Mandates and Operational Lacunas in Darfur
blurb:isstoday:06032008darfur
6 March 2008: Mandates and Operational Lacunas in Darfur
February 2008 saw the United Nations embark on what appears to be a media offensive aiming at putting the challenges facing the African Union-United Nations Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) firmly on the Security Council’s agenda. In a press briefing the Security Council’s President, Panama’s Ricardo Alberto Arias, emphasised the strategy of dealing with the debacle of UNAMID in a public debate rather than through consultations. The question to ask therefore is this: why has the United Nations found it necessary to embark on a public offensive, as opposed to the ‘secret talks’ that had been taking place between the Government of Sudan and the Secretary General?
The clear answer lies in the admission of the United Nations that ‘although the mission [UNAMID] is now in operation in Darfur…many outstanding issues remain between UNAMID and the Government of Sudan.’
Perhaps it is this media offensive that has resulted in the increased international pressure that led to the signing of the Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) last month. If that was the case, then it is arguable that public discourse on devastating conflicts like the one in Darfur yields greater dividends than secret talks.
Technically speaking, the SOFA establishes the legal basis for the existence, deployment, and operations of UNAMID. This is critical in a Sudan whose Government has, from the onset of the conflict in 2003/2004, strongly asserted the country’s sovereignty over Darfur and its right to set the course of the war with the rebels. The SOFA is also significant for the reported large scale freedom of movement the agreement provides for UNAMID. Without a doubt, the whole operation of UNAMID will be thrown into jeopardy if the mission is not accorded such unhindered movement and access.
Beyond such legalities, however, it remains to be seen whether the parties to the conflict, notably the Government of Sudan, will be faithful to the agreement. All the indications are that the worst is yet to come. The international community will be wise to keep a close eye on the Darfur situation. The complexity of the Darfur conflict has been thrown into sharp relief by the stalled peace implementation in the south and by the escalating proxy cross-border engagements on the Chadian-Sudan border.
All this deepens concerns over the UN’s slow progress on force generation. Even though it is true that force generation in many missions, including the one in the south, took some time to gain critical mass, the humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur underscores the urgency of timely and effective operations. The lack of substantial numbers of personnel, both military and police (including formed police units) is worrying enough. But the lack of helicopter assets is even more worrisome.
Considering the vastness of Darfur’s terrain and the poor communications infrastructure in the area of UNAMID’s operational responsibility, helicopters are critical in creating the capability for communications, mobility and logistical support.
The difficulty of obtaining such critical assets underscores how unrealistic the international community was at the inception of the hybrid operation. At that time it was expected that the developed world would be able to provide, in short order, the necessary equipment and other assets as part of the United Nation’s Heavy Support package, while the African Union would be responsible for giving the operation an ‘African character’. This African character was understood to include the mission leadership and a preponderance of African peacekeepers. However, little thought was given to the existing commitments of traditional African peacekeeping states.
It is obvious that the proponents of the hybrid operation have helped to place the African Union in a predicament. Regionalisation and hybridisation demand the commitment of capabilities that are either not in existence among African security forces or are not readily available. This predicament has resulted in a scramble to ‘rebuild’ African military capabilities, in order to enable Africa to be able to mind its own dirty business of incessant conflicts that arise from bad governance, the absence of the rule of law, and a lack of respect for human rights. Ironically, these and other root and structural causes of conflicts in Africa are not receiving the urgent and serious attention they so clearly demand.
In the interim the hybrid operation will have to grapple with the reality that its helicopter assets are now to be provided by a conglomeration of contributing countries, as reported by the Darfur Consortium in its Press Release of 8 February 2008. It is reported that Ethiopia will be committing three attack and two transport helicopters, while Bangladesh will also commit helicopters of an as-yet unknown quantity and type. The contribution of assets from multiple countries has implications for maintenance, as well as operational doctrine. This contrasts with what may be argued as best practice as seen in such missions as the United Nations Mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which was for a significant period supported by single nation helicopter squadrons provided by Italy.
The right lessons need to be learned from the Darfur experiment. If there is any indication that this experimentation will in the long run prove fatally difficult in light of the political dynamics of the Darfur conflict, the international community should exercise the moral courage necessary to review that course of action, rather than blindly adhere to one fraught with insurmountable challenges.
Festus Aboagye, Head: Training for Peace Programme, ISS Tshwane (Pretoria)
