Improving compliance and accountability in AU peace operations

African Union compliance framework implementation should be routine, capacitated and regularly reviewed across all AU peace support operations.

Published on 13 August 2026 in PSC Insights

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PSC Report

On 25 June, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) was briefed on the progress of implementing the AU compliance and accountability frameworks for peace support operations (PSOs). The AU compliance framework is the AU’s permanent compliance and accountability framework. It integrates legal obligations, policies, mechanisms and responsibilities to ensure that PSOs comply with international humanitarian law, human rights standards and AU conduct guidelines.

The June briefing marked the PSC's first focused discussion on AUCF implementation since the 2017 endorsement. It coincided with the completion of the initial project phase of the AUCF tripartite AU-European Union (EU)-United Nations (UN) 2022 to 2025, which aimed to strengthen the AU’s capacity to implement the AUCF. While progress has been made, practical adoption remains slow. The 1 352^nd PSC communiqué requests further efforts to institutionalise the framework within PSOs and to extend it to peace operations led by regional economic communities and mechanisms.

Progress

For the AU, compliance grew from operational experience. A former AU official noted that, before the development of the AUCF, missions developed their own standard operating procedures for sexual exploitation and abuse, conduct, crisis reporting, hotlines and civilian harm in response to operational needs. These included the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and later the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS).

Pre-AUCF, missions developed their own response mechanisms to sexual abuse, civilian harm and crisis reporting

Somalia, however, showed the limits of relying solely on mission capacity and often ad hoc responses that led to fragmented authority and accountability. Additionally, the 2018 AU-UN review of AMISOM warned that the joint operations between it and Somali security forces could heighten violations and stressed the need for stronger compliance capacity and oversight.  

The AU's compliance architecture has evolved through three overlapping phases.

The first shift was political and normative, moving compliance from a broad pledge to a concrete, reportable obligation. PSC decisions gradually made compliance an operational requirement for AU peace missions, including the 2017 request for updates on the AUCF and annual reports. In 2021, PSO effectiveness and integrity were linked to personnel performance and in 2021, AUCF obligations were included in the ATMIS mandate. While institutional oversight of AUCF implementation was PSC-mandated, it still needs to be regularised.

The second shift created a dispersed accountability system to manage responsibilities, information and follow-up across headquarters, missions, member states and T/PCCs. The PSC oversaw and coordinated the peace support operations directorate and designated roles for the office of internal oversight and office of the legal counsel, with T/PCCs investigating allegations and reporting to the AU. 

For instance, the AU-EU-UN partnership supported systems such as complaint mechanisms, communication guidelines and the Case management system to establish a shared accountability chain for handling allegations. This aimed to improve traceability of responsibilities and follow-up without centralising accountability in Addis Ababa. The complaint mechanism illustrates this logic: it connects receipt and documentation to investigation, communication with authorities, accountability follow-up and victim assistance, as needed.

Compliance was moved from a broad pledge to a concrete, reportable obligation

The third shift was operational. In 2022, the PSC added AUCF compliance to the ATMIS mandate, leading to revisions to the rules of engagement, police directives and inquiry procedures aligned with AUCF standards, thereby enhancing incident reporting and investigations. The integrated compliance and accountability framework was included in the concept of operations for the AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia, and was aligned with operational directives. The framework's remedial actions, including victim support and compensation, indicate that compliance addresses the consequences of conduct and aims to prevent violations. Three related implementation gaps remain.

Weak action and follow-up

Converting reporting into accountable action, with follow-up, remains weak. More difficult has been organising accountability across institutions with different responsibilities. The strategic framework divides implementation across strategic headquarters, missions and member states, including T/PCCs. Mission leadership must implement the framework, while different AU Commission offices coordinate, investigate and conduct legal functions and T/PCCs investigate allegations and report disciplinary or judicial action to the AU.

The AUCF does not centralise all accountability in Addis Ababa, but seeks to make a dispersed system more governable by clarifying how information, responsibility and follow-up move among actors. Although frameworks exist on paper, enforcement often depends on troop-contributing countries, making accountability uneven across missions. Weak follow-up and limited monitoring mechanisms further undermine implementation.

AU headquarters has sought to address this by establishing an AUCF coordination architecture involving departments and offices. However, competing institutional priorities, limited human resources and unclear reporting lines remain. While missions report misconduct and actions to the commissioner for political affairs, peace and security, these reports do not consistently reach the PSO directorate. The case management system is expected to address this gap by providing a centralised platform to capture and track misconduct, although its effectiveness will need to be determined during implementation.

For compliance oversight, every mission briefing to the PSC should include a section on implementing compliance obligations under PSC mandates. These updates should move beyond describing activities to reporting measurable progress, including allegations received, investigations undertaken, remedial actions implemented, civilian harm mitigation measures, implementation challenges and lessons identified.

Capacity and resource gaps

The AUCF requires missions to monitor and report incidents, investigate alleged non-compliance, track civilian harm and integrate compliance into operational planning and review. These functions require specialist personnel, investigative expertise and functioning information systems. Yet, there is often insufficient capacity to ensure corrective action or systematically track implementation.

Given the risks of donor-dependent compliance structures, the AU must have its own funding for the compliance framework

The most significant challenge is resourcing. Missions face severe staffing shortages that undermine their operational effectiveness. In Somalia, for example, the number of compliance officers has dropped from about 14 during AMISOM/ATMIS to only two in AUSSOM (although recruitments is ongoing). Similar capacity gaps exist within the Multinational Joint Task Force, which lacks compliance and human rights officers. 

Compounding these constraints, AU officials report that the digital case management system software has expired due to the AU-EU-UN tripartite arrangement that funded the system, which concluded in 2025. Although the AU has budgeted additional funding for the system, internal procurement rules must be addressed to access this.

Holistic implementation

Implementation and absorption among regional economic communities is slow. Despite South African Development Community and Economic Community of West African States agreement and the development of roadmaps, ongoing support is needed to achieve operational compliance and accountability. The PSO directorate has conducted several training sessions with economic communities on its AUCF, but the sustainability of these resource-intensive sessions is in question.

Finally, AUCF sustainability remains uncertain as permanent obligations rely on temporary infrastructure. Much recent policy and operational development was supported through the AU-EU-UN trilateral project, underscoring the risks associated with donor-dependent compliance structures. Long-term financing is needed. Furthermore, the PSC should enhance institutional learning by ensuring that operational lessons from missions consistently influence continental policy. The development of the AUCF exemplifies how several AU-wide compliance policies emerged from innovations among missions. Thus, future reforms should prioritise field evidence alongside headquarters guidance.