24 January 2008: Manhasset Spirit Fading in Western Sahara

For the third time in less than a year Morocco and the Polisario Front met across the negotiating tables with the aim of reaching a mutually acceptable agreement on the question of Western Sahara. The talks were first held on 7th and 8th January in Manhasset, a suburb of New York City. Neighbouring countries Algeria and Mauritania, also attended the talks as interested parties. They were present at the opening and closing sessions and consulted separately during the discussions. The second and third rounds of talks took place respectively on 18-19 June and 10-11 August 2007, both under the auspices of Peter van Walsum, the UN Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy.

The talks focused on implementing Security Council resolution 1754 (30 April 2007) and resolution 1783 (31 October 2007) in which the Council called on the parties to engage in “substantive” negotiations without preconditions and in good faith to achieve a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution. But, as in previous talks, the final communiqué read by Mr Walsum at the end of this third round stated that “the Parties continued to express strong differences on the fundamental questions at stake.” At the heart of those differences is the fact that Morocco holds that its sovereignty over Western Sahara should be recognised, while the Polisario Front insists the territory’s final status should be decided in a referendum that offers the voters the choice of independence.

The crisis over Western Sahara started in the early 1970s, when Spain was forced to announce plans to withdraw from the territory it had effectively occupied since 1934. But when Spain withdrew from the territory in February 1976, the Kingdom of Morocco, which lies to the north, and Mauritania, located to the east and south of the territory, sent troops to occupy parts of what was then called ‘Spanish Sahara’, with the lion’s share going to Morocco.

Both Morocco and Mauritania lodged claims to those parts of the territory they had occupied, considering them to have been part of their countries well before the Spanish occupation. Some argue, however, that Mauritania’s occupation of parts of the ‘Spanish Sahara’ was a strategic move to shield itself from Moroccan claims to parts of its own national territory.

About three years before the departure of Spain, a local resistance movement had been formed to fight Spanish colonialism, namely the Frente Popular para la liberaciόn de Saguia el-Hamra y Río de Oro (the Popular front for the liberation of the Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro, more commonly known as the Polisario Front). Thus, along with the territory, the two claimants also inherited this resistance movement, which turned its guerrilla war against them. The Polisario Front also escorting a significant number of the Sahrawi population into exile in Algeria, whose government provided it with open support. In 1979 Mauritania withdrew from its sections of the territory after suffering heavy losses in the guerrilla war. Morocco, however, has held on to the territory to the present day, and the government of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), which was unilaterally proclaimed by the Polisario Front a few days after the Moroccan occupation in February 1976, lives in exile in Sahrawi refugee camps in the Tindouf areas in Western Algeria and in a tiny area inside Western Sahara itself.

Today, Morocco is in control of most of the territory and is virtually assured of the support of at least two permanent members of the UN Security Council, namely France and the US, a considerable advantage. On the other hand, the Polisario Front remains determined to assert control over what it considers ancestral land, and believes that all relevant international instruments have vindicated this claim.

In a document sent to the UN Secretary-General on 11 April 2007, Morocco proposes autonomous status for Western Sahara within the framework of Moroccan sovereignty. In a major shift from all previous proposals, Morocco suggests that the autonomy status be final, thereby ruling out any possibility of ‘self-determination’ for the Sahrawi people. From Morocco’s standpoint, the autonomous status would enhance the territorial stability of the states of the region. The possibility of a referendum is not ruled out, but this will be limited to voting on only one question, namely whether or not to accept autonomy as a final solution to the conflict.

Only a day before Morocco sent its final proposal, the Polisario Front submitted its proposal in which it maintains that the solution to the conflict lies only in holding a referendum on self-determination, allowing the voters to choose between independence, integration with Morocco, and self-governance or autonomy.

What follows from this is that, though the two parties yet again reiterated their commitment to show political will and negotiate in good faith when they meet again in March, there is an urgent need for them to move the process into a more intensive and substantive phase of negotiations, as called for by Resolution 1783.

Considering the history of the crisis and the positions taken by both parties over the years, one may argue that concessions are possible from both sides, but only if they realise or are led to realise that the issue at hand is both legal and political and that insisting on one aspect of this at the expense of the other may not be in anyone’s favour.

What is now required is for both sides to strive to make an objective and critical analysis of the situation and the realities on the ground, and in that light seek a way forward from the current situation. One may suggest that in order for any mediation to have a realistic chance of success, it should be conducted in utmost confidentiality. Will the Manhasset talks achieve this aim? That will depend pretty much on the strategies the UN mediators will adopt and, most importantly, the commitment of the two parties to engage in serious and bona fide peace negotiations.

Issaka K Souaré, African Security Analysis Programme, ISS Tshwane (Pretoria)