6 March 2009: The Role of Civil Society in Security Sector Governance in Kenya

The love-hate relationship between civil society and government in Africa is well known. And Kenya is no exception. In Kenya unfortunately, the civil society largely regards the state security instruments as oppressive, while the government on the other hand regards the civil society with suspicion and sometimes as a threat to state security. What role then for civil society in the reform of the security sector in Kenya?

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The concept of good governance is premised upon three characteristics namely legitimacy, accountability and transparency - the cornerstones of democracy. African countries often have inherited weak political, social and economic structures due to the history of conflicts that have plagued the continent in recent centuries. As a direct result of this legacy, post-conflict countries are faced with governments and societies in which corruption, human rights violations and lack of transparency is rampant. The amalgamation of these elements result in a diminished capacity for security sector governance in these countries.

The crux of the (democratic) security sector governance challenge is to develop both effective oversight mechanisms and affordable security bodies capable of providing security for the state and its citizens on the basis of democratic principles. Issues pertaining to security should always be a priority on the agenda of countries engaging in post-conflict reconstruction, and the needs of minorities and marginalised persons need to be addressed in the promotion of a secure state. Women, children, the aged, refugees and persons internally displaced due to conflict are the most vulnerable groups and require special attention and protection. Strengthened civil society oversight mechanisms are thus essential to enforcing the principles of good governance on the continent.

Yet, in many cases, as in Kenya, the civil society perceives the public security sector regime as secretive and as a representation of an often unresponsive government while in turn the civil society is regarded as representing interests outside those of the country. One could argue therefore that the relationship between government and civil society is largely one riddled with mutual distrust, misunderstanding and suspicion. The question may be posed then should security governance issues be left as a preserve of the state, given the seemingly massive ‘onslaught’ on civil society on the continent in general? Or alternatively, shouldn’t civil society be accorded an opportunity to contribute to the crucial attainment of security?

An environment conducive to such engagement should be created and while being versatile, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) are expected to respond to issues in a structured manner and with due sensitivity to the stakeholders, communities, the state as well as the private sector. But is there space for them to do that in Kenya? How can they and how have they been be involved in the reforms of core security actors? These include armed forces, police, border guards, customs and immigration, and intelligence and security services. Security management and oversight bodies are also concerned. They include ministries of defence and internal affairs, financial management bodies and public complaints commissions, while justice and law enforcement institutions include the judiciary, prisons, prosecution services and traditional justice systems. Finally non-statutory security forces include private security companies, guerrilla armies and private militia.

Some of the recent contributions of civil society in Kenya include community policing; regularisation of the private security sector; advocacy (highlighting human rights abuses, raising awareness); monitoring (the judiciary); raising awareness among policy-makers and public (SALWs) and the Bomas draft. Yet many challenges remain. These challenges to civil society effectiveness in Kenya include the continued inability of African security organisations to provide safe and secure environments for economic and political development. This arises, to a large degree, out of poor governance. Also, despite the fact that insecurity impacts disproportionately upon the poor, many have been left out of the security sector governance agenda. Further challenges include the acrimonious relationship between government and CSOs which is based on suspicion and competition; the absence of homogeneity, and lastly, the lack of demonstrated political will. Good governance of the security sector, and thus security sector reform, is a critical component of democratic consolidation, conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction.

Policy recommendations to strengthen the role of civil society in security sector governance in Kenya include an active involvement of the public, using CSOs as a potential platform for debate. Civil society should engage more in activities such as setting norms and standards to guide government actions, providing protection and relative information, and finally, CSOs should negotiate participation in regional governance issues through already existing regional policy frameworks.

While the diversity of civil society groups can negatively affect their cohesion, this nonetheless constitutes one of their major strengths. Enmeshed in the broad range of civil society organisations - from large and well-organised groups to local community groups - is a plethora of expertise and resources vital to responding to the multifaceted nature of conflicts. At the community level, locally-based civil society organisations have assumed a critical role in combining indigenous approaches to security sector governance with more conventional methods. Indigenous methods - which are grounded in local customs and practices - emphasise an inclusive approach to SSG that seeks to ensure the participation of war-affected local communities in reconstruction efforts. Civil society organisations that are in touch with local communities are able to reach marginalised communities that are often inadvertently excluded from conventional security sector governance processes. It has been argued that the trigger for conflict has come from the systematic abuse of human rights by security institutions. Law and order are consistently flouted by those mandated to uphold them; and police, army and other security units turn into brigands on rampage. This is the direct result of the bad governance of such security institutions.

Tarrin-Rae Oxche, Junior Researcher, Security Sector Governance Programme, ISS Tshwane (Pretoria)