29 January 2009: Somalia: The Djibouti Process Has a Better Chance of Success

After about 15 failed peacemaking processes, Somalia is once again undertaking another attempt at a negotiated peace settlement. The Djibouti peace process, which begun in May 2008, was started following the failure of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to consolidate itself into an all-inclusive national government embraced by all Somalis. It also comes in the midst of a deteriorating security and humanitarian situation following the forcible ouster of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) by Ethiopia. It was driven by the realization that the Somali crisis would not be resolved without a negotiated settlement involving the Islamist groups, who denied foothold to the TFG in most parts of Somalia.

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At this point in time, as one Somali scholar puts it, and as many would agree, the Djibouti process is the only game in town. It does carry some hope for the political future of the country. Many thus advocate that it should receive the support of all actors, both internal and external.

There are also certain conditions that have increased the chance of success of the Djibouti process. Unlike many of the previous initiatives, the Djibouti process is led by the United Nations. This process also has the support of major external actors within the region and outside, including Ethiopia, the League of Arab States and the US. Recent changes, particularly the withdrawal of Ethiopia and the resignation of TFG President Abdulahi Yusuf created more favourable conditions for moving the process forward. Unfortunately, although these are very relevant, they are not sufficient conditions for this current initiative to succeed. The Djibouti process still faces important uncertainties and challenges.

Firstly, there is a need to recognize the existence of critical regional dimensions to the Somali conflict. In this regard, unless it addresses the legitimate security concerns of Ethiopia including the recognition of Ogaden as legitimate part of the Ethiopian territory and Somali actors discontinue harbouring and supporting armed groups fighting against the authorities in Addis Ababa, the Djibouti process would suffer the fate of other previous initiatives. The second imperative is the inclusion of all the important actors in the Somali crisis. One reason for the failure of many of the past processes has been the limited inclusion of these crucial role players. Currently, the Djibouti process is centred around the TFG and the moderate faction of the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia, known as ARS-Djibouti. These groups represent only a very limited portion of the Somali actors whose involvement is crucial for the establishment of a lasting peace in Somalia. This include not only the Asmara-based faction of the ARS and the militant Islamist groups known as al Shabaab, which currently controls most parts of Somalia, but also members of civil society including local councils, women, business leaders, clan elders and the Somali Diaspora.

There are also divisions and disagreements even within and between the actors currently parties to the Djibouti process. Besides the divisions within the TFG, there is disagreement between TFG actors and ARS-Djibouti over the issue of whether ARS-Djibouti would be part of the TFG parliament that would elect a new president replacing Abdulahi Yusuf. Such divisions and disagreements may deepen, leading ultimately to a crisis that bedevilled many initiatives for fixing Somalia.

Thirdly, the focus should be on all the regions of Somalia. For obvious reasons, the focus of the Djibouti process has so far been on resolving the situation in south central Somalia. This is the part of Somalia where most of the conflict has been raging on for the past 18 years. Although the focus on this part of Somalia is understandable, the Somali conflict cannot be effectively addressed through such peace meal approaches. Such an approach fails to take account of, among others, the situation in Somaliland, which is in many ways a result and manifestation of the Somalia crisis. Any peace initiative to comprehensively resolve the Somali crisis should take account of the situation of different regions of Somalia.

Finally, the issue of justice requires serious attention. This is probably one of the most neglected aspects of the Somali conflict. During the past 18 years, alongside the collapse of the state, Somalis endured serious human rights violations including killing, rape and torture under conditions where there is no mechanism to bring perpetrators to justice. This led to the prevalence of a culture of impunity and the breakdown of any existing culture of respect for rule of law and human rights.

As part of the process for achieving lasting solutions, it is imperative to include some mechanism/s for addressing the human rights abuses and violations perpetrated against Somalis for the past 18 years. One option that should be considered is the establishment of a judicial inquiry or tribunal. Another option would be a truth and reconciliation process embraced by and involving all Somalis. This is imperative not only to deter the legitimization of politics by the use of gun but also to rebuild the confidence of Somalis in the rule of law and respect for human rights.

All these and other factors leave the Djibouti processes with uncertainties. Whether and how these issues are addressed determine its fate. Although it is good to be optimistic about the chance of success of this process, one should be mindful that there is a chance for failure. In the unfortunate event that this happens, the question is: do the UN and others in the international community have a Plan B?

Solomon Ayeledersso, Training for Peace Programme, ISS Pretoria