Mauritania: What Way Out of the Political Crisis in the Country?
blurb:isstoday:160309mauritania
16 March 2009: Mauritania: What Way Out of the Political Crisis in the Country?
The Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, newly appointed chair of the African Union (AU), has been asked to mediate in the current political and constitutional crisis in Mauritania.
Gaddafi was asked to step in by the International Consultative Group on Mauritania, set up by the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) to try and resolve the crisis that emanated from the military coup in this country in August 2008.
At the time, the unconstitutional change of government in Mauritania was condemned by almost all the major external partners of Mauritania, particularly the AU, the United Nations, the Arab League, the European Union, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Organisation of Francophone States (OIF). In an unprecedented move, following a number of visits to Mauritania by the Chairperson of its Commission and the Commissioner for Peace and Security, the AU set up the International Consultative Group on Mauritania composed of all these partners in order for them to take coordinated and harmonised positions in their efforts to ensure the return of the country to constitutional order.
Eventually, in the face of the growing international pressure, the military junta promised to release the ousted President Sidi Mohamed Ould Cheick Abdallahi from house arrest by 24 December 2008. Indeed, the President was released according to this promise. It would seem, however, in light of some of his media interviews, that President Abdallahi does not enjoy all the rights that a genuine release as requested by the AU would entail.
In the period between 27 December 2008 and 6 January 2009, the junta and its civilian supporters organised what they called États généraux de la Démocratie, or national consultation on democracy, ostensibly aimed at reflecting on the best ways of restoring constitutional order. This meeting ended with a number of recommendations, including the holding of new presidential elections on 6 June 2009. But in contrast to one of the demands of the AU, these recommendations did not prohibit the candidature of members of the junta to these elections. In fact, in an interview aired on the Francophone Television channel TV5 in late January 2009, General Mohamed Ould Abdelaziz, the head of the junta, opined that there was nothing that could prevent him from being a candidate if the people wanted him to be.
Following a meeting on 28 January 2009 in Addis Ababa, the AU and its partners in the International Consultative Group on Mauritania rightly noted “that the initiative known as the Etats généraux de la Démocratie […] was not attended by all the political forces in Mauritania and that its conclusions did not meet the requirements of the international community regarding the return to constitutional order through a consensual process.”
Already in December 2008, the PSC had decided: “to impose targeted sanctions against all those, both civilian and military, whose activities are designed to maintain the unconstitutional status quo in Mauritania, if, by 5 February 2009, constitutional order is not restored, and to seize the UN Security Council to confer a universal character on these measures.” It is clear that the PSC realised that despite several high level meetings and consultations between the AU and its partners on the one hand, and the military junta on the other, there had not been any meaningful progress by the junta in the direction of restoring constitutional order, as requested by the AU.
Finally, as per the Lomé Declaration of July 2000, the Council decided to impose targeted sanctions against the military junta and anyone associated with it in maintaining the unconstitutional order. But in its determination to still work towards finding a consensual solution, the International Consultative Group appointed Gaddafi on 20 February 2009 to mediate between the Mauritanian parties with the aim of finding such a consensual solution to the political and constitutional crisis in that country.
According to the Mauritanian (Le Calame, 4 March) and Libyan (Al-Fajr Al-Jadeed, 9 March) papers and other media, Gaddafi has since the beginning of March held talks in Tripoli with the leader of the military junta in Mauritania, a delegation from the coalition of political parties and movements that support the ousted president and President Abdallahi himself over the weekend of 7-8 March. He discussed with all his guests the various scenarios susceptible to resolve the crisis. Gaddafi himself arrived in the Mauritanian capital, Nouakchott on Monday, 9 March, to continue with the discussions (Al-Fajr Al-Jadeed, 10 March).
There are currently four proposals or possibilities to resolve the crisis, but none of them seems to have been endorsed by all concerned.
The first and best-case scenario is to return to the status quo ante; that is for President Abdallahi to be reinstated in his functions and continue serving his mandate. This is clearly the ideal solution which will be a strict respect of the constitutional order as requested by the AU and will send a strong signal to the military junta in nearby Guinea-Conakry that gone are the days of tolerated military rule on the continent. But the military junta in Nouakchott does not seem in a mood to countenance this option.
The second scenario is for the ousted President to be reinstated and then organise anticipated presidential elections that will be open to all. He would be leading a transitional government in this case, as he has himself offered in several interviews. While this option falls short of the ideal one, it would nevertheless constitute a respect of constitutional order and the authority of the AU. But here again, the military junta has not sanctioned this proposal and seem not to be very keen on it.
The third option proposed by the junta itself, according to Le Calame (4 March), is for them to leave power and commit to return to the barracks. This will then be followed by a theoretical recognition of the constitutional legitimacy of the ousted president, for he would have to immediately tender his formal resignation to pave the way for new elections, the winner of which will serve only one term. While this constitutes a concession by the junta in light of their earlier positions, this option not only falls short of a proper respect of the constitutional order, but it has at least two grey areas. For one, it does not say who will lead the country following these two hypothetically induced resignations and before the organization of the elections. It is also silent about whether or not the ousted president can stand for these elections.
The role of the AU mediator is now to get the Mauritanian parties, particularly the junta, to make more concessions with the view to breaking the political impasse and returning the country to a legitimate political order. Failure to do this will lead to the fourth scenario, which is the maintenance of the post-coup status quo with incommensurable consequences for the country given the AU sanctions.
Issaka Souaré, Researcher, African Security Analysis Programme, ISS Tshwane (Pretoria)
