No End in Sight for DRC Crisis
The effectiveness of the United Nations peacekeeping mission (MONUC) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has again come under the spotlight. This is against the background of reports that the joint operations of MONUC and the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) have made far less progress in containing the illegal operations of various rebel movements and militias in the east of the country - the very groups whose operations MONUC is mandated to curtail – than was expected.
Nelson Alusala, Senior Researcher, Arms Management Programme, Pretoria Office
The effectiveness of the United Nations peacekeeping
mission (MONUC) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has again
come under the spotlight. This is against the background of reports
that the joint operations of MONUC and the Congolese armed forces
(FARDC) have made far less progress in containing the illegal
operations of various rebel movements and militias in the east of the
country - the very groups whose operations MONUC is mandated to curtail
– than was expected.
A report of the UN panel of experts on the DRC helps to confirm
previous reports that MONUC has been providing logistical support to
the DRC army, which has also been benefitting Rwandan FDLR rebels. One
such collaboration occurred when MONUC helped a joint offensive by the
FDLR and FARDC to repulse rebels allied to Laurent Nkunda`s Congrès
National pour la Defense du Peuple (CNDP) from advancing into Masisi
late last year.
The UN panel of experts report documents that neighbouring countries
continue to illegally involve themselves in the affairs of the DRC.
For instance the report states that while Ugandan officials facilitate
an illegal trade in gold mined from eastern Congolese sites controlled
and taxed by the FDLR - including recruiting combatants for FDLR from
Rwandan refugee camps in Uganda - Tanzania is linked to delivery of
weapons and ammunition via Lake Tanganyika to the FDLR. This is also the
case with Burundi, where some senior government officials are said to
have close links with the FDLR. Without an assured chain of supply for
arms, any rebel movement would find it impossible to exist.
The latest revelations are a step backwards in the regional efforts
to deal with the effects of the FDLR, an armed group composed largely
of remnants of perpetrators of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. There have
been several bilateral and regional efforts to repulse FDLR elements
out of the DRC, but with little success. One such effort was Operation Umoja Wetu
(Our Unity), a joint Rwandan-Congolese military operation meant to
compel FDLR into voluntary surrender and return to Rwanda. Although the
effectiveness of operations such as Umoja Wetu remains
questionable, the doubt over the impartiality of MONUC in a conflict
whose magnitude goes beyond the borders of the country of its mandate,
may reverse the little gains achieved so far.
These developments further dampen the commitments by the Tripartite
Plus Joint Commission Heads of State Meeting made during one of their
unprecedented meetings in Addis Ababa in 2007, facilitated by the
United States. Among the discussions on a range of issues of mutual
concern in achieving lasting peace and security in the Great Lakes
Region was the affirmation by member states to the all-important
question of eliminating the threat to regional peace and security posed
by negative forces, as well as the need to strengthen regional
security mechanisms. This includes the resumption of full diplomatic
relations among the four member states of Burundi, the DRC, Rwanda and
Uganda.
Also watered down are the commitments laid down in the Nairobi
Communiqué
signed between the governments of the DRC and the Rwanda, which spells
out a
common approach to ending the threat posed to both Rwanda and the DRC
by the FDLR, and recognizes the additional threat posed by other armed
groups in the eastern DRC. One then wonders how these processes could
move forward under the current circumstances.
The fact that the results of the 35-day offensive early this year,
in which the Rwandan army moved through North Kivu province with the
aim of purging the rebel militia from its main strongholds were quite
dismal, points to the fact that the FDLR’s strength may be
underestimated, and that the chain of weapons supply to their base is
assured. After Operation Umoja Wetu the FDLR regrouped and
began to retaliate against civilians, necessitating a new military
campaign by the Congolese army and MONUC under codename Kimia II (Silence II) to be initiated in protection of the population.
As has always been the case in the past, Congo’s tribulations have
never been limited just to the African continent. The plundered wealth
has in many cases ended up in western markets through a complex of
intermediaries, many of whom are also arms brokers. The report of the
panel of experts faults governments of France and Germany for allowing
leaders of FDLR to operate from their territories, and Spanish
charitable organisations for funding this armed group. For instance the
FDLR leader Ignance Murwanashyaka was based in Germany until his
recent arrest.
It is discernible that the protracted lack of co-operation both at
the regional and international levels in finding a lasting solution to
the long-standing problems in the DRC continues to cause the Congolese
people enormous suffering and loss of life and property. At a regional
level, the Great Lakes Region continues to suffer political instability
and retarded economic development due to this endemic conflict as
chains of agreements continue to be signed bilaterally, regionally and
globally without serious commitments by stakeholders.
Against the background of all these convolutions is the need for a
renewed momentum in the search for a comprehensive strategy that would
not only focus on diminishing the effects of negative forces in the
DRC, but also one that envisages neutralising all armed groups in the
country. Such a strategy should also incorporate international legal
initiatives in third countries aimed at preventing FDLR leaders outside
Congo from getting support of any kind that would further their
destructive activities in the Congo. This requires the involvement of
national, regional and international actors.
MONUC should include in its priorities the protection of civilians
and their property while the UN, in conjunction with the Congolese
government and the Tripartite Plus Joint Commission reform the
disarmament approach in order to incorporate voluntary and psychosocial
elements aimed at making the process more adaptable especially to
civilians affiliated to FDLR armed group. Such a process should include
an option for resettlement in a third country and logistical support
to families.
The Congo-Rwanda entente remains at risk until all stakeholders in
the Congolese conflict truly commit themselves to the pursuit of
long-term peace in the country. If this is not attained soon, the US $1
billion a year that is spent on MONUC’s presence in the Congo will
even increase without much tangible outcome, and at the expense of the
suffering of the common Congolese population; displaced, poor, hungry
and predisposed to all vagrancies.
