Somalia: Al-Shabaab Takeover of Baidoa, a Case of the Chickens Coming Home to Roost?
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4 February 2009: Somalia: Al-Shabaab Takeover of Baidoa, a Case of the Chickens Coming Home to Roost?
To anyone who has been following the political and security developments in Somalia, the takeover of Baidoa, home to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) Parliament and the Presidential Palace, by Al-Shabaab last month, did not come as a surprise. The only surprise should come from the fact that after months of warning of withdrawal of Ethiopian Forces, the African Union (AU), the United Nations (UN) and the TFG remained unprepared to fill the security vacuum that arose when the Ethiopian forces withdrew. Al-Shabaab (“the Youth”) is a militant Islamic group initially aligned to the Union of Islamic Courts, with its roots shrouded in obscurity. It is increasingly becoming an alternative centre of power. The fact that Al-Shabaab overran Baidoa almost before the withdrawing Ethiopian forces had crossed the Ethiopian border, illustrates a collective failure of the TFG and its allies.
As if to demonstrate the predictability of these developments, a venue for a meeting of an array of Somali politicians numbering about 1,000 was changed from Baidoa to neighbouring Djibouti, shortly before the attack, citing security fears. The meeting elected an additional 200 members to an expanded Parliament to accommodate the opposition group Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS). In turn the expanded Parliament has elected ARS leader Sheik Sherif Ahmed as the new President to replace Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed who resigned a month ago, citing his failure to end the conflict, and the failure of the international community to support his government. Just as it was thought that the inclusion of the ARS into the TFG would bring broader acceptance to the ongoing peace process, Al-Shabaab demonstrated that it holds real power that in the pattern of ARS, is a potential bargaining power for inclusion in the peace process, or for advancement of its own agenda.
The capture of Baidoa by Al-Shabaab is a major setback to the TFG in its attempt to establish a functional and legitimate central authority that has eluded Somalia for the last eighteen years. It also adds another dynamic to the peace negotiations between the TFG and various militant groups especially the ARS. The question that must now be answered is where this leaves the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)? Among other tasks, AMISOM was mandated to protect the TFG in its attempt to develop its nascent institutions. If the withdrawal of Ethiopian Forces from Somalia highlights anything, it is that there was no clear outcome: not only for Ethiopia, but also for AMISOM who are likely to withdraw. The first Ugandan contingent of AMISOM arrived in Mogadishu in January 2007 and yet the AU is yet to generate the 8,000 strong authorised forces for the Mission. Had all the member states that pledged forces fulfilled their pledges; perhaps the effect of the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces on the TFG would have been phased, if not minimised. That only 3,500 of the 8,000 AU authorised force was realised in a two year period notwithstanding logistical constraints, is a serious indictment on the commitment of the member States of the AU, the UN and its donors to fully supporting the Somali peace to Somalia.
AMISOM, according to its own mandate, is meant to stabilise the situation in the country in order to provide conditions to conduct humanitarian activities. Among other things, one of its tasks is to protect the Transitional Federal Institutions to enable them to carry out their functions. With the Parliament and Presidential Palace at Baidoa now in the hands of the Al-Shabaab Islamic militants, it is now apparent that not only was the AMISOM mandate too ambitious, but is also faces serious logistical and other constraints of achieving it. It is unfortunate that the UN Security Council buoyed by the “lack of peace to keep in Somalia” is yet to demonstrate the enthusiasm it garnered during the drawing of resolution 1851 in the fight against piracy, to focus itself on a mission to replace AMISOM.
Also brought to the spotlight is the role of the Ethiopian Army in Somalia in its clamoured pursuit of Islamic militants. With the backing of the United States of America (USA) they entered Somalia two years ago with a prime purpose of defeating the then ruling Union of Islamic Courts (ICU) for making provocative statements about Ethiopia. It is therefore ironic that barely with the completion of their withdrawal, Al-Shabaab a group initially aligned to the ICU, fills the power vacuum left in Baidoa. These developments highlight, if not confirm, the balance of power tilting towards Al-Shabaab, raising doubts over the ability of the expanded TFG in itself to exist without foreign intervention.
As to whether the Ethiopian forces were successful in their invasion, ousting of the ICU and the occupation Somalia for the last two years can be viewed in two contrasting ways. First, by providing backing to an internationally recognised Government in Somalia in the face of continuing violence, until such a time when they withdrew from Somalia, illustrates that without their presence the TFG remains a government only on paper. Whilst Ethiopia and its backers had their own national interest in entering Somalia, the legitimacy of the TFG as a Government of the Somalis devoid of the backing of the international community or foreign forces hangs in a balance.
On the other hand however, the fall of Baidoa to the Al-Shabaab echoes a chilling contradiction to proclamations and the clamour of the Ethiopian forces of unsuccessful the Ethiopian Forces militant groups in Somalia had been defeated. By several accounts it was clear that in the two-year occupation of Somalia, Ethiopian forces had found themselves trapped between the futility of nursing a weak TFG, and fighting militant groups whose origins, variety, modus operandi, and increasing strength had become amorphous. Despite calls for their departure by Somalis engaged in the UN-brokered peace process, Ethiopian Forces provided stability, at least to the TFG.
In the final analysis, what the events in Baidoa illustrate is that Somalis, regardless of their orientation, need to take responsibility as primary stakeholders in governance and security. If not, the support of external Somalis remains futile. It needs to be impressed upon the TFG, or whatever Government there may be, that rather than blame its woes on the international community, it has an obligation to build institutions and provide security for all Somalis. On the other hand, the international community, especially the UN and Western countries need to do more in supporting the AU in its initiatives in peacekeeping in Somalia. It is simply not enough to use the “lack of peace to keep in Somalia” as an excuse for a more concerted effort in providing peace support, while finding it easy to fight piracy - an effect of insecurity and lawlessness in Somalia.
Xavier Ejoyi, Researcher, Training for Peace Programme, ISS Nairobi
