Niger Delta: Yar`Adua`s Amnesty Deal: Palliative or Cure?

On June 24, 2009, the Nigerian Federal Government officially opened a two-month amnesty window (from 06 August to 04 October 2009) to all militants in the Niger Delta region in exchange for their demobilization and disarmament. Upon surrendering their weapons, militants would receive financial compensation from the government over a period of time. The question is whether these measures really tackle the contentious issues in the troubled Niger Delta?

Published on 09 September 2009 in ISS Today

Halif Sarki, Intern, ASAP, Pretoria Office

On June 24, 2009, the Nigerian Federal Government officially opened a two-month amnesty window (from 06 August to 04 October 2009) to all militants in the Niger Delta region in exchange for their demobilization and disarmament. Upon surrendering their weapons, militants would receive financial compensation from the government over a period of time. The question is whether these measures really tackle the contentious issues in the troubled Niger Delta? Will government’s handouts bring sustainable peace to the region? Why are the recommendations of the Niger Delta Technical Committee (NDTC) only partially implemented? These questions raise serious doubts about the political will and determination on the part of the Nigerian Federal Government to effectively and sustainably achieve peace in this oil rich region.

The stabilisation of the region logically appeared paramount to the implementation of subsequent recommendations. The Federal Government was thus to engage the various militant groups in a confidence building process with a mutual ceasefire agreement, an open trial with the prospects of the release of Henry Okah, a highranking official in the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the retreat of the Joint Task Force (JTF) from the region, and the creation of a demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) commission.

So far Abuja has offered, as part of its amnesty deal, to gratify each militant with N65 000 (US $841) as part of its disarmament and demobilization programme. As for reintegration, the details of the process are still unclear, as no DDR commission has yet been established. Abuja also released Henry Okah. However, the JTF that was deployed in the region still remains in position and active. This has raised concerns from MEND, which threatened to break their unilateral ceasefire declared on 15 July 2009.

Handing out money to militants cannot be expected to solve a situation as complex and volatile as the Niger Delta. On the contrary, it only works as a symptomatic relief not a cure. The ‘disease’ remains and another armed group could replace MEND around the same grievances. The region, which comprises nine states, produces the bulk of Nigeria’s oil and yet only receives about 13 percent share of the petroleum revenues. Militant groups such as MEND call for an upward revision of the share - consistent with NDTC recommendations - to 25 percent, therefore considerably boosting the economy of the region. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the same militants receiving grants will not remobilize and reengage to receive even greater handouts. The grants would only uncover the federal government’s ‘Achilles heel’ that other groups could exploit over various grievances.

For the past two decades the Niger Delta has seen militants rise and fall over the same unchanging cause: better socio-economic conditions for the people of the region mainly through a better allocation of oil revenues. However, Abuja has been continuously circumventing the issue by applying palliative measures that only worsen the situation. It must be noted that this is not the first amnesty deal between the Federal Government and militant groups in the Niger Delta region. Former president Olusegun Obasanjo reached an agreement in 2004 with Mujahid Dokubo-Asari’s Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) whereby militants were offered amnesty for their weapons. The deal subsequently collapsed and Dokubo-Asari was arrested and charged with treason. This to say that ignoring the ‘real’ issue will ultimately not make it disappear. Partial and unstructured policies will not bring any commendable results either.

The recent turn of events, with the demands by some militants for N3 billion and houses, only illustrates the frivolity of governmental policies in the Niger Delta. Feeding on the Federal Government’s reluctance to truly address popular grievances, some militant leaders could try to selfishly cash in on the cause. Once again the people would be utilized to pursue individualistic interests.

An unrestricted implementation of the recommendations of the NDTC would, arguably, genuinely address the situation in a sustainable manner and prevent future militarized protests. These recommendations, albeit substantively covering the demilitarization of the Niger Delta, also provide for a durable socio-economic development and popular participation in the processes. There is no rational explanation as to why the Nigerian Government would choose to pay off militants rather than investing the funds to finance socio-economic projects that would empower the youth in the region in line with NDTC recommendations. The amnesty deal is costing the Federal Government a total of US $64 million, enough to build a few roads and schools.

More than three weeks into the amnesty and only small isolated militant groups have answered Abuja’s call. MEND, a polarized militant group, has consistently refused to disarm and promises renewed military activities at the end of its 60 days ceasefire. MEND has vowed to relentlessly continue its ‘war on oil’ until Abuja undertakes serious measures that would address the socio-economic needs of the Niger Delta populations.

The amnesty deal and its implementation revive the debate about the type of leadership suitable for Africa’s development as a continent. Does Africa need a theoretical leadership concerned with the blind application of ideals or a more practical leadership that only strives to address the needs of the people? The latter would seem more appealing to most Africans as they are more concerned with practical and sometimes even basic problems of human security.