Madagascar: What Now?
blurb:isstoday:190309madagascar
19 March 2009: Madagascar: What Now?
On Tuesday 17 March, President Marc Ravalomanana of Madagascar announced his resignation and said that he would be handing over power to a military directorate. Soon after this announcement, the military officers who had seized one of the presidential palaces the previous day declared Andry Rajoelina, former mayor of Antananarivo, “president” of Madagascar. They declined Ravalomanana’s suggestion that a directorate made up of military officers take control of the State. This was the culmination of a three-month long standstill between Ravalomanana and Rajoelina that started in December 2008.
Given the circumstances in which it took place and the apparent failure of mediation efforts, questions are being raised about whether or not Rajoelina’s coming to power constitutes a military coup d’état or an unconstitutional change of government”; whether the former mayor were in some way encouraged by the manner in which his rival had first come to power in January 2001; and what actions should the African Union (AU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) take to transform the situation into one that serves the greater good of the Malgasy society.
With regard to the question as to whether or not what happened in Madagascar constitutes an “unconstitutional change of government” (UCG), it should be established whether Rajoelina’s taking over power was done through constitutional means. First, it is clear that it was not done through an electoral process, which is the principal constitutional channel by which leaders of all democratic countries come to power. Article 45 of the August 1992 Constitution of Madagascar stipules that the “President of the Republic shall be elected by universal direct suffrage”. Rajoelina was not, nor could he have been elected, given that he is only 34 years of age, which is six years short of the minimum 40-year bar required from presidential candidates according to Article 46(1) of the same Constitution.
With regard to the succession of the Head of State when he resigns – as Ravalomanana did on 17 March – or becomes incapacitated, Article 52(1) of the Constitution provides that in such cases “the duties of the President of the Republic shall be temporarily exercised by the President of the Senate” until the holding of new elections. This renders even “unconstitutional” Ravalomana’s own suggestion that a directorate of military officers succeeds him. This can be understood as a desperate attempt by him to deny his rival, Rajoelina, any possibility to claim victory. In any case, the military officers turned down this offer and rallied behind Rajoelina. This makes the whole operation nothing but an “unconstitutional change of government”, as defined by the July 2000 Lomé Declaration of the Organisation of African Unity/African Union (AU) on UCG.
Regarding the question of Rajoelina being inspired by his rival’s 2002 precedent and, thus, the possibility of his “victory” inspiring others in the future, this is a very plausible scenario, yet one would be unable to establish that with absolute certainty. It should be recalled that Ravalomanana forced his way into power in January 2002 after a dispute over the results of the first round of the December 2001 presidential elections between himself and the then incumbent President Didier Ratsiraka. The official results of this poll gave Ratsiraka 40,89 percent of the votes, against 46,2 percent for Ravalomanana, which made a run-off election inevitable. A few days after the election, however, the opposition leader and his supporters claimed that he had won outright according to their independent tally of the votes. Ravalomanana was then unilaterally declared President by his supporters.
Although the AU initially refused to recognise his self-proclaimed government, having concluded that he had come to power through unconstitutional means, he was finally accepted in the fold after he organized legislative elections in December 2002, which was considered to have met AU requirements. It is highly possibly that Rajoelina had this in mind when he called for the resignation of Ravalomanana based on claims that his rival was a “dictator”, “flouting democracy and the rule of law, and abusing his position as president to further his business interests”.
The way Ravalomanana was eventually accepted clearly points to a shortcoming in the Lomé Declaration or, at the very least, its “inconsistent” application on the ground. While the AU in the past had barred a number of coup leaders from being candidates in the elections that paved the way to the return to constitutional order (i.e. Mauritania, 2005 and 2008; Guinea, 2008); others were tolerated after organising fresh elections in which they took part and “won”, as it happened with Ravalomanana in 2002; Francois Bozizié in the Central African Republic in 2005; and Faure Gnassingbe in Togo in 2005. One would suggest that all coup plotters be barred from standing in elections that they organise to avoid such cases in future.
The recent coup in Madagascar shows that there has been a drastic realignment of political forces and new political dynamics in the country since the outbreak of the crisis in December 2008.
As far as the attempted mediation is concerned: the AU, the Southern African Development Community and the IOC, initially apparently failed to have any success. It is worth pointing out, however, that following the killing of over 28 opposition protesters – supporting Rajoelina – on 7 February by some elements of the state security forces in what is now known as “Red Saturday”, the international community realised that the political crisis in Madagascar had reached boiling point and that the only solution would be mediated negotiations. Both Ravalomanana and Rajoelina had repeatedly agreed to talks on the basis that Haile Menkerios, the United Nations Under-Secretary for Political Affairs, would mediate. However, they both showed little consideration to compromise. Envoys from the AU, the IOC, the Organisation of Francophone Countries (OIF), the influential Madagascan Christian Council of Churches (FFKM) and individual countries such as France and Senegal all attempted to broker talks between the rivals. It can be argued that the failure of international and local actors to successfully bring the rivals to the table is what ultimately led to the coup d’etat.
The fact that there had been a myriad of mediators or potential mediators in the country was problematic because they lacked coordination, and none of them seemed to have deemed it necessary to take the lead in coordinating their efforts and harmonising their proposals - something that is critical for any successful mediation. One could argue that the onus was evidently on the AU, SADC and the IOC to take the lead on this. It was not until the emergency meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council on 16 March that any steps towards a proper united position were taken. This unfortunately came too late, given that soon after the AU announced that it had resolved to support the Ravalomanana administration in ensuring peace and constitutional democracy in the country, the army seized the central presidential palace and the country’s Reserve Bank, declaring that they were doing so in the interests of the nation.
The volatile political situation in the country had already adversely affected Madagascar’s tourism sector, which is the country’s main source of income. Now that Rajoelina has come to power unconstitutionally - albeit on a wave of popular support - and says that his government will be in power for 24 months before organising elections, this presents the AU with yet another dilemma.
Ottilia A Maunganidze, Intern, African Security Analysis Programme, ISS Tshwane (Pretoria)
