Volume 4 Number 4

Remarkably, and contrary to domestic and international expectations, the integration of the former South African Defence Force (SADF), the two former guerrilla armies (that of the African National Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress) and the four armed forces of the so-called ‘homelands’ (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei) is proceeding well. Increasingly the focus will shift to the programme of demobilisation and eventually, rationalisation or downsizing of the new South African National Defence Force (SANDF).

A large number of the 34 000 former guerrillas from the armed wing of the ANC and the PAC, possibly some forty per cent eventually, have opted not to report to the assembly areas. A much smaller portion have reported but were found unsuitable for integration for reasons relating to age, lack of education, poor health, and the like. Many former guerrillas, therefore, still remain outside the integration process although some have also found other, more lucrative employment.

Ironically, much of the credit for the successful integration process must accrue to the senior military commanders of the various forces, who negotiated the structure and composition of the SANDF in the months leading up to the elections last year, while the delays in the demobilisation programme appear to be political rather than caused by the military. In particular, the strain and lack of mutual confidence between the Ministry of Defence, the Defence Secretariat, the SANDF and the parliamentary defence committees is an increased source of concern.

During 1996 the SANDF will commence with a process of rationalisation. Ostensibly, demobilisation and rationalisation will consist of ‘downsizing’ the bloated SANDF from a peak of approximately 125 000 soldiers, civilians and bureaucrats, to an affordable90 000 soldiers or less. This process is complicated by integration which has further increased the size of the officer corps, already disproportionately large for many years, and the requirement to restructure and redesign the SANDF in accordance with its new role and defensive posture. As a result, many of the newly integrated soldiers may soon be out of a job.

At a time when unemployment figures approach fifty per cent of the employable population in the country, the demobilisation of soldiers could have negative implications. Many of these men and women lack the necessary skills to find alternative employment in an economy desperately short of job opportunities.

Little appears to be happening to prepare for the social reintegration of combatants. Without the necessary assistance and support programmes, an influx of demobilised soldiers in the job market could further add to the already high levels of crime and violence in a country beset by rampant levels of lawlessness, thereby reducing investor and tourist confidence. A particularly disturbing factor is that only a minuscule amount of the weapons of the ANC and PAC have been handed in. As a result, numerous arms caches still remain hidden across the country and the fear is that former soldiers may have ready access to these arms or that the arms may fall into criminal hands.

To some degree the successes of the past have been attained by putting off difficult decisions on demobilisation and downsizing - problems that cannot be ignored for much longer and that imply solutions which are bound to lead to dissatisfaction among important sections of the electorate.

The South African military is approaching a belated crisis of transition. Despite the fact that the military has undergone dramatic changes in recent years, the transformation of the SANDF as a whole is still incomplete. Strong political leadership will be required to restore morale, to direct the formulation of defence policy and place the military squarely within the democratic model. Recently, the initial momentum with which the Department of Defence had entered the new South Africa had been tapering off. The question is, who will provide this leadership, and in particular the political direction to conclude the transformation to an effective, accountable and affordable force.

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