What The Future Holds For Zimbabwe?
blurb:isstoday:27062008zimfuture
27 June 2008: What The Future Holds For Zimbabwe?
The withdrawal of MDC-leader Morgan Tsvangirai from the presidential run-off to be held in Zimbabwe today, 27 June, came as a surprise to some and wiped many possible scenarios for the immediate future of Zimbabwe off the table.
Tsvangirai’s announcement came just four days before the scheduled election in the midst of a rapidly deteriorating security situation. The crisis in Zimbabwe constitutes a major challenge to regional stability in Southern Africa, not only because of its likely direct impact on the region's political and economic stability, including possible mass displacement of people, but also because it creates a dangerous precedent for the political future of the continent.
Zimbabwe has experienced a high degree of political violence these last few weeks, with the opposition claiming that over 80 of its supporters have been killed by Zanu-PF supporters and thousands displaced from their voting wards. There is ample evidence that such violence has been perpetrated by a combination ofstate agencies (army, police and intelligence), war veterans, and youth militias. The government claims that MDC activists have also perpetrated violence and are attacking Zanu PF supporters. However, evidence suggests that while there has been some retaliatory violence, it has been of a far lesser degree than that instigated by the government and its supporters.This widespread campaign of intimidation and violence is antithetical to the very spirit of elections. Instead of openness, competition and transparency, the current climate is one of fear, hostility and danger.
The violence and the displacements pose an immediate challenge to the credibility of the voting process.
It was hoped that the climate would improve with the arrival of a large number of regional and international observers for the run-off. During the first round of voting, initial reports by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Pan-African Parliament observer missions provided first-hand accounts of politically motivated violence. However, this time round observers have now also become a target of those determined to prevent a democratic vote in Zimbabwe.
Against this background the United Nations Security Council condemned the violence in Zimbabwe, urged the government to put an immediate stop to it and create a space for a free and fair election.
This week heads of state forming part of the troika of the SADC organ on politics, defense and security did meet in Mbabane, Swaziland and asked the government of Zimbabwe to postpone the elections. However this seems unlikely.
A few scenarios now remain:
Scenario 1: The elections take place without MorganTsvangirai
At this stage this is the most likely scenario to play out in the short term. If Tsvangirai does not participate it is likely that the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission would declare president Robert Mugabe the winner. Mugabe is still using all the instruments of the state to ensure that the MDC is no threat even if Tsvangirai decided to change his mind.
The United States, United Kingdom and the European Union will not recognize Mugabe as president and lobby for African leaders and specifically Southern African leaders to follow suite. Sanctions might be increased. The government of Zimbabwe relies heavily on its earnings from mining and there could be EU and US restrictions on companies doing business with state enterprises in Zimbabwe. The loophole is that China or other countries might step in to fill the gap. The UN has no sanctions on Zimbabwe. Whether the Security Council would impose any is doubtful.
It is foreseen that these measures will have no impact in the immediate future and that the Zanu-PF will just become stronger and the securitization of the state will continue.
Scenario 2: Government of National Unity
This option was apparently envisaged by the current mediation team, led by president Thabo Mbeki, but was never accepted by the two parties. Tsvangirai has indicated that he is willing to discuss this option with Zanu-PF but not with Mugabe. This scenario is built around the assumption that Mugabe accepts that his position internationally and regionally is weakened and agrees to form a Government of National Unity (GNU). The key question here is whether he would remain president of the country in such a GNU. If he did, would the MDC agree? If not, would he agree? Any accord like this would also need pressure on Mugabe and guarantees that follow-up elections would be free and fair.
Scenario 3: Military Intervention
This option was raised at various occasions these last few days. The African Union (AU) can intervene in terms of the Constitutive Act if crimes against humanity or war crimes did take place or if the host country invites the AU to intervene. The government of Zimbabwe is highly unlikely to invite the AU to send troops. The AU needs a two-thirds majority at the heads of state level to launch a military intervention. At this stage this is also unlikely. A UN invasion is equally unlikely since it can only happen in terms of Chapter 8 (regional arrangement) or Chapter 7 (peace enforcement) of the UN charter.
A humanitarian intervention, with the aim of protecting and feeding people, is however a possibility if things get totally out of control. A UN-authorised force might be assembled in terms of Chapter 7 but it would be difficult to do anything if there is no consent from the Zimbabwe authorities.
Scenario 4: Transitional Arrangements
This scenario provides for a transitional arrangement between the MDC and ZANU-PF for a period leading up to an election. Who to lead the transitional authority would be a challenge. This scenario is likely to have the support of the international community. The MDC has also already come out in support of such an arrangement. It could provide for changes to the electoral act and reform of the security forces to ensure impartiality in the run up to the election. International observers or a peacekeeping force could be deployed to oversee a peaceful transition.
At this stage, it seems clear that the first scenario is most likely to play out. The election will take place on 27 June and Mugabe will win. Zanu-PF will establish total control under a renewed Mugabe presidency. Economically, the country will regress rapidly. The chances of a full-scale civil war look remote at the moment, given the weakness of the MDC and the intimidation used by Zanu-PF.
The second and third scenarios are unlikely to happen.
The preferred scenario is the fourth scenario. This will requireinternational pressure to bring the parties together agreeing on a transitional authority. A transitional arrangement will have to be based on a common commitment by both parties to reach a political compromise and to cease violence to save lives and to save Zimbabwe from disaster.
Henri Boshoff, Analyst, African Security Analysis Programme, ISS Tshwane (Pretoria)
