The Changing Geo-Political Situation in Eastern DRC and the Impact on Stability in the Region
blurb:isstoday:240209drc
24 February 2009: The Changing Geo-Political Situation in Eastern DRC and the Impact on Stability in the Region
The situation in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) continues to evolve very rapidly. The events of the last six weeks have significantly reshaped the political and military landscape in the Kivu-provinces and have major implications for bringing stability to this troubled region.
A dramatic change happened on 5 January 2009 when Bosco Ntaganda, then Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP) Chief of Staff, announced that he had replaced Laurent Nkunda as leader of the CNDP. Following a period of uncertainty, Ntaganda announced, on 16 January 2009, at the Uhusi hotel in Goma that the CNDP and the Government of the DRC had reached an agreement on the immediate cessation of hostilities. He also declared the participation of the CNDP in a new joint operation by the DRC army, the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) and Rwanda against the former Hutu soldiers from the FDLR based in the DRC. Finally he announced the immediate integration of CNDP combatants into the FARDC.
It seems that a considerable amount of planning had been done before Bosco’s declaration because within 4 days, on 20 January 2009, some 6 000 Rwandan soldiers crossed into DRC at Goma and immediately merged with the FARDC to start the joint operations to be known as operation “Umoja wetu”, or “Our unity”. It was recently announced that these Rwandan Defence Force troops would completely withdraw by 28 February 2009.
The joint force immediately deployed along two routes: one towards the north in the area of Rutshuru and Kanyabayonga, and one towards the west from Mushaki to the Masisi area. The force claimed to be successful, based on the number of FDLR-soldiers repatriated to Rwanda. The UN force in the DRC (MONUC) reported that 1003 FDLR combatants and their dependents have since been repatraited. This figure, taken over the last 48 days, equals the number of repatriation in the entire 2008. The UN High Commission for Refugees has since 1 January 2009 also reported voluntarily repatriated of 883 civilians to Rwanda.
However, whether the operation has really been successful, is still debatable. This is mainly because the presence of the FDLR in its stronghold, South Kivu, has not been addressed and Rwanda is due to withdraw soon. The plan is to replace Rwandan troops with MONUC troops in operations in South Kivu.
Meanwhile the population in North Kivu is worried about what will happen when Rwanda withdraws. Will MONUC be able to protect them against possible FDLR retaliation? Only time will tell.
At the same time and in the same geographical area, the FARDC and MONUC has also embarked on the “accelerated plan” for the integration of CNDP and other armed groups into FARDC. The plan initially foresaw the establishment of so-called regroupment sites for CNDP at Rumangabo and Kimo in North Kivu. Two sites for the smaller groups PARECO and the Mayi-Mayi have also been identified at Murambiro and the Nyaleke brassage and training centre. Once the operation against the FDLR is over, these newly established units are expected to be sent for training or refreshment courses. Until 18 February 3 548 CNDP elements and 2 000 members of PARECO and Mayi-Mayi have been integrated into a pool of 9 335 FARDC troops. The CNDP and other groups will not be demobilised, disarmed and integrated into the FARDC outside North Kivu but be integrated directly into the FARDC and used against the FDLR.
This is again the wrong way to go about integrating rebels into the regular army and repeating the failed mixage process of 2007. It seems no lessons have been learnt from the previous process.
The recent developments present us with two scenarios. The first scenario will have a positive outcome, and a second scenario indicates the risks of failure. If the situation is to improve, it will require political will from the Governments of the region, fully backed by the international community. In this first scenario solutions could be found for issues such as the demobilisation of the CNDP and other armed groups as well as the repatriation of the FDLR back to Rwanda. The significant reversal of the balance of power in the Kivus is remarkable, with a united force for the first time against the FDLR since 1999. There is now a real opportunity to implement the main objectives to bring peace to Eastern DRC, set out in the Nairobi Communiqué and the Goma conference. The integration of the CNDP and other groups into the FARDC also opens a unique opportunity for the international community and the African Union to help the DRC to build a credible and professional security sector, especially its armed forces.
The second scenario spells out some risks that could destabilise the region. The biggest concerns are related to the humanitarian consequences of operations against the FDLR. In addition to the risk that civilians are caught in the crossfire, the FDLR could launch violent attacks against the civilian population. Such attacks could also escalate hostilities along ethnic lines. It is estimated that some 300 000 to 350 000 additional people could be affected by operations against the FDLR in North Kivu. The communities in North Kivu are also concerned about the withdrawal of the Rwandan forces and the security vacuum that could see FDLR returning to North Kivu. The situation is expected to be even more difficult in South Kivu where the FDLR is very deeply entrenched.
Key to ensuring that the first scenario prevails is the deployment of the FARDC, supported by MONUC, to continue with the integration of the CNDP and other armed groups as well as the repatriation of FDLR. Finally MONUC must also ensure the protection of civilians to be able to be seen as a credible force in the DRC.
Henri Boshoff, Military Analyst, African Security Analysis Programme, ISS Tshwane (Pretoria)
