14 August 2008: Suicide Attacks in Algeria Confirm the Presence of Al-Qaeda

Events in Algeria these last few months supports the analysis, made by commentators as early as February last year*, that alignment by the Algerian Salafist Group for Prayer and Combat (GSPC) with Al Qaeda will imply the growing possibility of suicide operations. The link with Al-Qaeda was clearly evident in the rebranding of the GSPC as the Al Qaeda Organisation in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM) and from rhetoric on the part of the GSPC. The latter clearly adheres to the strategy and philosophical principles of Al-Qaeda. Algeria has in fact lately experienced the following suicide bombings:

Bookmark with:

Facebook

del.icio.us

Digg It!

3 August 2008 – A suicide car bomb near a police station in Tizi Ouzou left 25 people injured, including 21 civilians and four police officers.
24 July 2008 – A suicide bomber on a motorcycle targeted a military vehicle near Lakhdaria.
4 June 2008 – A suicide bomber detonated his device near the gate of a military barracks. Although military personnel fired at the attacker, he still managed to detonate his explosive device. In a second attack, an attacker left an explosive device near a café in Bordj El Kiffan – possibly in an attempt to attract attention from military personnel. Two days later on 6 June, six soldiers were killed in an attack near Cap Djinet in a roadside bombing. This attack was followed by two bombings on 8 June in which a train station was targeted in Beni Amrane, while the second device targeted first responders. In the first attack a French engineer working for Razel (a French company) and soldiers that accompanied him were targeted.
29 January 2008 – The Thenia police station was targeted by a suicide attack (truck) east of Algiers
2 January 2008 – A suicide bomber in a truck targeted the Naciria police station, 50 kilometers from Algiers
11 December 2007 – Twin suicide truck bombs targeted the Algerian Constitutional Council and the United Nations building, housing the UNDP in Algiers
21 September 2007 – A suicide bomber targeted a convoy of foreign workers employed by a French company near Lakhdaria
8 September 2007 – A suicide truck bomb targeted a Coast Guard barracks in Dellys, approximately 100 kilometers east of Algiers
6 September 2007 – A suicide bomber on foot detonated his explosive device in the midst of a crowed waiting to see President Abdelaziz Bouteflika in Batna
11 July 2007 – 10 soldiers were killed and 35 people injured when a suicide bomber drove a truck of explosives into their barracks near Lakhdaria, approximately 80 kilometers from Algiers
11 April 2007 – Three suicide bombers targeted the Prime Minister’s office and a police station in Bab Ezzouar in Algiers

Although suicide bombings is a new tactic in Algeria – a country that already experienced 17 years of terrorism – these attacks still predominately target security forces (police and military), seen as representatives of the Algerian government. New in this target selection is attacks directed against foreign companies and foreign representatives – in particular French workers followed by US representation. An earlier attack on Brown and Root-Condor on 9 December 2006 serves as an example. The attack against the United Nations (UN) came as a surprise, although this attack could have been expected, if only for what the UN represents for Islamists: ‘An enemy of Islam under the control of the United States’.

In addition to the targets selected, another element needs our attention: the method of delivery. Most suicide attacks till now were executed through vehicles (trucks and cars that were predominately stolen) and the latest first attack using a motorcycle. The Batna attack on 6 September and again the attack on 4 June, in which the suicide bombers used suicide vests, as well as the recovery of suicide vests in counter-terrorism operations, are definitely a concerning development. It is to be expected that with the increasing protection of targets through using barriers and cordoning off areas, terrorists need to adopt a new approach in penetrating intended targets – being on foot, the terrorist has an additional advantage in getting as close as possible to his intended target.

Countering this trend in most countries that have experienced this form of threat was to ‘profile’ potential suicide bombers as being male. Terrorists answered by recruiting female suicide bombers. Although Algeria is not at this point yet, it needs consideration, particularly in taking into account the lax or even in some strategic areas a non-existence of security checks on women.

It is equally important to note that above-mentioned suicide attacks came despite a number of roadside bombings – that is not a new tactic – predominately directed at members of the security forces. Also raising concern is that despite the fact that most of the attacks are carried out in smaller towns to the east of Algiers, AQLIM-operatives previously shown an ability to successfully execute their attacks in the capital Algiers.

Despite the devastating impact of suicide attacks, two ‘positive’ consequences came out of this new modus operandi: public outrage and conflict within the organisation, involving individuals that cannot associate itself with the indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians. Although the target might be considered ‘legitimate’ an explosive device detonated in a public area, frequented by members of the public never only kill or injure those it was intended for. In other words, there will always be ‘unintended casualties’ – similar to the use of bombs (even smart-bombs) targeting potential terrorists that cannot be exclusively directed at the intended target.

The unfortunate realities taken from the Algerian experience cannot be summarised in a few words, but if there is one lesson that one can learn: terrorists will always adopt their focus and strategy to achieve their objective and to remain relevant. A lesson to security forces: always think and prepare for the unexpected, since terrorists need to stay one step ahead to achieve their objectives.

Anneli Botha, Senior Researcher: International Crime in Africa Programme, ISS Tshwane (Pretoria)

* ISS Today 2 February 2007 entitled “Official Alignment of the GSPC with al-Qa’eda”