The role of BASIC Countries in the Climate Change Negotiations after Copenhagen
BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) have been vilified and praised for the role they played in brokering the Copenhagen Accord at the United Nations Climate Change Conference in 2009. They have been praised for saving climate talks that appeared destined for complete breakdown. They have equally been vilified for participating in a discredited and exclusionary process. Given the supposed central role in Copenhagen, it is important to reflect on what future potential role the BASIC countries can play in the ongoing climate change negotiations.
Webster Whande, Senior Researcher, Climate Change Project, Corruption and Governance Programme, Cape Town Office
BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) have been vilified and praised for the role they played in brokering the Copenhagen Accord at the United Nations Climate Change Conference in 2009. They have been praised for saving climate talks that appeared destined for complete breakdown. They have equally been vilified for participating in a discredited and exclusionary process. Given the supposed central role in Copenhagen, it is important to reflect on what future potential role the BASIC countries can play in the ongoing climate change negotiations.
Despite misgivings about the process in Copenhagen, the BASIC countries are likely to continue playing a key role in the climate change negotiations. Such a role will involve participation in formal processes run under the auspices of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and informal negotiations with other countries such as the United States. They are also likely to intensify efforts to reach consensus within intergovernmental groups such as the African Union (AU) to placate concerns of sidelining developing countries.
From a process perspective, the lead up to the Copenhagen Accord lacked the multilateralist spirit that characterized previous negotiations. The few countries that drafted the accord circumvented the two-track negotiation process under the UNFCCC. The two-track system follows two negotiation processes under future commitments for industrialized countries or continuation of the Kyoto Protocol and long-term cooperative action to enable effective implementation of the convention. The formal and informal processes, however, are likely to result in a different two-track altogether, one premised on the power and influence of coalitions.
On the one hand are the BASIC countries and other countries involved in brokering the Copenhagen Accord. On the other hand are the rest of the countries under the aegis of the UNFCCC. BASIC countries are likely to continue participating in the informal processes as happened in Copenhagen. They will, however, deal with the criticism of pursuing individual agendas by aligning with other developing countries. They will use their newly found political platform to push both individual country interests and those of intergovernmental groups they belong to. The BASIC countries’ responses to the Accord are instructive in this regard.
While not disowning the Accord, the BASIC countries have continued to criticize its place in future negotiations for a climate change pact. They argue it is not a replacement for the UNFCCC two-track system. Committing industrialized countries to emissions reductions and agreeing on long-term cooperative action for effective implementation of the convention remain key objectives. Such pronouncements give and take from the role the BASIC countries played in Copenhagen. Firstly, they limit the weight of the Accord as preparation to continue calling for rich nations to lead global efforts to slow global warming. Secondly, they protect the continued role of the BASIC countries in future negotiations by disowning a supposedly flawed outcome but incorporating it as important for rejoining the two-track system.
A key aspect going to Copenhagen was a legally binding agreement with clear targets for emissions reduction and financing to developing countries for mitigation and adaptation. The Accord mentions commitments to providing US$30 billion from 2010-2012 per annum and to setting up a Copenhagen Climate Fund. The Accord does not, however, commit developed countries to specific targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The BASIC countries have continued to call for developed countries to commit to financing, set clear targets for emissions reduction and to the provision of technologies for mitigation. These calls resonate with the interests of other developing countries.
The immediate responses from civil society and developing countries were disappointment and rejection of the Accord. The question of the future role of the Accord, and by implication the BASIC countries, arises. Various countries have since spoken of the Accord in terms of building blocks for future negotiations. More than 100 countries have formally associated with the Accord. This indicates some softening of the first responses that greeted the announcement of the Accord. The reference to the Accord as building blocks but not replacing the two-track system resonates with the BASIC countries position. As well as maximizing on changing perceptions of the Accord, the BASIC countries are likely to continue to seek consensus on the actual issues.
Going to Copenhagen, the AU formulated a common position for the climate change negotiations. The Nairobi declaration provided the basis for cooperation among African countries. Key concerns for the AU are adaptation processes for the majority of citizens living in poverty. The BASIC countries have aligned with some of these issues by virtue of their own contexts. South Africa was party to the Nairobi declaration while China explored a common position with the African countries prior to Copenhagen. Coalescing on the basis of the issues is likely to continue.
As well as pursuing an individual agenda, it is clear from previous pronouncements from the Brazilians, Chinese and Indians that there are certain issues that resonate among the group itself but also with other African countries. Such issues include reaching a compromise between development and reducing emissions. As a result, technology transfer for mitigation of green house gas emissions and meeting the social and economic needs of citizens is of paramount and common interest. Additionally, the issue of justice in a climate pact resonates for both the BASIC countries and the AU. There is commonality of perspective on developed countries meeting the costs of adaptation and contributing to mitigation technologies.
The participation of the BASIC countries in the formal process is largely driven by the fact that decisions made in this platform will inform a climate change regime from 2012 going on. The group`s political power to gain concessions from other countries such as the US is based on shifting power dynamics. It is for this power dimension that they will continue participating in informal processes while also seeking to build consensus with other developing countries for formal processes.
