Institutionalising the AU Sanctions
In February 2010, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) imposed sanctions on Niger following the military coup that overthrew President Mamadou Tandja. The sanctions included the suspension of Niger`s membership in keeping with the AU`s recent commitment made at its last Summit, in February 2010. The PSC Protocol does not define the term “sanctions†and it does not define the form of sanctions that could be imposed in different scenarios. However, the Lóme Declaration on the Unconstitutional Change of Government of 2000 list a potential range of sanctions from the suspension of membership; interruption of economic relations and communications and targeted flight restrictions on a political or military leadership.
Hallelujah Lulie, Junior Researcher, Peace and security Council Report Program, Addis Ababa
In On February 2010, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) imposed sanctions on Niger following the military coup that overthrew President Mamadou Tandja. The sanctions included the suspension of Niger`s membership in keeping with the AU`s recent commitment made at its last Summit, in February 2010. The PSC Protocol does not define the term “sanctions” and it does not define the form of sanctions that could be imposed in different scenarios. However, the Lóme Declaration on the Unconstitutional Change of Government of 2000 list a potential range of sanctions from the suspension of membership; interruption of economic relations and communications and targeted flight restrictions on a political or military leadership.
International sanctions are often seen as the last resort to address acts that contravene pre-established principles and norms of political behaviour. The deployment of sanctions gained momentum at the end of the Cold War as a tool to bring governments to alter their behaviour and a particular choice of action. However, the effectiveness of the sanctions which have historically been imposed, especially on African countries, by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) have been questioned due to lack of a proper research and monitoring mechanisms to implement them, and their effects in terms of the humanitarian crises and collective punishment they generate. Subsequent to its institutional transformation from the Organization for African Unity (OAU) to African Union (AU) in 2002, the continental body has undergone structural and operational transformation. The AU has adopted a much more interventionist stance than the OAU in terms of how it addresses crises on the continent. Article 7(g) of the PSC Protocol, of 2002, based on the Lomé Declaration, mandates the Council to institute and impose sanctions whenever an unconstitutional change of Government takes place within a Member State.
The AU PSC has issued a series of sanctions against Togo, the Comoros, Mauritania and recently on Guinea and Niger. These sanctions have been met with mixed results in terms oversight, monitoring and the verification of implementation. For sanctions to be effective they require a robust pre-assessment and monitoring of their socio-political consequences and their potential effect on the concrete economic, political and social dynamics in the target country. The imprecise design of sanctions can fuel negative perceptions about the imposing entity and the lack of proper regular monitoring of sanctions could even entrench particular regimes.
The PSC is mandated by article 8(5) of the Protocol to establish subsidiary bodies when necessary for the performance of its functions which also includes structures like the sanctions committee. The AU has decided to create a Committee on Sanctions. Ideally, this should be buttressed by the creation of a permanent unit within the AU to support the work of all the sanctions committees and a monitoring body whose functions would include providing substantive advice and analysis, obtaining and collating information, or coordinating field visits. However, additional components need to be enumerated including the structure, composition membership and more of the proposed regime.
The proposed committee will carry out a pre-assessment study on the impact of proposed sanctions; seek information from AU Member States on assortment of actions taken by them to implement and enforce sanctions; conduct regular assessments and based on findings, recommend to the PSC, AU and other legitimate bodies the steps and strategies to be taken with a view to increase the effectiveness of sanctions and offer recommendations deemed appropriate in response to violations. It will also recommend to lift or harden sanctions. The regime will also brief new members of the committee and retain institutional memory.
The regime mainly requires a technical preparedness and capacity to design the methodology of the sanctions committee and its infrastructure in addition to the political leverage and backing of such a committee to act quickly, evenhandedly and consistently by member states of the AU and other institutions. In the absence of these two conditions it will only be symbolic gestures. Existence of leverage of the AU will be a prominent factor in the proper functioning of the regime. The leverage is mainly manifested by the unflinching support of Member States for the values and institutional actions of the AU. The working relations between the PSC of the AU and the UNSC, the bigger international community and institutions like the EU, Interpo and the World Bank, as well as other international diplomatic, financial and intelligence institutions will also be vital. To get international support it is also believed that the AU should show support for and cooperate with sanctions imposed by the international community.
Sanctions should always strive to serve their intended purpose effectively. Understanding the importance of sanctions for the process of maintaining and upholding compliance of the decisions of the AU cannot be over-stated. The PSC therefore needs to further enumerate and discuss the rationale, structure, mandate, size, membership and selection procedures and operational and reporting frameworks of the sanctions regime that remains a work-in-progress.
