Reintegrating Ex-combatants in Vulnerable Environments: Evidence from Central African Republic, the

The availability of suitable livelihood opportunities for ex-combatants is vital to the success of peace-building efforts after war. That is, in order to encourage ex-combatants not to re-militarise, an alternative and appealing means of making a legitimate living should be available. Recent ISS research on the reintegration of ex-combatants in the conflict prone areas of the Central African Republic, eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan found that the achievement of sustainable peace is a realistic possibility, so long as the process of ex-combatant reintegration into civilian life continues unabated.

Published on 05 March 2012 in ISS Today

Guy Lamb, Senior Research Fellow,  Transnational Threats and International Crime, ISS Cape Town

The availability of suitable livelihood opportunities for ex-combatants is vital to the success of peace-building efforts after war, especially in Africa. That is, in order to encourage ex-combatants not to re-militarise, an alternative and appealing means of making a legitimate living should be available. In addition, if former combatants are able to make a constructive economic contributions to the communities into which they settle, these communities are more likely to be receptive to their presence. However, reintegration processes are often implemented in fragile and challenging environments, which are not conducive to consolidating peace.

Recent ISS research (funded by the World Bank’s Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program) on the reintegration of combatants of ex-combatants in the conflict prone areas of the Central African Republic (CAR), eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and South Sudan has revealed some intriguing results. 

In all three countries ex-combatants undertook a wide variety of economic activities in order to sustain themselves and generate an income, with the most common being small businesses. Other activities included cross border trading, artisanal mining, motorcycle taxi businesses, agriculture, fishing, hunting, logging and construction (amongst others). Nonetheless, most economic activities remained small and locked within the informal sector, as the costs and procedures associated with transitioning a business from the informal to the formal were generally prohibitive.

Ex-combatants often undertook a variety of income generating activities in order to save funds and provide for themselves and their families. In some cases ex-combatants were running multiple small businesses, usually employing in family members to assist. In many cases ex-combatants had sought to improve their socio-economic status by changing and adapting the manner in which they generated an income. For example, some ex-combatants started working in menial jobs, accumulated savings and then invested in more profitable ventures.

The manner in which ex-combatants used the reinsertion or reintegration kits that were provided to them varied. Some used them directly for income generation activities. A significant number sold the kits, with some using the proceeds for short-term consumption, while others invested the funds in economic ventures, which they felt were more appropriate to their personal circumstances. Some former combatants were able to use the skills that they had acquired through the reintegration capacity-building process for economic gain. Others employed their skills and expertise acquired from conflict or prior to the conflict to generate an income in the post-conflict environment. 

Dilapidated road networks and related infrastructure restricted the ability of ex-combatants to enhance their livelihoods particularly with regards to agricultural production, as it was exceedingly difficult for farmers to ferry their produce to urban markets. Most ex-combatants with cross-border trade enterprises encountered frequent checkpoints when ferrying goods between source and the market. Not only were fees required to be paid, but significant delays were also encountered. This usually increased the price and reduced the quality (in the case of fresh produce) of the goods. Formal sector import and export business was beyond the reach of most ex-combatant entrepreneurs due to the excessive cost of importing/exporting cargo containers. Consequently, most trading businesses were small, with ex-combatants transferring their goods on their backs, bicycles, or motorcycles.

A key paradox if many post-war countries, is that despite being characterised by weak governance and underdevelopment, the formal economy tended to be regulated by unwieldy and sluggish bureaucratic systems and processes. In many cases, ex-combatant businesses did not comply with government regulations, which made the business owners (and their employees) vulnerable to exploitative behaviour by corrupt government officials. The complexity of taxation was an added burden, with taxes having to be paid to numerous levels of government. Ex-combatants tended to regard the tax system as excessive, and predatory in some circumstances. High rates of taxation reduced the amount available resources that ex-combatants could reinvest in or improve their businesses. Some ex-combatants therefore sought to avoid paying formal tax (where possible) or paid informal taxes or bribes to officials, which were typically lower than the official tax.

The commercial banking sector was underdeveloped, with very little in the way of credit being available for small businesses, especially in the informal sector. In a small number of cases microcredit was available, but this was dependent on the availability of assets that could be provided for surety. Where ex-combatants had access to credit, businesses were expanded and operating risks reduced. Those ex-combatants that required credit typically borrowed money from family members, friends and relatives. Others acquired investors or business partners as means to grow their businesses.

Areas outside of governmental control presented both opportunities and risks for ex-combatants. Where the ungoverned space corresponded with mineral wealth (as in the case of the DRC and CAR), opportunities for wealth accumulation were enhanced (particularly through artisanal mining). Such activities were usually illegal, and involved a high degree of risk on the part of the ex-combatant. Violence was often a feature of such an environment. In CAR and DRC, for example, armed groups and government soldiers often “taxed” ex-combatants involved in mineral extraction and trade. These militarised groups then used these tax revenues to reinforce and perpetuate their control of mineral areas.

There appeared to be a correlation between ex-combatants’ livelihood choice and martial/family status. It seemed that in most cases if a male ex-combatant was married and had children then his livelihood option was often stable and legitimate. A similar dynamic existed for female ex-combatants, particularly those who were unmarried and had to provide for their dependents. In the case of young male ex-combatants riskier livelihood options were often pursued, such as artisanal mining, mineral smuggling and the motorcycle taxi sector. Some resorted to criminal activities or joined armed/militia groups.