Beyond stalemate: how can the African Union stay relevant in Libya?
A sustained AU engagement is essential to mitigating external interference, supporting an inclusive political process, and advancing national reconciliation in Libya.
On 9 June 2026, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) held its 1,351st meeting, which discussed Libya. Chaired by Sierra Leone, with Nigeria as stand-in chair, the Council received a comprehensive briefing on the country’s political, security and humanitarian developments. This came nearly a year after the landmark 1,291st PSC session of heads of state and government in July 2025. That meeting was convened following the serious clashes in Tripoli in May 2025 that had earlier been addressed at the Council’s 1,280th emergency session.
Those clashes resulted in the killing of Abdel Ghani al-Kiliki, leader of the Tripoli aligned armed group – the Stability Support Apparatus (SSA) – by the rival 444th Brigade. It underscored the enduring influence of armed militant groups over Libya’s fragile political security landscape.
Fifteen years after the 2011 uprising that toppled Muammar Gaddafi, the African Union (AU) has been notably persistent. The PSC has held at least 20 meetings on Libya since February 2011, while the AU High-Level Committee on Libya (chaired by Republic of Congo) is the AU’s main vehicle for an African-led settlement. Yet Libya remains in a state of managed fragmentation: rival eastern and western power centres prevent total collapse but block meaningful national reconciliation, institutional unification and democratic transition.
Libya is one of Africa’s most strategically important files. Instability fuels arms trafficking, organised crime, irregular migration, terrorism and foreign fighter movements across the Sahel and beyond. With Africa’s largest oil reserves and about 150 armed groups (around 20 significant), competition over resources exacerbates the crisis.
Consolidating momentum
The communiqué of the 1,351st meeting was cautiously optimistic. The Council welcomed additional signatories to the February 2025 Charter for Peace National Reconciliation and commended the leadership of Congolese President Denis Sassou Nguesso, who chairs the high-level committee. It noted the Unified Budget Agreement of 11 April 2026 (driven largely by the United States) and the joint military exercise held in March 2026, both viewed as modest but important confidence builders.
Rival eastern and western power centres prevent Libyan collapse but block reconciliation and transition
The PSC renewed its rejection of external interference in Libya’s internal affairs and reiterated calls for withdrawal of all foreign forces and mercenaries. It also expressed concern over continued violations of the United Nations (UN) embargo, illicit fuel exports, sporadic armed clashes and the deteriorating humanitarian conditions of African migrants in detention centres across the country. Importantly, the Council announced it would undertake a field mission to Libya and reiterated its commitment to relocating the AU liaison office to Tripoli by the end of 2027.
The meeting also brought a gradual shift in the PSC’s approach. Instead of launching new initiatives, it reinforced existing commitments on national reconciliation, institution-building and implementation. It recognised that Libya’s core challenge is no longer lack of agreements – at least nine major roadmaps or peace processes have been launched since 2011 – but persistent failure to implement them.
While the proposed mission and the office relocation signal greater on-the-ground engagement, neither is new. Field missions were announced (but not conducted) at the 1,244th (November 2024) and 1,291st (July 2025) meetings. Similarly, the office, established by the 297th PSC meeting in 2011 and based in Tunis, has operated in Tunisia ever since. The formal decision to relocate it was taken during the 35th AU summit (February 2022) Decision 815 and has since been repeatedly reaffirmed without progress.
Diplomatic headway
The 1,351st meeting occurred amid cautious but significant diplomatic progress. The UN Secretary-General’s April 2026 report noted slow implementation of the UN political roadmap launched in August 2025, yet the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)-facilitated structured dialogue continued to generate consensus opportunities despite east-west institutional schisms.
Libya’s core challenge is no longer lack of agreements, but persistent failure to implement them
On 16 June 2026, Libya’s three principal institutions – the High Council of State (western aligned), Presidential Council (western) and the House of Representatives (eastern) – signed the Document of Principles: Roadmap for Ending the Transitional Period. This largely Libyan-led tripartite agreement commits the parties to simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections by 17 February 2027, established a high sovereign oversight committee and outlines steps to end the transition. Although parallel to the UN roadmap, it builds on key UNSMIL elements, including electoral framework recommendations and dialogue.
