The Challenge Of Securing South Africa`s Prisons
On 26 April 2009 Sondolo IT‘s contract to secure South African prisons came to an end. On that day the private contractor left their high tech surveillance equipment behind and withdrew their staff.
On 26 April 2009 Sondolo IT‘s contract to secure South African
prisons came to an end. On that day the private contractor left their
high tech surveillance equipment behind and withdrew their staff. For 4
years Sondolo IT had provided advanced security equipment and trained
staff to 66 public Correctional Centres (prisons), through a contract
with the Department of Correctional Services (DCS).
There is nothing abnormal about the expiry of the contract; and the
Correctional Services Act of 1998 (CSA 1998) allows the department to
contract out prison services to the private sector. What is peculiar is
that the department had argued extensively before the Parliamentary
Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services that it had needed the
services of the company, and had paid dearly for those services. Yet
when the contract expired DCS assured the media that the withdrawal of
Sondolo IT did not place prison security under threat. The Citizen
newspaper reported DCS spokesperson, Manelisi Wolela, saying that the
number of escapees had been low even before Sondolo IT was awarded the
contract, suggesting that the company’ services were not so vital after
all.
This raises the question: if prison security was and is not
threatened by the departure of skilled staff to manage the security
equipment, why did the department pay a private company for the service
at all? One also has to question why the department took a decision to
outsource the provision of the security system (that includes advanced
systems as well as trained personnel) if prison security is a core
function of the department? After all, the department’s mandate is to
`Prevent persons incarcerated from participating in criminal activities
and escaping, by providing an environment that ensures the safety of all
persons entrusted to the Department’s care as well as the safety of the
public`.
Prison security involves ensuring that inmates do not escape
(external security) and ensuring the safety of inmates and correctional
officials inside the facility (internal security). In 2003 (before
Sondolo IT took over security) the department had come under strong
criticism for the high number of escapees from correctional centres.
However the number of escapes already begun to decrease after 2004 (from
195 in 2003/04 to 171 in 2004/05).
There is no doubt that there were problems with prison security and
that these problems were exacerbated by corruption, as revealed by the
Jali Commission. To meet its mandate the department took a decision to
upgrade their external security system and to implement a system for
monitoring visitors, inmates and correctional officials. However, the
high level of overcrowding in correctional facilities meant that staff
members were unable to monitor all inmates without help. It was decided
that surveillance cameras were required and that trained staff would be
needed to manage the new system efficiently. On the face of it
outsourcing the function of managing the system may have seemed to be
the most viable option. Yet, as the Portfolio Committee on Correctional
Services noted, there were a number of problems in this case. Not least
of these was the cost of such a service. In 2005 the department
estimated that the four-year contract for security would cost a total of
R237million (approximately R59m a year). By 2007 the then Minister of
Correctional Services, Ngconde Balfour, reported that the contract with
Sondolo IT was costing the department an astounding R64.2 m a year. This
is more than the total costs to the DCS for administration,
corrections, care, social reintegration, development and facilities.
The department justified the high cost by arguing that the contract
included skilled staff that would be employed by the contractors. This
didn’t entirely satisfy the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services
that wanted to know why there was a need to engage external staff. The
then Director of Supply and Chain Management of the DCS explained that
the ‘Department outsources services because there are certain skills and
expertise that were not available within the Department’. He pointed to
the fact DCS found it difficult to secure staff with the necessary
skills and that retaining those was very almost impossible since these
individuals tended to move to the private sector where higher
remuneration was offered. Balfour himself argued that if security staff
in the control rooms were contractors, the potential for collusion
between staff in the control rooms and correctional officials working at
the prisons would be reduced, thus reducing the chance of escapes.
Even though the department has managed to reduce the rate of escapes
since Sondolo IT were awarded the contract in 2006 (from 112 in the
financial year 2005/2006 to 93 in the financial year 2006/2007), this
alone does not signal success, as it does not address internal security.
Although CCTV cameras were placed on the outside of prisons and new
security gates were in the process or were built in some of the prisons
inspected; gang-related incidences were reported to have decreased, much
more could have still been done by Sondolo IT to improve internal
security. This is a problem that is unlikely to be adequately addressed
until overcrowding is reduced.
The more security conscious the department is, the more unlikely it
will be to deal with what causes prisoners to be there in the first
place. This is underpinned by the DCS in a presentation to the
Portfolio Committee where it was noted that the recidivism rate was
estimated by an unnamed independent body to be around 94%, which means
the department needed to do more to ensure that through rehabilitation,
these individuals do not come back.
In light of the huge drain that Sondolo IT put on the department’s
budget, it is perhaps a good thing that the private contractor pulled
out when the contract expired, despite concerns about security. The DCS
argues that it does have a proper contingency plan to deal with
security, despite media claims to the contrary. The department has said
that they have advertised the 600 vacant posts for individuals to
operate the security system. They say that training will not be
necessary because these individuals will be expected to have the
expertise required for the job, and if they don’t the DCS will have
support systems in place. The DCS also contends that security is not
under threat, as 500 temporary correctional officials have been deployed
to take the place of the 500 contract staff, and indeed that there were
other security measures in place before they awarded the contract to
Sondolo IT.
But, that brings us back to the question we initially asked. If the
DCS can handle security why were they paying a private company millions
to do it for them? As importantly, have the problems that DCS identified
been overcome to the extent that security will not become a problem in
the near future? Will the department manage to retain skilled staff if
they do appoint them? How will they prevent corruption and collusion
between security personnel and prison guards?
Until these questions are adequately answered, and until the
departments in the criminal justice system work together to reduce
prison overcrowding, it seems that prison security may remain a problem.
A more comprehensive and practical plan to overcome the security
challenges the department is currently faced with is needed.
Tizina Ramagaga and Chandré Gould, Crime, Justice and Politics Programme, ISS Tshwane (Pretoria)
