The AU Seeks Clarity on Immunity of State Officials Under International Law
In the latest decision of the AU Assembly relating to the International Criminal Court, member states raised the important new issue of immunities for heads of state under international law and are seeking clarity from the International Court of Justice on the matter. AU member states should be given credit for addressing the ICC issue within an international legal framework.
Max du Plessis,
Senior Research
Associate, Transnational Threats and International Crime Division, ISS Pretoria and Associate Professor,
University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban
The decision of the African Union (AU)
Assembly at its 18th Ordinary Session in January this year on the
International Criminal Court (ICC) is more or less unchanged from previous
Assembly decisions relating to the ICC. Having reiterated their commitment to
fighting impunity in line with the AU’s Constitutive Act, AU member states
repeated the request that the UN Security Council defer ICC proceedings in
Sudan and Kenya under article 16 of the Rome Statute. The decision that member
states will not cooperate with the ICC in respect of the arrest and surrender
of President al-Bashir of Sudan also still stands. Member states are urged to
comply with this decision, and representatives of relevant African states are
also requested to ‘scrupulously’ follow up on the implementation of these AU
decisions by the UN Security Council and the ICC’s Assembly of States Parties.
The concerns that AU member states have
with the ICC thus remain. There was however one important new issue raised by
the Assembly at the January meeting: a request to the AU Commission ‘to
consider seeking an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice
regarding the immunities of State Officials under international law’. This
decision presumably stems from AU member states’ unease with the ICC’s arrest
warrant for al-Bashir.
It is not yet clear what route African
states envisage taking in this regard. The AU Commission itself cannot approach
the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion. The UN General
Assembly would however be able to do so. The UN Security Council would arguably
be a more appropriate avenue – by virtue of the role it plays in international
criminal justice generally, and under the Rome Statute in particular. The real
question is whether the AU (via African members of the UN
Security Council) could convince other UN Security Council members to play ball. This seems
unlikely, not least of all because Western powers, including permanent members
and ICC states parties like the UK and France, are most likely content with the
ICC’s earlier Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) position on the subject.
AU member states might alternatively
consider using article 119 of the Rome Statute. African Ministers of Justice
have in the past recommended that the issue of the relationship between
articles 27 and 98 of the Rome Statute (which deal, in a somewhat contradictory
manner, with immunities for certain state officials) be referred to the ICC’s
Assembly of States Parties in terms of article 119 of the Rome Statute (see
‘Ministerial Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC’,
8-9 June 2009, Addis Ababa, MinICC/Legal.) Article 119, which relates to
‘general disagreements’, says that ‘disputes that do not pertain to judicial
functions – that arise between two or more states parties – and relate to the
interpretation or application of the Statute’, shall be referred to the
Assembly of States Parties which can: (i) seek to settle the dispute itself or;
(ii) make recommendations on further means of dispute settlement, notably
including referral to the International Court of Justice in conformity with the
statute of that court.
This avenue implicates difficult legal
questions. First and foremost is the question of whether this issue of state
cooperation in the arrest of al-Bashir relates to ‘judicial functions’ of the
ICC or would qualify as a dispute (i) not pertaining to judicial functions,
(ii) arising between two or more states parties and (iii) concerning the
interpretation or application of the Rome Statute. How this question is
answered might well depend on the position one takes on the article 27/98
relationship: some might see the article 98 disputes as concerning the judicial
function of the ICC; but others might maintain a strict separation between the
exercise of jurisdiction by the court and cooperation obligations on states
parties to argue that such a dispute is a non-judicial one, governed by article
119(2) of the Rome Statute.
As turgid as these questions may be, they
may raise deeper political divides. Who decides what is ‘judicial’ and what is
‘other’ is not clear – and quite circular – but if it goes to the ICC’s
Assembly of States Parties an unpleasant North-South divide might emerge. What
is more, even if it is determined that article 119(2) – and the International
Court of Justice – is the appropriate route, questions remain regarding how
this will play out. Chiefly, which two states will be the parties to the
dispute?
The route chosen by African states would
influence the subject matter of the dispute to be resolved by the International
Court of Justice. If an advisory opinion is sought
it could address a broad range of legal issues such as: (i) immunity before
international courts under international law (although this was addressed
obiter in the Arrest Warrant case, it
might be further clarified), (ii) immunity under the Rome Statute, both
generally and in respect of cooperation obligations on states in particular,
and (iii) the effect (if any) of UN Security Council resolutions referring
matters to the ICC on (i) and (ii).
However, should African states take the
article 119(2) approach, then the Rome Statute would seemingly require the
question posed to the International Court of Justice to be more narrowly tailored to the question of
immunities under the Rome Statute as a dispute ‘concerning the interpretation
or application of the Statute’.
The upshot of these difficulties is that
there is a long way to go before the AU Assembly’s concerns regarding the ICC
reach the International Court of Justice. However, expressing an interest in
resorting to the International Court of Justice to gain clarity should be
welcomed (and encouraged) as a positive step towards a legal solution to a
problem with immense political significance.
What
should not be missed is that AU member states have chosen to rely on the
available international legal institutions to seek such clarifications. Indeed,
AU member states should be given credit for their tendency to address concerns
about the ICC (and international justice more generally) within an
international legal framework, as opposed to adopting blunter political
approaches (or, in the case of many superpowers, simply ignoring international
law or international institutions that are not predisposed to their interests).
This is testament to both the relevance of international law, and the stock
that African states place in its ability to resolve matters of international
concern in a fair and predictable manner.