AU Commission Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf welcomed it as an encouraging step towards constitutional order and reconciliation. Conversely, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative Hanna Tetteh, in remarks two days later, did not mention the agreement by name and continued to prioritise the roadmap, noting unresolved technical and legal issues .
Structural obstacles to peace
Libya has a consistent record of agreements that collapse or fall dormant at implementation. As Anas El Gomati of the Tripoli-based Sadeq Institute notes, ‘endorsement is not implementation’. The core obstacles are institutional and economic. Rival authorities east and west benefit politically and financially from maintaining parallel institutions – particularly through control of oil revenues and state resources. This creates strong incentives to preserve fragmentation rather than unify. Competing security structures, administrations, judicial bodies and financial networks are sustained by oil revenues. El Gomati posits that elections alone are unlikely to resolve the crisis without deeper reforms in institution building, public finance and the security sector.
External actors add greater complexity. According to El Gomati, the United Arab Emirates has faced little consequence or attention in mediation despite being the primary external military patron of the Khalifa Haftar-aligned Libyan National Army (LNA) since 2016, specifically through the Al-Khadim Airbase. LNA-controlled territories have also reportedly served as a supply corridor for Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces. The PSC has strongly rejected (although not by name) the presence of foreign forces, mercenaries, and fighters. However, the 5+5 Joint Military Commission has acknowledged that lack of unification among security sector institutions remains a major obstacle to external force withdrawals.
In this environment, overlapping peace initiatives – UN roadmap, AU efforts and the 2026 tripartite agreement – risk duplication and forum-shopping. Greater coordination among them will be essential to turn recent diplomatic momentum into lasting impact.
Why the AU still matters
The AU has wisely refrained from launching yet another competing roadmap. However, its 2011 roadmap and subsequent high-level committee decisions have faced significant implementation challenges. These stem from a combination of external factors (foreign interference and competing mediation tracks) and internal constraints (limited follow-up capacity, resources and competing continental priorities).
The PSC strongly rejects the presence of foreign forces, mercenaries and fighters
Nevertheless, a clear example of the AU’s added value is the National Reconciliation Charter, facilitated by the committee. Introduced at the 38th AU summit in 2025, the charter brought together traditionally opposed power centres: the Presidential Council, High Council of State (Tripoli aligned), the House of Representatives and factions, including those linked to Gaddafi’s son Saif al-Islam Gaddafi. Although the latter’s killing in February 2026 was a setback, the charter has still helped bridge Libya’s deep political and geographical divide and contributed to recent diplomatic momentum.
The AU is distinct in Libya’s crowded mediation landscape. Unlike many actors focused narrowly on elections and institutions, it frames the crisis as both political and societal. Through the high-level committee and Brazzaville Process, it prioritises national reconciliation, transitional justice and social cohesion. The AU further reinforced its diplomatic role through the A3’s collaboration with the United Kingdom (as Libya’s penholder) to secure the unanimous adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2819. This extended Libya’s sanctions regime, a development welcomed by the PSC at its 1,351st meeting.
Opportunities for advancement
Fifteen years after Ghaddafi’s fall, Libya’s transition remains elusive. The coming months will prove whether momentum translates into progress ahead of the planned 2027 elections. Libya, therefore, remains a significant challenge for the PSC, particularly given the United States’ emphasis on the Unified Budget Agreement. As El Gomati argues, such efforts risk reinforcing elite bargains that secure oil contracts and revenue flows while leaving institutional dysfunction, state capture and external patronage networks that sustain Libya’s division. Unless the AU can help harmonise the implementation of existing peace initiatives, its influence on the ground may continue to wane.
To strengthen its contribution, the PSC should:
- Champion greater harmonisation of mediation by supporting implementation of the tripartite agreement with the UN roadmap and the charter. This will reduce duplication and advance measurable institutional reunification and credible elections by end-2027.
- Expedite the field mission and relocation of the AU liaison office in Tripoli by end-2027.
- Sustain pressure for the withdrawal of foreign forces while addressing Libya-Sudan linkages.
- Expand support for local reconciliation dialogues based on AU transitional justice policies.
Ultimately, the AU’s relevance will depend not on new initiatives, but on its ability to act as an effective coordinator and guarantor of implementation in a landscape dominated by powerful external players and entrenched, fragmented domestic interest.
