The Dilemma of El-Baradei in the Egyptian Polity
Egyptians are expected to vote in presidential elections in 2011. They may elect a new president or re-elect President Hosni Mubarak, in power since 1981. As in most African countries, there are scores of aspirants, but only few stand out of the crowd. The new comer and by far the most talked-about ‘potential’ candidate is Mohamed El-Baradei.
Issaka K. Souaré & Muna Abdallh, African Conflict Prevention Programme, ISS Pretoria and Addis Ababa offices
Egyptians are expected to vote in presidential elections in 2011. They may elect a new president or re-elect President Hosni Mubarak, in power since 1981. As in most African countries, there are scores of aspirants, but only few stand out of the crowd. The new comer and by far the most talked-about ‘potential’ candidate is Mohamed El-Baradei. The man is none other than the immediate former Director General of the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the 2005 Nobel Peace laureate with his organisation.
A lawyer by training, El-Baradei’s third four-year term as head of the IAEA expired in September 2009 and he returned to Egypt in February this year. He had been abroad for the past 30 years, as a high-flying diplomat in the UN structures, specifically the IAEA that he joined in 1984.
El-Baradei has not announced his candidature for the presidential election. His condition for doing this is for the ‘right conditions’ for free and transparent elections to be met. However, even before his return to the country and since then, excitement about him has grown so exponentially that one could only describe it as ‘El-Baradei Phenomenon’. Scores of supporters and curious onlookers tumultuously welcomed him at the Cairo airport in early February. On 21 February, he formed a movement called the National Assembly for Change (NAC). The aim of the NAC is both to assemble the various political forces around the famous man’s ideas of change and fundamental political reform, as well as to create a space for greater engagement between the latter and ordinary Egyptians on the streets.
But El-Baradei has a herculean task and elephantine obstacles to surmount in order to achieve his objectives, noble as they may be. These obstacles are found in all directions of his campaign: from ordinary people, his colleagues in opposition and, most importantly, the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP).
His long absence from Egypt seems to have had some serious impacts on his personality, some very positive and others problematic for an aspirant to the highest political office in his country. One of the latter is his spoken Arabic, which many observers have found a bit ‘rusty’. Eloquence in the language of the masses is a clear asset in a political campaign, and lack of it is a major obstacle. Barack Obama, whose message of change he seems to be emulating, is a case in point here. While the El-Baradei’s reformist appeal might offset this, his critics, particularly from the ruling party, are using it to claim that he is out of touch with the Egyptian realities on the ground.
The other challenge El-Baradei has to overcome is the unification of the main opposition forces around him. It is true that he is unlike other opposition leaders who have had some affiliations or involvement in the Egyptian politics. Thus, the current environment has offered him the opportunity to present himself as a saviour. But he comes to a political scene not void of political parties, movements and actors that have their own ambitions and have over the years been working hard to attain those. Whereas many had welcomed his arrival and pledged to work with him, some now seem to be taking distance from him if not to reaffirm their independent opposition stance to both him and the ruling party. This is for example the case of Ayman Nour, the leader of the Ghad (tomorrow) Party. As the El-Baradei phenomenon today, albeit at a lesser extent, it was the Ayman Nour phenomenon that excited Egyptians and international observers around the 2005 elections. It is perhaps needless to highlight the political force that the banned Muslim Brotherhood represent in the country. The Brotherhood welcomed the emergence of El-Baradei, although the movement fell short of endorsing him as a presidential candidate.
However, while all the opposition forces converge with El-Baradei that Egypt needs some fundamental reforms, there is a sea of differences between some of his views and policies and those of his colleagues. And far from being limited to the Brotherhood, which is based on religion, differences are bound to emerge between him and other opposition forces, such as Nasserites and the leftist Tagamu Party over issues of economy, relations with Israel and the West. It could also be argued that the initial welcome extended to him by the old-age Wafd Party and other traditional parties was informed by the latter’s desire to make him their candidate and use him for their own gains. But it now seems clear that El-Baradei does not want to associate himself, in an exclusive manner, with any of these parties that are greatly discredited in the eyes of the Egyptian masses. As a consequence, leaders of these parties are also beginning to withdraw their initial enthusiastic support.
But of all the obstacles on his way, the Kilimanjaro that El-Baradei has to climb is really the ruling party, and particularly the constitution. First, as noted above, El-Baradei has conditioned his hypothetical candidature to the transparency and credibility of the electoral process. By this, he has implicitly implied that the current arrangements do not guarantee a credible election, an insinuation that the ruling party does not take kindly to. Secondly, not being a member of a recognised political party, El-Baradei cannot be a presidential candidate. Article 76 of the constitution requires presidential aspirants to be nominated by a political party founded and recognised ‘at least five consecutive years before the starting date of candidature and [which has] been operating uninterruptedly for this period, and whose members have obtained at least 3% of the elected members of both the People’s Assembly and the Shura Council or what equals this total in one of the two assemblies.’
A 2007 amendment of Article 76 did away with even the stringent conditions set for independent candidates, which required such candidates to ‘be supported by at least 250 elected members of the People’s Assembly, the Shura Council and local popular councils on governorate level, provided that those shall include at least 65 members of the People’s Assembly, 25 of the Shura Council and 10 of every local council in at least 14 governorates.’
It would seem that the amendment of this article was informed by the good showing of ‘independent’ candidates of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 2005 legislative elections. But even if it was not, the Brotherhood itself would have found it difficult this time round to shine, for all the structures mentioned in the article (introduced after the 2005 poll) are dominated by the ruling party. El-Baradei and the Brotherhood want the current reading of this provision revised. But here, they may count less on the support of traditional political parties.
In the final analysis therefore, one could argue that El-Baradei is in for a tough game whose referees are yet to arrive on the pitch. Would the excitement around him be sustainable until the 2011 elections and would this force the regime to acquiesce to his demands? This is a question that one cannot answer with certainty at this point, but one could legitimately doubt an affirmative answer.
