Who Will Save Chad From This Agony?
blurb:isstoday:28022008chad
28 February 2008: Who Will Save Chad From This Agony?
In his book Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict Stephen van Evera points out that ‘wars would be fewer if the losers could foretell their defeat and if both sides could foresee the cost of fighting. … Thus a root cause of war lies in the opacity of the future and in the optimistic illusions that this opacity allows.’ These illusions, adds Evera, lead parties to fight in false hope of victory, or for pyrrhic victories. No better description can be given for the state in which Idriss Deby, the Chadian president, has been in recent years. The consequences for Chad are nothing short of tragic.
The latest assault on Deby’s regime began on 2 February 2008, when the rebels seized control of large parts of the capital and came within reach of Deby’s palatial residence. The Red Cross estimates that more than 160 people have been killed and more than 1,000 injured in the latest outbreak of violence. Deby survived the latest attack only due to military intervention by the French. But for how long will Deby depend on external support to help him ‘lead’ his own country?
Although the European Union (EU) has offered to send a 4,000-strong peacekeeping force to Chad by the end of this month, the force, which carries a UN mandate, will not be involved in Chad’s woes. Instead its mandate restricts it to protecting civilians and refugees from violence in Darfur, and to providing security for aid agencies.
Chad is a country that embodies both fortune and misfortune. In 2000, Chad caught the attention of the international community with the revelation that newly discovered oil reserves would earn it an estimated $6 billion over the following 25 years. In 2003 the vast landlocked country exported its first barrel of oil through a new pipeline that cost £2.6 billion and which runs through neighbouring Cameroon to the Atlantic coast. The pipeline project was said at the time to be the largest private investment in sub-Saharan Africa, a development that brought considerable hope to Chad, where 80% of the population continue to live on less than US$1 a day.
Under the Petroleum Revenue Management Law (PRML) agreed between Chad and the World Bank, a provision was made whereby 10% of the country’s oil revenues were to be saved in a special fund reserved for future generations. It is estimated that the oil reserves will last about 70 years. The remainder of the money was to be invested in roads, health, education infrastructure, and bringing potable water to the people.
The inauguration of the pipeline in July 2003 has, however, done little to ease the social problems facing Chad. The discovery of oil brought with it new problems that have kept Chad near the bottom of United Nations development Index. The country has plunged into serious financial problems, it faces internal conflicts and army desertions, and the threat of a civil war looms on the horizon. These and other factors make Chad an endemic member of the class of the poorest countries in the world.
In October 2005, Chad's president, Deby, initiated a process to draft a new law aimed at redistributing oil revenues. He sought to change the agreement on revenue distribution from the Chad-Cameroon pipeline so that Chad can extract greater profit for itself. In particular the proposed law sought to abolish the provision on the amount of money reserved for future generations.
Critics of Deby's policies noted that his government was likely to use the extra money to buy arms to defend his now floundering regime. In December 2005, the World Bank stated that it was considering sanctions against the Chadian government if Chad went ahead with its plan to tamper with the petroleum revenues. The World Bank reaffirmed to Deby that the 1999 Petroleum Revenue Management Law (PRML) was a legal condition of the Bank agreeing to back a pipeline linking Chad to Cameroon's Atlantic coast. In return for the World Bank funding the government of Chad had promised not to amend any provisions of the law in ways that would "materially and adversely affect" the poverty-reduction strategy enshrined in the PRML. The agreement allowed the World Bank, in case of a breach of contract by Chad, to suspend new credits or grants, to halt disbursement of funds, and to demand accelerated repayment of loans.
In June 2005, Deby called for a referendum to change Chad's constitution, in order to allow him to run for a third term as president. Deby's second and supposedly final five-year mandate was to end in May 2006, but his contested win in the referendum allowed for a constitutional amendment that eliminated term limits, in spite of strong opposition from civil society groups.
Meanwhile, the tension between Chad and Sudan continued to heighten in 2005, with Deby claiming that Sudan was providing arms and logistical support to Chadian rebels and deserters. He claimed that Chad had proof that the Sudanese government had armed rebels, put vehicles at their disposal, and provided logistics and communications capability. Sudan, for its part, accused Chad of offering support to rebels in Darfur.
The escalating tension within and between Chad and Sudan makes renewed armed conflict in the region highly likely, with the possibility of neighbouring countries getting involved. The widespread availability of small arms, especially in Chad, could easily prolong the ongoing strife and possibly lead to a full-blown war between Chad and Sudan. With Idiss Deby ensconced in the palace in N’djamena under French military guard, and the rebels baying for his blood in the outskirts, who will come to the rescue of the ordinary Chadians caught in the middle?
Nelson Alusala, Senior Researcher, Arms Management Programme, ISS Pretoria (Tshwane)
