Piracy in Somalia: Indications of a Breakdown of Global, Regional and National Security Systems
blurb:isstoday:091008piracysomalia
9 October 2008: Piracy in Somalia: Indications of a Breakdown of Global, Regional and National Security Systems
The latest piracy incident off the coast of Somalia is an unprecedented development that has reverberated across the world highlighting once again issues of international peace and security. The seizure of the Ukrainian registered ship, the MV Faina that was reportedly transporting about 35 T72 military tanks and an assortment of other weapons, appears to be the boldest attack with the most prized booty yet to have fallen into the hands of the pirates. Were it not for the seizure of the military hardware consignment, the issue of piracy would not have received such high level attention from both the media and the international community. By the 25th of September 2008, over 61 actual and attempted hijackings had in fact already been recorded by the International Chamber of Commerce and International Maritime Bureau since the beginning of the year.
The Gulf of Aden in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean off the Somalia coast has turned into an extremely treacherous maritime route, despite it being vital in the movement of goods and services internationally. Piracy is a criminal act that has impacted on the freedom of movement of goods and services across the globe, especially since the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean are strategic in international trade. The incident further underlines the misplaced priority of the international community that is at the moment preoccupied with the United States’ Global War on Terror. The piracy menace appears to have increased drastically because of the breakdown of the national, regional and global security systems. This is a direct result of these misplaced priorities.
At the national level, this also portrays the failure of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG). The TFG has failed to consolidate itself nationally despite the goodwill and the recognition by the international community. The TFG fulfils the criteria of a government only in the spirit of the narrowly negotiated Inter Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) agreement and typically portrays itself as a client-government for the external actors. It cannot provide national security for its citizens, let alone for the international community.
It is important though to emphasize that provision of security rests primarily on the full participation of the people in the affairs that affect them. As a client state of the external actors, the TFG has not provided the people with the space to contribute to their affairs. Looking a few years back: the TFG’s predecessor, the Union of Islamic Courts government, was indeed able to contain piracy under the areas in its jurisdiction. The number of pirated ships was negligible and even then, the short-lived government was able to contain the problem and bring the pirates to justice.
As for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), it wasn’t able to provide security beyond its barracks due to a glaring gap in its mandate. What then about Ethiopia? Ethiopia is an occupation force and therefore the mandate is broad. Given this special role, Ethiopia’s duties and obligations are spelled out in the 1907 Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention to among others, ensure public order and safety. What is surprising then is that if the presence of Ethiopia is to make Somalia more secure and stable, it has not been successful in dealing with piracy, but instead it has been more concerned with tackling the insurgency crisis in Mogadishu. Interestingly, the international laws of occupation also justify armed resistance to the occupation force, which has inevitably created a security predicament for both Ethiopia and AMISOM and diverted their attention from the piracy crisis.
Matters are made even worse by the regional and international security architecture. While the Somalia coast sees the movements of important global goods and services, the regional security organisations such as IGAD and the East African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) are yet to fulfil their mandate of providing peace and security within the jurisdiction of the member states. Whereas the names and the charter of these organisations elicit hope and aspirations for the people of the Horn of Africa and Somalia in particular, it is feared that they are the tools of perpetuating regional elites in power.
IGAD in particular, despite the broad mandate covering human and state security, has been an instrument of swift endorsement of the ‘familiar’ government that is in power in the event of an electoral contest even before the outcome is clear. For Somalia, IGAD exported the government composed of warlords to Somalia thus working at cross-purposes with its charter. The United Nations (UN) is not any better. As a state-oriented and protocol guided body, the UN is yet to get to know the Horn of Africa generally and Somalia in particular, and develop the courage to guide the implementation of international laws and conventions.
On its part, the US, as the only superpower, could not do much since it is pre-occupied with the war on terror at the expense of other major international peace and security threats such as piracy. Hence, the US is akin to a person fearing his own shadow or chasing a mirage in the Somalia desert. The net result: the interests of the international community are driven by perceptions rather than the reality on the ground.
It is quite evident that there has been a breakdown of not only the Somali state security structure but also societal (clan) security regulations since the collapse of the central authority in 1991. The absence of state security coupled with the incessant clan conflicts have contributed to the regressing economic situation in the country. The warlords and their clan solidarity networks, together with other regional players, have divided Somalia into various clan and sub-clan enclaves. The breakdown of the clans has major social implications particularly on any future governance plans. Given the breakdown of the traditional institutions regulating property rights regimes, groups such as pirates, who lay claims on Somalia’s territorial waters, as well as the warlords who impose their jurisdiction on the land, have emerged and proliferated not only within the clan but also across the clan lines.
The pirates have come up with the specific dubious claim of protecting the Somali waters. The ever-transforming nature of local conflicts in Somalia has been aggravated by foreign states and companies. For instance, like in many other conflict-prone states, some foreign consortiums perceived the collapse of the state as a blank cheque for them to plunder Somalia’s international waters in the Indian Ocean. In the mid-nineties before the pirates emerged forcefully in the area, there was major exploitation of Somalia’s marine resources by foreign companies.
Like many illegal exploitative ventures driven by profit, the marine resources were often exploited unsustainably with considerable negative impact on the marine biodiversity and the socio-economic activities of the local communities. This does not mean that the clan or factional leadership are innocent. In some cases, the local leaders sell the “rights” to operate in the Somalia waters in return for royalties from the international companies.
Protecting Somalia’s waters from the illegal foreign vessels has given pirates a source of inspiration, legitimisation and justification for their actions. Although the reasons for their alleged action, that is, “protecting Somalia’s waters” appears rational, their actions over the years have increasingly cast doubt about their patriotism. For instance, on many occasions, pirates have targeted the ships carrying humanitarian supplies that are a lifeline for many people, especially the displaced persons in Somalia. The delays in humanitarian services delivery has impacted significantly on human security. In addition, the demand of ransom by pirates has pushed up the cost of humanitarian aid in Somalia. Furthermore, the financial benefit could be used to fuel local conflict in Somalia given that pirates benefit extensively from the chaotic situation that has been prevailing in Somalia.
Whilst the international community is expected to take immediate and radical action to eradicate piracy along the busy sea route, much would depend on the methods used to address the menace. There is also need for a major paradigm shift by the international community to one that is guided more by the realities in the Horn of Africa rather than by perceptions. The military solution as proposed by the TFG and the European Union to establish anti-piracy security operations off the coast of Somalia are likely to be of limited significance. Instead, there is need to spice the state-driven security measures with some human security ingredients. Amongst the priorities should be the orderly withdrawal by all external forces and the formation of a genuine, all inclusive government in Somalia regardless of the content of governance and the labels. The emerging government will thus be obliged to contribute to international peace and security at least within the jurisdiction of Somalia territory.
Mohamed Guyo is an ISS Associate Researcher currently collaborating with the Africa Human Security Initiative in Nairobi
