Is a Military Coup an Answer to the Political Crisis in Mauritania?
blurb:isstoday:150808mauritania
15 August 2008: Is a Military Coup an Answer to the Political Crisis in Mauritania?
"We want to prevent Mauritania from falling into a vicious cycle, where the crisis deepens and the international community is compelled to take steps that would be unfortunate for the lives and for the future of the Mauritanian people."- Ramtane Lamamra, African Union Commissioner for Peace and Security.
The military coup that took place in Mauritania on the 6th of August, just a few months after the first democratic elections since independence in 1960, highlighted once again the danger that the army still poses for political stability in Africa. It also emphasised the fragility of the democratic consensus reached with the elections, which took place without infusing the institutions with values and without creating the capacity for their adequate functioning. Though the elections ushered in a new political dispensation after a two-year transition that laid the foundations for a fresh democratic experiment, mechanisms put in place to address conflicts between the existing political institutions appear rather weak or non-existent. The majority of the citizens in Mauritania enthusiastically embraced the democratic process and were hoping for the elected elite’s robust response to some of the socio-economic problems affecting them, but the elite failed to use this opportunity to show coherent leadership and give substance to the vision of a democratically governed and socially cohesive Mauritania.
For some, the coup was predictable, with the overwhelming presence of the army in Mauritanian political life and the accumulated frustrations dating back to the 2005 coup. Mauritania, throughout its political trajectory, has also experienced a number of military or authoritarian regimes - from Moktar Ould Daddah (1960-1978), Mustafa Ould Salek’s military junta (1978-84) to Maaouya Ould Sid' Ahmed Taya (1984) who ruled the country until he was deposed in the coup on the 3rd August 2005. Many Mauritanians, notably the black African population would still remember Ould Taya’s repressive, brutal responses to the numerous imaginary coups and plots of which they were frequently accused. Some were persecuted and even sentenced to death without a fair trial - to the extent that Ould Taya’s destitution in 2005 was seen as a relief and the beginning of a new era in the country.
The political crisis that led to the current army’s intervention stemmed from the vote of no confidence in the two-month old government of Prime Minister Yahya Ould Ahmed el-Wagf passed by the parliament in July. Earlier on, the president dismissed the entire government amid protests over food price hikes (Mauritania imports over 70% of its food). The cabinet that replaced it was marred by instability and failed to gain the support of members of the ruling political coalition and a major opposition group that were in the former government. The president had even threatened to dissolve parliament after MPs filed a motion of no confidence in his new cabinet. This resulted in an institutional crisis that threatened the survival of the nascent democratic consensus but also brought to the fore the poor leadership ability of the elected president Sidi Mohamed Ould el-Cheikh Abdellahi. His move to forge alliances with former members of the deposed Ould Taya’s dictatorial regime was perceived as a violation of the post-transition political arrangements. In addition to the already volatile and tense political environment, it was the decision to sack the entire military leadership including his chief-of-staff that caused his political misfortune. The MPs who distanced themselves from the government they brought to power, criticised President Abdallahi's exercise of personal power and his failure to deliver on the expectations of the people of Mauritania.
A few days after the military coup, the junta seems to be consolidating its grip on power. With the establishment of a State Council (Haut Conseil d’Etat) and the appointment of new military leaders in the army, the junta is unlikely to hand over power and restore the democratic order any time soon. It has been reported that the prime minister and other government officials have been released but President Sidi Mohamed Ould el-Cheikh Abdellahi remains in custody for “national security reasons.” In the meantime, meetings between the coup leader General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz and leaders from the AU, Arab League, the UN as well as the donor community have only resulted in ceremonial condemnation without any clear indication of what the future holds for the democratic process in Mauritania. While the AU maintains that the country is suspended from the organisation, there is no guarantee of a quick return to the democratic order.
As soon as he was released, the former Prime Minister Yahya Ould Ahmed Waghf attended a mass meeting where he condemned the military and called for the return of constitutional order. Meanwhile, members of parliament expressed support for the military junta arguing that the former president was leading the country to instability and war. These statements came as no surprise given the fact that the majority of the MPs had withdrawn their support for the government just a few days prior to the coup. The walkout by 25 MPs and 23 senators from the ruling National Pact for Democracy and Development (PNDD) was a new blow to the collapsing government and to President Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi own legitimacy.
The question is, what next? Will the junta plan another election? Who will be the candidates? Do Mauritania’s coffers have enough resources to institute fresh elections? France, the US, Germany and Spain have made it clear that they are opposed to a unilateral planning of any subsequent elections. Moreover, it is still unclear whether the military regime will follow the example set by Ould Vall, the leader of the 2005 coup. The political future of Mauritania looks bleak and the restoration of the democratic order will need more than public declarations.
As African countries strive to end the perennial conflicts and establish political systems that are accountable and people-driven, it is imperative that the political elite gives democracy its true meaning rather than tailoring it to suit their own interests or simply trivialise it as alien to African realities. Political instability remains one of the biggest impediments to African socio-economic recovery and the improvement of the living conditions of the citizens. Instead of appearing as a threat to national peace and stability or a symbol of fear and a source of discomfort for politicians, the army will also have to be reoriented towards a more productive role in the consolidation of a socio-political order that is representative of the will of the people and the consolidation of the state institutions.
From this political crisis in Mauritania, a number of lessons can be learnt that could be relevant for preventing future political crises. Although legitimised by the elections, poor leadership can lead to political turmoil. In the process of the transition, the reform of the army was neglected making the military a perpetual prominent feature of Mauritania’s national politics. This aspect deserves attention to strengthen the national democratic polity in Mauritania. The reform of the whole security sector and the existence of effective oversight mechanisms are crucial for the survival of a post-transition political order. Also, the discovery of oil in Mauritania in 2002 has complicated the situation. It is estimated that since 2006 Mauritania has been generating revenues of more than US $340 million annually from oil production. Even if the economy has been performing well, the redistribution of the revenue is still uneven with more than 46 percent of the citizens living below the poverty line. Two decades of economic reforms with high inflows of development assistance have failed to generate sustainable growth, mainly because of profound institutional shortcomings. It is likely that the prospects of oil exploitation and production have caused some greed within the current political elites. This too requires attention. Finally, the AU action should not be limited to a mere condemnation of the coup and the sending of a fact-finding mission to Mauritania. The continental organisation ought to be more vigorous in its approach to unconstitutional regimes to pre-empt a façade reconversion of the junta as we have witnessed in Togo and elsewhere.
David Zounmenou, African Security Analysis Programme, ISS Tshwane (Pretoria)
