Race and Ethnicity in the Shadows of Opposition Politics in South Africa
The announcement by the leader of the Democratic Alliance (DA) and Premier of the Western Cape, Helen Zille and the leader of the Independent Democrats (ID), Patricia de Lille, on the 15 August 2010, that the ID will merge with the DA highlights the precarious nature of opposition politics in South Africa. The DA is the official opposition party but its support was limited to 17% of the national electorate, predominantly based in the Western Cape. The ID has struggled to retain its once promising rise in the Northern and Western Cape, garnering only four parliamentary seats in the 2009 election. The Congress of the People (COPE), a breakaway from the ANC in 2008, had a meteoritic rise and fall as factionalism continues to tear the party apart. The United Democratic Movement (UDM) an earlier breakaway from the African National Congress (ANC) and New National Party has not made significant inroads into the South African electoral landscape.
Siphokazi Magadla, consultant, Security Sector Governance Programme, ISS Pretoria,
The announcement by the leader of the Democratic Alliance (DA) and Premier of the Western Cape, Helen Zille and the leader of the Independent Democrats (ID), Patricia de Lille, on the 15 August 2010, that the ID will merge with the DA highlights the precarious nature of opposition politics in South Africa. The DA is the official opposition party but its support was limited to 17% of the national electorate, predominantly based in the Western Cape. The ID has struggled to retain its once promising rise in the Northern and Western Cape, garnering only four parliamentary seats in the 2009 election. The Congress of the People (COPE), a breakaway from the ANC in 2008, had a meteoritic rise and fall as factionalism continues to tear the party apart. The United Democratic Movement (UDM) an earlier breakaway from the African National Congress (ANC) and New National Party has not made significant inroads into the South African electoral landscape.
The ANC continues to enjoy overwhelming support, despite concerns about internal dissent, corruption and lack of service delivery. This we argue is because of a continued pattern of voter behaviour largely influenced by the politics of race and ethnicity and the legacy of the ANC as the bearer of liberation. Even opposition politics, though negated in rhetoric, utilizes the politics of race and ethnicity, taking us into a cul de sac that inhibits our ability to move beyond this narrative of identity based politics.
Analysis of the first three democratic elections in South Africa 1994, 1999 and 2004 predominantly viewed voting behavior in terms of race and ethnicity. The dominance of the ANC was therefore attributed to the fact that the majority of voters in South Africa are black. Opposition parties also structured their manifestos on racially defined interests, as stated by Taylor & Hoeane in a 1999 article in Politikon. Well-known political analyst Steven Friedman explains that the key to identity politics is the belief by the voter that identity is used to “denote a social self definition based on criteria other than socioeconomic interest”. Identity then lessens the focus on issues of policy that parties uphold and are accountable for, an argument that seems to hold given that the differences in policy between the parties appeared to be minute.
In 2009 the emergence of COPE presented an opportunity to move away from this discourse as COPE held the possibility of attracting support from all sectors of the population. All analysis pointed to the fact that a viable opposition party could only come from the loins of the ruling ANC. However, the current internal dissension within COPE as South Africans proceed to the local government elections in 2011 make it timely to ask: what can be expected from a DA and ID merger? How and will this union escape race and ethnicity as a determiner for voter behavior in the 2011 local elections?
One should start by asking why after 16 years of supposed non-racial democratic rule have voters and political parties not been able to transcend the racial divides? Black voters vote overwhelmingly for the ANC, continuing to view it as the protector of their interests and as having given them back their dignity. This is regardless that under its leadership South Africa continues to be a highly unequal society in which the African majority bear the burden of poverty. The DA’s support is largely White and Coloured. The ID’s support is Coloured. The UDM support is Xhosa. The United Christian Democratic Party support is Tswana speaking, whilst the Inkatha Freedom Party has not been able to move beyond Zulu based support in KwaZulu Natal. It is the failure of these parties to appeal to the national vote that gives credence to the belief that race and ethnicity are the key galvanising factors.
When analyzing the nature of the ID and the DA then it appears that the ID is in greater need of a partnership with the DA. The DA has been increasing its support base in the Western Cape while the ID has been on the decline. But, the DA is limited in extending its support base to other sections of the population, most notably African, largely because it is deemed to be a White party. Though it has attracted substantial Coloured support, the face of the party, notwithstanding its inclusion of other groups, remains White. Adding De Lille and her supporters to their support base does not essentially change the DNA of the party though it slightly increases the numbers. There have been overtures made to COPE and the UDM to join forces, but their reluctance yet again speaks to the politics of race: they do not want to be subsumed by a party still viewed as representing minority interests.
The DA can only grow into a party able to govern, if it can make in roads into the African constituency and go beyond the Western Cape. But what will it take to do this? Simply put, South Africa’s realities are still steeped in its apartheid past. Race is still the dominant criteria for life chances. Race still pre-occupies the political landscape where it was used to oppress people in the apartheid era and used as the lens through which power was to be acquired and distributed. In the post-apartheid era it is used as the basis for affirming the previously disadvantaged and continues to be the source of reference for leadership. This means that in the foreseeable future there will be no White president in South Africa. Helen Zille, no matter how strong her credentials as a politician will not be elected into the presidential office.
If she steps down as party leader will the party stand a better chance? With de Lille probably not. But, then even if the whole leadership of the party was to darken its hue it still does not have the liberation credentials that the ANC can still use as its draw card. The DA will have to be content with the position of official opposition for a long time to come. The merger with the ID is unlikely to substantially change their position in the next election.
As long as inequity in South Africa continues to be reflected along the divide of race and ethnicity these variables will be used to determine political interest and therefore party support. Whites and Coloureds will see their interest more protected by the DA for as long as they remain in their enclave (the Western Cape) feeling threatened by the unknown in the other provinces. Blacks will not be able to look past the colour of the incumbents for their experience of racialised oppression is far too recent.
