West Africa must take the helm in the fight against piracy
With their strong track record of naval engagement, Gulf of Guinea states can achieve greater self-reliance on maritime security.
Published on 29 September 2025 in
ISS Today
By
The Gulf of Guinea has recorded the fewest overall piracy incidents in 30 years. But when attacks take place, they result in tangible harm or death, and still have a severe and immediate impact.
In this evolving threat landscape, regional responses need to measure up. That means moving beyond fragmented naval deployments or externally sponsored exercises towards integrated naval approaches that are regionally owned and sustainable.
The region has managed to shift its approach before. In 2020, 10 of the 12 states bordering the Gulf of Guinea initiated at least one naval response to maritime threats. In the years since, African navies have continued to deploy warships and boarding teams, and have improved information-sharing mechanisms to address piracy and armed robbery at sea.
Recent United Nations (UN) assessments and regional analyses highlight that these states are gradually translating political resolve into operational tempo, deploying their navies on a scale unseen a decade ago.
The momentum for action can be traced back to 2012, when the UN recognised that the alarming surge in West African maritime crime posed a ‘clear threat’, tying piracy to oil theft, narcotics and weapons trafficking. Benin’s president at the time, Thomas Boni Yayi, called for urgent international support, citing catastrophic risks to regional economies if piracy remained unchecked.
The resulting UN assessment mission highlighted the efficacy of Nigeria-Benin joint patrols as an interim measure. However, it argued for a long-term, integrated regional strategy underpinned by robust coordination, harmonised legislation and sustained resourcing.
|
Maritime zones in the Gulf of Guinea
|
By 2024, there were many tangible signs of progress. States in Zone E conducted Operation Safe Domain in October 2023, Zone F has conducted joint patrols since 2021, and Zone G’s chiefs of staff of member states’ navies and coast guards recently convened.
The European Union’s Coordinated Maritime Presence now rotates security forces such as the Spanish patrol vessel Meteoro through the Gulf of Guinea, augmenting regional patrols and contributing to deterrence. However, this still falls short of a genuinely integrated, locally owned, and burden-shared security response.
Another challenge is converting regional frameworks into functional patrols that can respond decisively to piracy, kidnapping and the complex mix of trafficking and illegal fishing that appears endemic. Success hinges on being able to identify maritime threats and rapidly deploy naval patrols to intercept, board and, if warranted, detain pirates or traffickers.
The infrastructure underpinning West African maritime security remains heavily reliant on external partners. This has contributed to maritime agreements, communication centres and multinational exercises proliferating across the region over the past decade.
The United States’ Exercise Obangame Express has been convened, and the Grand African Nemo exercise is scheduled for the second half of 2025 in the Gulf of Guinea. Plans for the African Union’s (AU) Amani Africa III exercises are underway after several delays.
Success hinges on both being able to identify maritime threats and rapidly deploy naval patrols
The planned Gulf of Guinea Combined Maritime Task Force (CMTF) could carry out more integrated patrols. The AU Peace and Security Council’s April 2025 communiqué signals a move beyond the ad hoc zone-based patrols created under the Yaoundé Code of Conduct on maritime security.
Those earlier arrangements (in Zones E, F and G) relied on loose coordination and national command, with no permanent joint headquarters or standing force. By contrast, the CMTF is planned as a single, integrated structure with a fixed headquarters in Lagos hosted by Nigeria. The CMTF will have an agreed Concept of Operations and a mandate to assemble regionally owned naval and coastguard assets for rapid cross-border response.
This formal designation of command, legal and technical backing, and plan for a deployable multinational force represent a level of institutionalisation not seen in previous initiatives.
However, effective maritime security faces two persistent threats. First, shifting foreign priorities from the US and EU raises concerns about sustainable funding and technical assistance. Second, China, India and Russia have shown they are prepared to deploy naval assets into the region to serve their maritime interests, potentially increasing geopolitical competition. Their differing visions for how the maritime space should be governed could complicate existing initiatives.
Second, although the Yaoundé-based Interregional Coordination Centre has expanded its mandate to include information-sharing and facilitating joint operational frameworks, it does not directly command navy units. Arrests, interdictions and detentions are still the domain of national forces and multinational maritime coordination centres.
This highlights an enduring gap at the sharp end of maritime law enforcement and is among several reasons why the Yaoundé Code of Conduct that underpins the Interregional Coordination Centre is urgently in need of review.
The infrastructure underpinning West African maritime security is heavily reliant on external partners
SeaVision and the Yaoundé Architecture Regional Information System (YARIS) are some of the primary systems for gathering, analysing and sharing maritime information. SeaVision is a global US initiative and therefore permanently and externally capacitated, while YARIS is tailored for the region through EU sponsorship. Without local ownership and national budgets, this technological capability may diminish when external funding cycles end.
Long-term maritime security requires greater self-reliance from the Gulf of Guinea countries. That means investing nationally in trained operators, infrastructure and system integration.
Each state will eventually need to budget for YARIS maintenance, integration with automatic identification systems, vessel monitoring, satellite communications, and analysts and operators. Failing to address this will allow critical capabilities to atrophy, undermining hard-won gains.
In line with the calls of the UN and AU for a reinvigorated multilateral system based on strong regional frameworks, the Gulf of Guinea must embrace flexible cooperation and fully resource the region’s maritime security responses.
Exclusive rights to re-publish ISS Today articles have been given to Daily Maverick in South Africa and Premium Times in Nigeria. For media based outside South Africa and Nigeria that want to re-publish articles, or for queries about our re-publishing policy, email us.
