The South African Navy Facing up to Reality
The recent acts of piracy in the Mozambique canal has prompted Mozambique to ask South Africa to deploy some of its navy assets along the Mozambique coast. This development leads to a number of important questions regarding the efficiency and sustainability of this operation.
Anton Kruger, Consultant Peace Missions Programme, ISS Pretoria Office
The South African Government has now finally made a decision concerning anti-piracy operations, following the successful hijacking of a fishing vessel off the Mozambique coast in December 2010 and calls for military assistance by the Mozambique government to counter the threat. Following this request, the South African Navy (SAN) recently deployed one of its newly acquired Valour class frigates, the SAS Mendi, to the Mozambique Channel to conduct anti piracy patrols.
It is quite obvious as to why the South African Government would approve such a request. South Africa is classified as a maritime nation and is considered as one of the world’s top 12 maritime trading nations. More than 90 percent of the country’s exports and imports flow through its ports and South Africa’s landlocked neighbours are also dependant on these ports for their own exports and imports. The country’s strategic location also increases the importance of these ports in times of international political and military tensions as current events in Egypt have shown. Consistent pirate attacks in the Mozambique Channel will most definately threaten South Africa’s maritime interests.
There are however some aspects to consider. Firstly one would have to ask whether the deployment of a single ship to cover the Mozambique Channel would make any difference. One cannot expect a single ship to counter piracy in this huge area if international fleets in the northern Indian Ocean have not been able to do so.
Secondly is whether the SAN has the financial resources to conduct such an operation. The South African Government has drastically reduced its own defence budget in recent years and it is an open question as to whether the SAN would be able to conduct anti piracy operations and at the same time fulfill its obligations towards South Africa such as search and rescue, defence of the South African coast, and patrolling the country’s vast EEZ.
Thirdly the operation will be everything but a bilateral mission between the two states. Mozambique has no naval or maritime capacity to speak of or any real Command and Control network for South African vessels to integrate into. This will mean that South Africa will be going into this mostly on its own.
Fourthly one would have to ask if the current situation warrants such a response. Up until now there were only three attacks over a time span of a week of the Mozambique coast perpetrated most probably by the same opportunistic pirates. As yet it cannot be stated for sure that piracy has moved into Southern Africa’s waters - no pattern or intent has so far been established. If piracy has indeed moved into our waters, the South African Government must of course respond to it most vigorously, but it must also be careful not to over-react and to waste already scarce defence resources.
Some suggestions could meanwhile be made to improve the operational and tactical aspects of the operation. Combining naval patrols with air patrols could go a long way to improve the range covered by the operation and to ensure that the SAS Mendi is used effectively. Currently only the South African Air Force has dedicated maritime patrol aircraft in Southern Africa in the form of 5 C47 TP “TurboDaks”. The stationing of such aircraft in either northern Mozambique or in the Comoros to conduct combined operations with SAN should be considered. This would probably entail the conclusion of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoD) with these states as to ensure that these aircraft are capable of operating in either of their airspace and to refuel.
At this moment France is the only other country in the immediate area of operations with a capable naval and air force. Bilateral naval patrols and the sharing of intelligence with French naval and air forces stationed in the area can be seen as an option. France has a significant number of patrol ships and aircraft deployed on both Reunion and Mayotte and keeping shipping lines open in the area is as important to France’s interest as it is to South Africa’s and working together will be to the benefit of both states.
Also, the proper exchange of intelligence between the South African Navy and international naval forces conducting piracy operations in the northern Indian Ocean must also be seen as a prerequisite for any successful operation. The South African navy must have credible information concerning possible pirate platforms as to ensure that time and resources are not wasted on fruitless actions.
For Somali pirates to be operating this far south, it can be seen as a given that some time or another pirates would have to dock at a nearby port in the area. The improvement of port security and intelligence gathering in Mozambique, Madagascan, and Comorian ports would go a long way to improve the immediate situation and to prevent further attacks.
In the end South Africa would have to realise that anti-piracy operations will become a given, and if South Africa is to conduct credible anti-piracy operations off the coast of Mozambique, the South African navy would have to be properly equipped and financed. This would also mean increasing the national defence budget. The effective conduct of such operations will be vital not only for South Africa’s and Mozambique economic security, but for the whole Southern African region as well.
