South Africa not Playing a Double Nuclear Game

South Africa has recently been accused of "playing both sides of the nuclear coin". This followed President Zuma’s speech at the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit held from 26-27 March 2012.

Published on 13 April 2012 in ISS Today

Noël Stott and Amelia Broodryk,  Senior Research Fellow and Researcher, Transnational Threats and International Crime Division

South Africa has recently been accused of "playing both sides of the nuclear coin". This followed President Jacob Zuma’s speech at the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit held from 26-27 March, in which he stated that South Africa’s technical achievement in being able to generate medical isotopes through low enriched uranium (LEU) was “a welcome addition to the capability to produce such isotopes using highly enriched uranium”. In addition, Zuma’s speech stated “South Africa has adopted a policy on the beneficiation of our mineral resources, including uranium”. This has been interpreted, by some, to mean that South Africa has a uranium enrichment policy and by implication will continue to hold on to its existing stock of highly enriched uranium (HEU), which it still has from the nuclear weapons programme of the apartheid government.

Although it is true that South Africa will continue to maintain and use its existing stockpile of HEU, South Africa does not currently have a policy of enriching uranium, rather the 2008 Nuclear Energy Policy document states that “there is presently no uranium enrichment infrastructure or economically proven technological capabilities in South Africa”, and that it is “Government’s intention to investigate the re-establishment of a uranium enrichment capacity as part of uranium beneficiation for peaceful purposes”. There is nothing clandestine about this, nor does it portray playing a game of two sides. Let’s be clear. As a leading African participant in both the 2012 and the 2010 Nuclear Summits, South Africa understands fully that nuclear terrorism continues to be one of the most challenging threats to international security and is totally committed to its Action Plans and Communiqués which seek to strengthen nuclear security, reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, and prevent terrorists, criminals, or other unauthorised actors from acquiring nuclear materials. With the other 50-odd States present, South Africa recognises that in doing this, the rights of states to develop and utilise nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should not be hampered.

The Seoul Communiqué encouraged States to take “measures to minimise the use of HEU, including through the conversion of reactors from highly enriched to low enriched fuel, where technically and economically feasible, taking into account the need for assured supplies of medical isotopes”, and also encouraged States “in a position to do so, by the end of 2013, to announce voluntary specific actions intended to minimise the use of HEU”. This sentiment was also highlighted in the Joint Statement of the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Industry Summit, which took place just before the Security Summit in March, proving that both policymakers and industry are on the same page regarding minimising the use of HEU.

South Africa has already done this, and today is leading the transition to produce the medical Isotope molybdenum-99 with LEU rather than HEU and on 17 August 2011 the government through the Nuclear Energy Corporation (NECSA), already returned 6,3kg of highly HEU spent fuel to the US for safe storage and ultimately for destruction. There are no double games here.

South Africa has every right to keep its stock of HEU, also given that the country is actually using it for peaceful purposes – which it also has every right to. And although HEU poses a proliferation risk, South Africa has put every possible non–proliferation measure in place, including comprehensive safeguards and 24 hour real-time video surveillance with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to ensure that the material does not end up in the wrong hands.

It is ironic that most of the research facilities around the world that were designed to operate on HEU are situated in the States that have nuclear weapons. One cannot exclusively focus on reducing reliance on HEU for peaceful purposes, without any real commitment and progress on the elimination of HEU and other fissile materials that are primarily being used for military purposes. As Abdul Minty, South Africa’s Ambassador to the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament, pointed out in 2006, the threat to humanity’s very existence is the continued use of such material for weapons purposes [and not for peaceful applications].

The Seoul Communiqué reaffirms that nuclear security measures will not hamper the rights of States to develop and utilise nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The HEU that NECSA holds does not pose a security risk and given the developmental benefits of nuclear and other radioactive materials for Africa, there is a clear need to ensure the continued delivery of such materials and related applications that they provide, such as radionuclides intended for use in life-saving medical treatments. In addition, South Africa is fully within its rights as a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to explore the feasibility of enriching uranium and fuel fabrication provided that this is done for peaceful purposes. Unfortunately, due to the sensitivities around this material the issue of possession and use of HEU has become, and will continue to be, highly politicised.