience some problems that affected the survey findings. These included: