Volume 5 Number 5

In the dying days of CODESA, at a time when the euphoria about the new South African rainbow nation was reaching fever pitch, the securocrats of the `old order` repeatedly warned that the incoming South African Government of National Unity would soon discover that it would be unable to rule South Africa without the instruments of law and order with which the National Party had armed itself. In time, this analysis has proven to be tragically accurate. Today, as crime, violence and corruption are perceived as being rampant, gloom and pessimism pervade South African society. To many foreign observers, South Africa is rapidly becoming ungovernable. Foreign investment has been reduced to speculative cash inflows and the never-ending depreciation of the Rand indicates the lack of faith that the international investor and markets have in the future stability and prosperity of this country.

Should South Africa not deal adequately with the very high levels of internal crime and violence, the country will require, very soon, much higher levels of security spending than at present. This will undermine the tentative progress made towards a constitutional state based on a respect for human rights. Reflect, for example, on the following conclusions from the Nedcor Project on Crime, Violence and Investment (June 1996, p. 13). "Government`s inability to deal with crime and violence represents by far its greatest failing to date ... vigorous action against crime and violence is not only the most important task of government and civil society, but also the most urgent ... the country simply cannot afford the current levels of crime and violence." The approximately 21 000 crime-related deaths that occurred during 1995, outnumbered deaths from motor vehicle accidents by two to one. The South African figure of 57 violent deaths per 100 000 head of population is nearly six times that of the United States. Every day 2 500 South Africans require hospital treatment as a result of stabbings, beatings and shootings. In 1995, only a quarter of all robberies were resolved, one fifth of all domestic burglaries, one tenth of all vehicle thefts and about fifty per cent of all murders. The country simply cannot afford these statistics. An early and important casualty in the process has been a levelling off of tourism to South Africa, an industry with arguably the greatest potential for job-creation in the short term.

There are many reasons for this violent situation, ranging from historical imbalances that have developed over hundreds of years, to the transformation of the civil service and the very liberal nature of our new constitution. Much has been written and will still be written in the apportionment of blame and in an attempt to analyse the past. But, while we debate the cause of the illness, the patient is in danger of dying from the secondary symptoms of the disease.

By international comparative standards South Africa is not significantly underpoliced. The number of police personnel equals 328 people per police officer (140 000 in total), and compares favourably with an international average of 1 014. Clearly, increasing the number of policemen or women alone will not solve the problem. Yet, despite the many plans and initiatives that the Department of Safety and Security have recently placed on the table, the domestic law and order situation does not appear to improve. Efforts at crime prevention, detection, investigation and successful prosecution are not aided by the Minister of Justice and the National Commissioner of the SAPS being reduced to public disagreements on the apportionment of blame.

Against this background, the Department of Defence has recently concluded the first round of its Defence Review. It culminated on 12 and 13 August 1996 in Cape Town with a National Consultative Conference following which, in October, the Review will be tabled in Parliament. The Minister of Defence and his staff have made a trail-blazing effort, unrivalled by other departments, to involve people and to consult widely. The Department has been rewarded in this process by an emerging national consensus on defence priorities and a greater degree of trust between the various stakeholders, such as Parliament, the academic community, the international defence analytical community, as well as between the Defence Secretariat, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and the Ministry itself. In many respects, this has been a remarkable process and the Department of Defence deserves credit for its efforts.

The essence of the Defence Review is that the SANDF intends to provide a `core` conventional force ready for expansion to a war force in times of military threat. The size and capabilities of such a core force are clearly debatable and will rely on a number of assumptions regarding the nature of any future conventional threats. From the preceding paragraphs it should be clear that the threats facing South Africa are not military, but criminal. Porous borders, inadequate population movement control and a culture of lawlessness characterise our society. The results are the emigration of skilled people, inadequate foreign investment and an outflow of South African capital into offshore assets. Yet, Government does not appear committed to contain the spiralling crime rate or to execute the tasks which the country will now require of our security agencies.

For example, despite the good intentions of the White Paper on Defence, and the agreement among all defence and police analysts, that the SANDF should withdraw from the internal security situation, it is inevitable that the support currently provided by the SANDF to the police will increase rather than decrease. Reasons for this belief include the slow progress made with the transformation of the SAPS, the virtual collapse of the criminal justice system, the ongoing crises within South African prisons and the failure of the Government thus far to deliver on its socio-economic commitments. The system which should protect and ensure the safety of our citizenry, in effect, is `broken`. According to the Nedcor Project, of 1 000 crimes committed, only 450 are reported, 230 solved, 100 perpetrators prosecuted, 77 convicted, 36 imprisoned and only eight imprisoned for two years or more. Of the eight imprisoned, one will be rehabilitated. One quarter of the approximately 120 000 people in our prisons are still awaiting trial.

In contrast, the possibility that the SANDF will deploy on major conventional operations in defence of the country during the years that lie ahead, is highly improbable. As a result, the core force should, firstly, be less intended to defend the country against conventional attack, but should rather serve as a rapid reaction force that can deal with larger, unexpected contingencies, while adopting a conventional peace-time training mission. It is equally important that the Department of Defence may have been better advised to plan its activities and budgets to a greater degree as a reflection of the real tasks of the SANDF in the short, medium and long term. These real tasks will inevitably entail:

• increased border control duties, not only to counter illegal immigration, but also to combat drug smuggling, gun running, cattle rustling and game poaching;
• disaster relief, and search and rescue missions, in the event of both natural and manmade disasters and crises, ranging from assistance to keep emergency services functional, to emergency water delivery during drought;
• assistance to the South African Police Services (SAPS) in combating violence and crime particularly with visible policing duties, among others providing the personnel for cordon and search operations, and roadblocks; and