Six years on: the UN's International Tracing Instrument
December 8th 2011 marks the 6th year since the adoption of the International Tracing Instrument (ITI) by the United Nations General Assembly. The ability to trace small arms and light weapons (SALW) is an important step toward transparency and preventing the illicit use of firearms in conflict and crime.
Published on 05 December 2011 in
ISS Today
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The ability to trace small arms and light weapons (SALW) is an important step toward transparency and preventing the illicit use of firearms in conflict and crime. December 8th 2011 marks the 6th year since the adoption of the International Tracing Instrument (ITI) by the United Nations General Assembly.
In adopting the ITI, although not legally binding, the UN Member States acknowledged that the instrument would enable them to identify and trace, in a timely and reliable manner, illicit SALW within their territories. The ITI will promote and facilitate international cooperation and assistance in marking and tracing of arms. The instrument points out that it does not restrict the right of States to acquire, manufacture, transfer and retain small arms and light weapons for their self-defence and security needs, or their capacity to participate in peacekeeping operations, in a manner consistent with the Charter of the United Nations.
The need for the ITI was founded in the desire for member States to keep track of weapons and ammunition in both government and civilian possession within its territories. However, the realization of this objective lies in a country’s ability to maintain an effective firearms tracing mechanism, which is an aspect that many countries still lack, especially those emerging from armed conflicts, usually characterized by widespread circulation of illicit arms and ammunition. In the case of African armed conflicts, many of the SALW used were recycled from past wars, with their original sources having been government stocks.
Although most arms are marked at the points of manufacture, in many countries especially in Africa, the lack of effective marking and record keeping processes leads to leakage from firearm stockpiles especially in times of conflict. In other cases, illegal handlers of such arms deliberately obliterate the manufacturer's markings on weapons, making it untraceable by normal physical inspection. In some instances new weapons are supplied deliberately in the course of armed conflicts, without due regard for record keeping. Circumstances prevailing in armed conflict environments therefore also constitute one of the major causes of untraceable weapons within societies. To mitigate this challenge, it is advisable that governments of recipient countries such as those in Africa undertake a post-manufacture marking process of arms (of all nature and categories) within their territory.
A post-manufacture mark is any unique mark placed on a small arm/firearm in addition to the manufacturer’s original markings. Such a mark would be unique and traceable to individual countries. Although import markings can facilitate the tracing of illegal firearms when recovered, often such markings are not as fool proof in preventing the diversion of arms to illegal ownership, as it would be when combined with a post-manufacture mark. Post manufacture marking may include, but is not limited to, import marking, proof marking, marking of state-owned weapons, marking of weapons transferred to civilian use and marking of seized weapons. However, the marking only serves its purpose if is well recorded and easily retrievable from the firearm for purposes of tracing to its original source or owner. In cases of crime, it would be easier to trace the firearm to the licensed bearer.
The ITI is non-prescriptive with regard to marking procedures, leaving it to States to choose methods for marking, as long as they ensure that whatever method is used, all marks are on an exposed surface, conspicuous without technical aids or tools, easily recognizable, readable, durable and, as far as technically possible, recoverable. Like in any other form of international trade, trade in arms is also vulnerable to illegal brokers who seek to exploit markets in conflict zones by supplying unmarked arms. In such instances, the ITI encourages member States to subsequently mark such arms for traceability reasons, even in circumstances where such arms are to be destroyed. This requirement is also taken into account by the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The Protocol requires that where a small arm or light weapon does not bear any marking, a unique marking be made on it.
A country that effectively marks weapons within its territory and keeps a clear database of the same, enhances the security of its arsenals, even in times of armed conflicts affecting neighbouring countries because it would be easier to detect undocumented (foreign) weapons if recovered. This situation is further enhanced through strict national legislation and regional cooperation, through simultaneous implementation of marking and tracing policies.
The implementation of the ITI is yet to be fully espoused by Africa's member states due to various reasons. One of the challenges emanates from the fact that conflicts are still simmering in a number of countries making governance and enforcement of law and order (necessary for effective implementation of the ITI) practically impossible. Secondly, even the few African countries that are in the process of implementing the ITI still have to contend with some neighbours that are still in conflict and therefore a source of undocumented SALW. A case in point is the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which is faced with a high concentration of illegal arms, but neighbours states such as Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi that are in the process of implementing the Nairobi Protocol’s requirement on marking and tracing of arms. Thirdly, most African countries do not consider marking and record keeping of arms within their territories as a matter of policy priority, and as such this they don’t allocate sufficient resources for even simple things like purchasing of machines necessary for marking of arms. In a few cases where countries have marked (or are marking), the equipment used has been donated by international partners. However, it suffices to recognize the great effort and courage that the member states of the Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA) and the states signatory to the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Firearms Protocol have shown in embarking on marking and record keeping of state-owned firearms within some of their member states, despite the enormity of existing challenges.
It is, however important to note that weak political will among a number of African states continues to impede the implementation of the ITI on the continent. At this rate, though only six years have passed since its adoption, the ITI may take several decades to be fully implemented in Africa. Until then, the region may continue being a theatre of armed groups and illicit flow of arms.
Nelson Alusala, Senior Researcher, Arms Management Programme, Pretoria office
